ANIMAL

Claus Carstensen
Jens Tang Kristensen
Thea Rydal Jørgensen



BECOMING ANIMAL

AS FOR HUMANS, GOD TESTS THEM SO THAT THEY MAY SEE THAT THEY ARE LIKE THE ANIMALS. SURELY THE FATE OF HUMAN BEINGS IS LIKE THAT OF THE ANIMALS; THE SAME FATE AWAITS THEM BOTH: AS ONE DIES, SO DIES THE OTHER. ALL HAVE THE SAME BREATH; HUMANS HAVE NO ADVANTAGE OVER ANIMALS. EVERYTHING IS MEANINGLESS.

ECCLESIASTES
CHAPTER 3, VERSES 18-19

THE REACTIONARY ATTEMPT TO TURN TECHNICALLY DETERMINED FORMS, THAT IS: DEPENDENT VARIABLES, INTO CONSTANTS APPEARS IN FUTURISM IN MUCH THE SAME WAY AS IN JUGENDSTIL.

WALTER BENJAMIN
CENTRAL PARK

G

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BECOMING ANIMAL

FOREWORD

Kirse Junge-Stevnsborg
Christine Løventoft

Den Frie Centre of Contemporary Art and the Museum of Religious Art are proud to present the publication *Becoming Animal*, based on the exhibition project of the same name. The publication has been developed in a close and unique collaboration between Den Frie Centre of Contemporary Art in Copenhagen, the Museum of Religious Art in Lemvig, the artist and curator Claus Carstensen and postdoctoral fellow Jens Tang Kristensen from the Department of Arts and Cultural Studies at the University of Copenhagen.

The publication is a manifestation of Carstensen's long-term research into attempts to explain human existence in art history. Focusing on the concepts of becoming-animal, transcendence and the void as form, which have largely been neglected in the field, the project aims to provide a significant contribution to the existential dimensions of art of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

What world orders have been established and depicted? What ideas do we use to distinguish ourselves from animals? In what ways can art contribute new perspectives on our existence? With questions like these, the project sets its sights on the impact and impressions of empty transcendence in art, addressing our relationship to religion, faith, knowledge and cognition.

The images and artworks in the publication represent a unique tour de force in the thinking of Carstensen. Artworks are juxtaposed, intersected and opposed in an alternative art history generated by Carstensen's perspective as an artist. The works represent a range of 'isms'—manifestations and periods of art history—but are related to each other independently of time and place.

The sheer number of artworks testifies to the vast amount of work behind the project, a simultaneously structured yet wide-ranging visual torrent of art ranging from Francisco de Goya's prints from the late eighteenth century, to the minimalist paintings of Gardar Eide Einarsson. Driven by curiosity and questioning human existence, Carstensen bases his work on theoretical as well as religious concepts, exploring the field of tension between dichotomies like life and death, Symbolism, Minimalism and humans and animals.

The publication is research based, with eight peer-reviewed articles by leading scholars in the field. With the support of the New Carlsberg Foundation, post-doctoral fellow Jens Tang Kristensen has based his editorial approach to the publication on a range of theorists applying different approaches to the core concepts of the exhibition in new art historical contexts.

It has been deeply fascinating to be part of a project where Carstensen's concept has uncompromisingly determined the method, syntax and layout of an exhibition guided entirely by visuality and the gaze. The artist-curator has retained an unerring focus on the meanings generated in the gaps, transitions and shifts in scale between the works, which form the essence of the project and function as the guiding principle behind the selection and presentation of the works.

As cultural institutions, we have different points of departure for our commitment to the project. The Museum of Religious Art operates at the intersection of art and religion, with a focus on art's exploration of existential concepts, whereas Den Frie Centre of Contemporary Art has a stronger focus on the view of artists and alternative curatorial approaches.

We would like to express our immense thanks to the editors of the publication, Claus Carstensen, Jens Tang Kristensen and Thea Rydal Jørgensen, for the dedication and tenacity they have shown in making this publication possible. Special thanks to Carstensen for presenting us with a dauntless, pioneering project, and allowing us to provide a framework for the culmination of so many years' work. We would also like to thank all the authors, peer reviewers and translator Jane Rowley, none of whom the project would have been possible without. Equally warm thanks go to graphic designer Albino Tavares and copy-editor Phoebe Colley.

We would like to express our gratitude to all the museums, galleries and private collectors who have made works available for the exhibition and publication, as well as the many people who have helped in liaising with galleries, private collectors and museums, as well as with coordination and fundraising—including Marie Emilie Olesen, Freja Sigsgaard-Hansen, Silke Calmer Dinesen and Anna Weile Kjær.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the many foundations that have generously supported the project: A.P. Møller and Hustru Chastine Mc-Kinney Møller's Foundation, the Bikuben Foundation, the Oticon Foundation, the 15. Juni Fonden, the Knud Højgaard Foundation, the New Carlsberg Foundation, the Danish Tennis Foundation, Konsul George Jorck and Hustru Emma Jorck's Foundation, the City of Copenhagen, the Danish Arts Foundation and Overretssagfører L. Zeuthens Mindelegat. Our thanks equally go to our collaborators MTAB Fine Art Shipping, Country Manager, Jørgen Jul Jensen, and Rammeværkstedet v/ Klaus Gråe.

Kirse Junge-Stevnsborg
Artistic Director, Den Frie Centre of Contemporary Art

Christine Løventoft
Museum Director, the Museum of Religious Art

CENSUS
BODY COUNT

Claus Carstensen

As for humans, God tests them so that they may see that they are like the animals.
Surely the fate of human beings is like that of the animals; the same fate awaits them both: As one dies, so dies the other. All have the same breath; humans have no advantage over animals. Everything is meaningless.
Ecclesiastes, 3:18–19

It can be difficult to define exactly when ideas arise. And even more difficult to identify when they start to take shape, coalesce and materialise, like *Becoming Animal*—both this publication and the exhibition of the same name. Maybe the embryo of the book can be found in a letter written in November 1987 to Asger Liebst, my editor at the time, when I suggested that Borgen Press publish an anthology on death, power and representation entitled *Beyond Aesthetics—Essays on Art*, which in content and title had an affinity with Freud's essay *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Unfortunately the anthology was never produced.

Three decades is a long time for an idea to take shape—paradoxically or perhaps symptomatically for a book and exhibition dealing with death and time. In real life, the impetus was two funerals.

In March 2006 I was on the night train to Cologne on my way to the funeral of a friend who had committed suicide. As I was falling asleep, I started to think about how many of my contemporaries—friends, schoolmates, fellow students at the art academy and close acquaintances—had died at a young age. Most of them did not make it to 30. It did not bear thinking about. I counted 35. Cancer, brain haemorrhages, AIDS, substance abuse, suicide, traffic accidents, involuntary manslaughter and a death shrouded in mystery. It was horrifying and totally overwhelming. Three died at primary school age, four in high school and another four during their time at the art academy. The 80s and 90s were especially fatal, maybe because of the ruthless scene we were part of.

The funeral the next day was held by a Jesuit priest, who read the following quote from Arthur Schopenhauer, which my friend had chosen as his last words:

> **In the case of the animal, it is obviously exactly the same. The process of nourishment is a constant generation; the process of generation is a higher power of nourishment. The pleasure that accompanies procreation is a higher power of the agreeableness of the feeling of life. On the other hand, excretion, the constant exhalation and throwing off of matter, is the same as what at a higher power is death, namely the opposite of procreation. Now, if here we are always content to retain the form without lamenting the discarded matter, we must behave in the same way when in death the same thing happens at a higher potential and to the whole, as occurs every day and hour in a partial way with excretion. Just as we are indifferent to the one, so we should not recoil at the other.**[1]

I'd never heard it spoken so directly, intensely and ruthlessly in a church. The same goes for the lines from *Ecclesiastes* that open this foreword, which I read for the first time at yet another funeral in April two years later.

These quotes became the lens that gathered and framed an exhibition I was asked to curate at the Tom Christoffersen Gallery in Copenhagen in 2010, set to be held in December 2011 with the lines from *Ecclesiastes* as its title. The exhibition ended up not being realised, because the material it included had become so vast that it would have taken a whole museum to show it.

Coincidentally, in 2014—and entirely independently of each other—I was asked by then-director of the Museum of Religious Art, Gerd Rathje, and director of Den Frie Centre of Contemporary Art, Kirse Junge-Stevnsborg, to curate an exhibition for both. I suggested the concept that is now *Becoming Animal* and also suggested a collaborative exhibition at both venues, accompanied by a publication that could stand as an independent anthology and visual essay rather than a standard catalogue.

'Becoming-animal' is a dual anthropological concept in which the active *modus operandi* determines the passive and vice versa, addressing culture, the emergence of consciousness, self-awareness and the specifically human at different levels. Existential psychology refers to four basic conditions for human existence that confront us during the course of a lifetime, and that we have to face and address: existential isolation and loneliness, meaninglessness, the inevitability of death, and freedom.

An aphorism by EM Cioran claims that to live is to lose ground[2]. The understanding being that the difference between humans and animals is that humans are conscious of not living in an open, endless terrain, but see themselves lose ground. Unlike humans, animals do not seem to have the same awareness of mortality as humans, who experience life as a conscious function of death—the birth as a dependent variable of the independent constant of death. Animals, on the other hand, see an open, limitless, timeless landscape with no 'before' or 'after' without attributing meaning to it on an abstract level.

There is thus a difference between the open and the apparent. A difference that can be described as the contrast between the life of animals, which is open and without revelation or consciousness, and the human view of and insight into life, which emerges in the process of watching oneself lose ground. Consciousness of the inevitability of death is connected to sight and space. When something blocks the view of an open landscape, that 'something' is made apparent—becomes palpable or manifest. The concept of 'revelation', on the other hand, is related to the concept of 'vision' rather than sight, a kind of inner observation, or 'seeing things'.

This vision is related to death, revealing itself as a consciousness of the inevitability of death in humans but not animals, for whom the inner perception of a finite time-horizon does not exist. Once in possession of this consciousness of death, it is inevitably difficult to imagine that there is nothing beyond it—no open, eternal realm beyond the limits of death, that during life can only be imagined and seen with the eye of the mind as a religious 'revelation'. The Fall of Man created the knowledge of death. Deliverance from that consciousness entails becoming animal again.

Which is where we move to the other, sinister side of the Janus-like concept of becoming-animal. Images of enemies are frequently animalised. Tainted, base creatures versus elevated, human purity—barbarity as a way of segregating 'the pure'. As seen under Nazism, which defined Jews as vermin or rats; as seen in Islamist propaganda, which defines non-believers as dogs or pigs; as seen in the massacres in Rwanda, where the Hutu defined the Tutsi as cockroaches.

In Rwanda, the bodies of around 800,000 massacred Tutsi were left lying unburied on the streets. When, unlike animals, humans bury each other, removing corpses from the surface of the earth, it is because the corpses remind us that we too will die, because they mirror and anticipate our own individual annihilation. Burying the dead is a simple but effective act that defines life as something before death. Thus 800,000 bodies left unburied on the streets in Rwanda

is bizarre. But it can be explained by the animalisation of 'the other'—the Tutsi. Their animalisation ends mirroring: empathy ceases to exist, and death ceases to exist as a universal human condition that also applies to the Hutu. "Bury the dead—not the truth" as a popular T-shirt in the period after the massacre stated.

In this book (and the exhibition), the 'syntax' is based on reasoning sustained by images, and the similarities, disparities, shifts and proximities between them. The guiding principles are as follows.

The focus is on existential concepts like empty transcendence, void as form, and becoming-animal. The form is not based on (art)historical classifications, categories or taxonomies, but is contagious and epidemic. The form relates to, or is rather indebted to, other formations, like the *Da Costa Encyclopédique* (published in 1947, by the journal *Acéphale*); the methods of Aby Warburg; the psychogeography of the Situationists; and Jorge Louis Borges' *Atlas*.

The other maxim for the book quotes Walter Benjamin ("The reactionary attempt to turn technically determined forms, that is: dependent variables into constants, appears in Futurism in much the same way as in Jugendstil"[3]) and maintains that the empty transcendence implied in the quote from *Ecclesiastes* above has its antithesis in a series of apparently irreconcilable and art-historically/politically divergent movements, all of which, however, attempt to replace this empty transcendence with ideas of eternity and utopias (the 'constants' of the quote) that point back in time, to Pre-Raphaelite ideals and *Jugendstil*, as well as forward in time, to Futurism's obsession with speed and technology and the timeless non-representation of modernism's monochromy (the historical 'dependent variables' of the Benjamin quote).

In addition, there are no major differences in the ways the works have been produced, be they the Minimalist-inspired, semi-industrial, silk-screen-printed wooden boards of Gardar Eide Einarsson, or the Symbolist Max Klinger's etchings, that were all transferred, engraved on copperplates and printed by a copperplate printer according to Klinger's drawings—as phrased in Lawrence Weiner's artist's statement: "1. The artist may construct the piece. 2. The piece may be fabricated."[4]

The exhibition is conceptual in that it refers to theory and literature (the exhibition includes books in display cases by the authors cited in this publication).

The colours of the book and the exhibition are primarily white against black and black against white. The approach is (skia)graphic: mainly prints, photography and painting. An 'understated' monochromy and a 'loaded' Minimalism versus 'overloaded' Symbolism and figuration. Abundance and excess versus emptiness. Life versus death. A movement in scale, from small, detailed, filigree etchings, to mid-scale figurative paintings, to large-scale abstract and/or monochrome works—with the implicit understanding that small, intense formats can address major, existential issues.

But first and foremost the book and exhibition traverse history, moving through time from the Renaissance, Symbolism and Surrealism, to Minimalist-inspired contemporary art.

The essays and art in this publication represent a blueprint for the exhibition. For practical reasons (the size of the exhibition venues, as well as financial limitations on the loan of works), the exhibitions at Den Frie Centre of Contemporary Art and the Museum of Religious Art will differ. *Becoming Animal* thus has three loci and points of resonance spanning the exhibition venues in Copenhagen and Lemvig, and the publishers of this volume in London.

Since the exhibition pairs apparently incompatible yet sanctioned styles of art history with ostracised, apocryphal and political/psychiatric entities (disfigured posters, forensic reports, psychotic drawings, National Socialism, dystopian psychedelic universes) the exhibition is more apocryphal than canonical.

The basic question remains: On the one hand, what kind of pictures does the fact that religion is increasingly eroding in the West generate? And on the other, what kind of utopias, dystopias, religions and myths are sought to transcend this empty transcendence?

And, not least, what does this mean for society and the individual?

1 Schopenhauer, Arthur, *The World as Will and Representation: Volume 1*, EFJ Payne trans, New York: Dover Publications, 1969, p 277.
2 EM Cioran, *The Trouble with Being Born*, Arcade Publishing, New York 2012, p 96
3 Benjamin, Walter, "Central Park", *New German Critique*, Lloyd Spender and Mark Harrington trans, no 34, winter 1985, p 50. Translators' note 6.1 on Jugendstil: "literally, the style of youth, the specifically German form of Art Nouveau", p 56.
4 Lawrence Weiner formulated his "Declaration of Intent" (1968):
1 The artist may construct the piece
2 The piece may be fabricated
3 The piece need not be built
Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist the decision as to condition rests with the receiver upon the occasion of receivership.
Buchloh, Benjamin HD, "The Posters of Lawrence Weiner", *Posters November 1965–April 1986 by Lawrence Weiner*, Benjamin HD Buchloh (ed), Halifax: The Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art & Design; Toronto: Art Metropole, 1986, p 173.

BECOMING ANIMAL

Ditlev Blunck
Nightmare
1846

Francisco de Goya
The Consequences
plate 72, *The Disasters of War*
1810–1820

The doctor is excellent, pensive, considerate, calm, serious. What more can one ask for?
Francisco de Goya

Francisco de Goya
Of What Ill Will He Die?
plate 40, *The Caprices*
1799

This business of having long nails is so pernicious that it is forbidden even in Witchcraft.
Francisco de Goya

Francisco de Goya
They Spruce Themselves Up
plate 51, *The Caprices*
1799

Collage with elements from Kay Blumenthal-Barby's book *When a Person Dies – Selected Aspects of perimortem Medicine* published by the East German publishing house Volk und Gesundheit, 1986. Mounted on a West German schoolbook cover (Franz Hebel (ed.): *Read, Depict, Understand,* Hirschgraben-Verlag 1980) (anonymously defaced with the added word *Nothing*).
Editor's comment



Claus Carstensen
Donkeys and Mules
(Read, Depict, Understand Nothing)
2006



Collage with elements from Kay Blumenthal-Barby's book *When a Person Dies – Selected Aspects of perimortem Medicine* published by the East German publishing house Volk und Gesundheit, 1986. Mounted on a West German schoolbook cover (Franz Hebel (ed.): *Read, Depict, Understand,* Hirschgraben-Verlag 1980) (anonymously defaced with a kid's drawing of a house on a hill).
Editor's comment

Claus Carstensen
Dying Human Being
(Read, Depict, Understand)
2006

Francisco de Goya
Might Not the Pupil Know More?
plate 37, *The Caprices*
1799

One cannot say whether he knows more or less; what is certain is that the master is the most serious-looking person who could possibly be found.
Francisco de Goya

Francisco de Goya
Neither More nor Less
plate 41, *The Caprices*
1799

He is quite right to have his portrait painted; thus those who do not know him and have not seen him will know who he is.
Francisco de Goya

This poor animal has been driven mad by Genealogists and Heralds. He's not the only one.
Francisco de Goya

Francisco de Goya
And So Was His Grandfather
plate 39, *The Caprices*
1799

The broom is one of the most necessary implements for witches; for besides being great sweepers, as the stories tell, they may be able to change the broom into a fast mule and go with it where the Devil cannot reach them.
Francisco de Goya

Francisco de Goya
Pretty Teacher!
plate 68, *The Caprices*
1799

It is the way of the world. People jest and fight with another. He who yesterday played the part of the bull, today plays the "caballero en plaza". Fortune presides over the show and allots the parts according to the inconstancy of her caprices.
Francisco de Goya

Francisco de Goya
Big Booby
plate 4, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1810–1820

Francisco de Goya
The Carnivorous Vulture
plate 75, *The Disasters of War*
1810–1820



Francisco de Goya
Flying Folly
plate 5, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815–1823

Francisco de Goya
It's a Hard Step!
plate 14, *The Disasters of War*
1810–1820

Terry Atkinson
MANET – MAP – GOYA – HIROSHIMA –TRANSMISSION
1986

Terry Atkinson
Ruby (Reading the Guide) and Amber (Examining the Gibbet) at Natzweiler-Struthof Concentration Camp in the Vosges, August 1985
1986



Francisco de Goya
Carnival Folly
plate 14, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815–1823

Francisco de Goya
Furious Folly
plate 6, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815–1823

Francisco de Goya
General Folly
plate 9, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815–1823

Francisco de Goya
Funeral Folly
plate 18, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815–1823

Francisco de Goya
Feminine Folly
plate 1, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815–1823

Francisco de Goya
The Kidnapping Horse
plate 10, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815–1823

Peter Flötner
Allegory: Tyranny, Usury and Hypocrisy Fighting Common Sense, Justice and the Word of God (detail above)
undated, a later impression

Lucas Cranach
Regnum Satane et Papae
undated

Lucas Cranach
Digna Merces Papae
undated

Lucas Cranach
Papal Ass
undated





Upton Sinclair's novel "Mountain City" (called in German: *So macht man Dollars* [How to Make Dollars] deals with the ruthless struggle amongst stock market speculators. For the back of the book cover Heartfield used a genuine photograph of panic in the Chicago Corn Market. In the dollar note he replaced the portrait of the president with the Biblical golden calf symbolising money.
Walter Wimmer

Repayment of the capital takes place through death.
Arthur Schopenhauer

John Heartfield
How to Make Dollars
1931

**sombre and osmotic dawn
with two large holes
cut into a membrane
of fluorescent orange and acid green
(covering a vertical construction that
carries a cross
as a support & surface or skin & bone)**

**(so) lonely among people
(so) homeless among animals**

**a headless butcher with
a bloody cloth
a defenceless calf
something fatal
from back then, eastwards
Oberschlesien, perhaps
(Aeberschläsing or
Gürny Šlünsk):
a territorialisation,
an excretion**

**a cleansing,
an extinction,
a victim**

Claus Carstensen



Only the most stupid calves choose their own butcher. God with us.
Inset text

Claus Carstensen
Uneasy Among People, Homeless Among Animals
2015

anonymous
Devil Eating Priests and Shitting Lansquenets
undated

F. Hildenberg
In the Devil's Cookshop
undated

Eating brings death, but in an accidental form. Of all conceivable luxuries, death, in its fatal and inexorable form, is undoubtedly the most costly.
Georges Bataille

BECOMING ANIMAL THROUGH CURATORIAL CONTAGION

Anne Gregersen

Pleasure

In Francisco de Goya's aquatint of a young woman on a bucking horse from his *The Follies* [*Los disparates*] series, the woman is held aloft by the jaws of the horse at the same time as being turned by the sharp twist of its body **(fig 1)**. The animal initially seems superior—and supremely powerful. But on closer examination, the antagonism between them appears more ambiguous. The woman's mouth forms a diabolical grin, like a "maniac in a frenzy of pleasure", as Aldous Huxley wrote.[1] This makes her raised arms, a gesture that initially looks like an instinctive defence against attack, into a gesture of welcome, an invitation, and a challenge to the animal to go through with its act of violence. The expression of the horse, on the other hand, is marked by a surprising lack of aggression, appearing more taken aback than belligerent. It is not clear who is the victim and who is the perpetrator here, just as any clear separation between the human and the animal is erased. The woman is consumed by her instincts, is wild, irrational and uninhibited, whereas the animal seems capable of bridling its behaviour. It is not only the woman who is animalised: as Huxley also writes, the buttes in the background look like animals—mountainous half-rodents, half-reptiles—lying in wait. While the eyes of these cliff animals and the horse are wide open, the woman is unseeing. Her eyes appear as two black holes, concealed by heavy shading. It seems obvious that rather than moralising, Goya's motifs in *The Follies* insist on the presence of the imaginary and irrational in human existence.[2] Any one-sided interpretation is dismantled by their paradoxes, the ambiguity of the narratives, and the unstable identities of the figures. The power of the works lies in their depiction of the obscene, bestial, monstrous and nightmarish as something latent in our everyday lives, thereby undermining the belief that these are governed by a civilised, predictable and entirely rational order. In any depiction of such a world, the relationship between the human and the animal

fig 1, p 25 - Francisco de Goya
The Kidnapping Horse, plate 10, from the series *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815-1823

fig 2, p 12 - Ditlev Blunck
Nightmare
1846

fig 3, p 223 - William Mortensen
Untitled (Incubus Variation 3)
Circa 1926

plays a central role. When the specifically human cannot be distinguished from the animal, the categories start to collapse, precisely the disruption that is at the heart of the exhibition *Becoming Animal*.

Within the narrative of the exhibition, by the time we reach *The Follies* number ten, of the woman and horse, we have already followed Goya's animalisation and anthropomorphisation in *The Follies*, *The Disasters of War* [*Los desastres de la guerra*] and *The Caprices [Los caprichos]*. Through an idiosyncratic, associative and anachronous curatorial approach, these works enter constellations that include satirical woodcuts from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a Danish Golden Age painting and collages by the curator behind the exhibition, the artist Claus Carstensen. This heterogeneous collection of work forms the first theme of the exhibition, which has the same title as the exhibition as a whole—*Becoming Animal*—and their meanings infect each other. From Goya's weightless woman our gaze is led to another sensuous encounter between woman and animal, this time in a painting from 1846 by Ditlev Blunck, a homosexual artist from Holstein who, in 1841, had been tried for offending public morals and forced to leave Denmark **(fig 2)**. Here the animal visits the woman in her bedroom. With closed eyes, a half-open mouth and a bared breast it is difficult to know whether she is in a state of sleep or awake, but her face expresses intense pleasure. In her lap is a child-sized 'mare' with the head of a hare and the torso of a human; the mare, the incubus of Nordic mythology and the root of the word 'nightmare'—here reminiscent of the satyr that pursues and seduces nymphs and maenads—has pulled the woman's white nightdress down. It is a somewhat atypical depiction of a spirit usually depicted as female, who haunted sleep and had to be warded off by pentagrams woven into blankets. As in the Goya work, the attack by the creature is a source of sensual pleasure and euphoria: human instincts are released in its company and an erotic coupling between animal and woman, attacker and victim, occurs. Later, under the theme of *petit traité de morale*, the passionate meeting of a woman and a similarly dual creature is recreated in William Mortensen's theatrical photograph of a male figure with a monstrous animal head attacking a woman **(fig 3)**. The naked woman tries to stop him with a raised arm, but in a pin-up manner that is difficult to take seriously. The next time we encounter the animal as aggressor and seducer is in images of Eve and the snake in the Garden of Eden **(p 199)**, the first time, as we know, that an animal led mankind to sin. Here we are reminded of the animal's capacity to make humans break 'the law', and why any encounter between them is so easily associated with sin and transgression.

It is also under the theme *petit traité de morale* that we approach the zones that enable the physical union of woman and animal, with images of bodily orifices and their violent and sexual penetration. It is the physical transition between the outer and inner, between what can be represented and the unknown, that is exposed. This is where, for example, we see George Grosz' portrait of a man as pig, insistently sticking his tongue out to meet the tongue of a prostitute **(p 228)**. "Small moral treaty", the title of this section of the exhibition, is taken from a series of ten etchings by Hans Bellmer that refer to Marquis de Sade. These include *Crimes of Love*, where numerous, anonymous male organs penetrate the mouth and womb of a woman bearing a well-developed foetus **(p 226)**. The depravity of the scene is amplified by the clear depiction of the faces of both the woman and the foetus, but also by the fact that the woman's participation in the sex act is apparently consensual. The bodies we encounter are human, but occupy a state in

which the erotic is severed from cultural norms and indistinct from the instinctive sexuality of the animal. This continues in a pencil drawing by Bellmer, in which a man with the face of a pig copulates with the skeleton of a Catholic priest, as he lifts his snout towards a woman above him to gaze into her vagina (p 228). The necrophilia and extreme, shameless sexuality here can be seen as an attack on established norms in the same ways as the works of Marquis de Sade, or Georges Bataille's pornographic fiction, which Bellmer also illustrated.[3] This section also reminds us that we all emanate from a bodily orifice, and lived within its formless interior before coming out into the world. As well as *Crimes of Love*, there are works by JF Willumsen, Werner Büttner and Claus Carstensen that all deal with pregnancy and birth. But death is still present, as in Carstensen's photograph of a dead sheep giving birth (pp 226–227). The concept of a distinct body that can be separated from its surroundings breaks down in the face of the opening of human fissures, the copulation of the living with the dead and the dead animal as life-giving.

Consumption

Acts of violence, in their anonymous, satirical and objectifying form, then intensify through a series of works where the animal and human join in impure and hybrid constellations. Whereas Goya's woman and horse and Blunck's woman and mare are still distinct entities—albeit with the bite of the horse and touch of the mare as omens of contagion and merging—we now enter a new level in the process of consumption. In *Devil Eating Priests and Shitting Lansquenets*, a protestant propaganda print from around 1590, the devil is a gorging giant with bestial features, greedily forcing Catholic priests into his mouth, after which they pass through his intestinal system before being excreted as foot soldiers (p 30). The point of the satirical print was to demonstrate how French Catholics could improve their military fortunes by entering a pact with the devil, who could transform superfluous priests into soldiers ready for battle:[4] political religious propaganda that makes the inner passages of the body the volatile site of the mutation and distortion of meaning. The presence of the devil as devourer continues in F Hildenberg's *In the Devil's Cookshop*, depicting a grotesque kitchen where human bodies are dismembered and disembowelled or stuffed with foreign elements (p 31). Also here, it is the inner body and its openings that are the source of the degradation of humans to the level of animals—in this instance, as butchered meat to be slowly roasted then eaten at the decked table that can be seen in the room to the upper right of the image. To the left, the torso of a hanging man has been ripped open, and a demonic figure is removing his innards—a mass of entwined animal forms and card games that he has been fattened with in captivity.[5] Another man is on the table, being stuffed anally with herbs or plants like a turkey. His arms and legs are held in place by flaps of cut skin like those on the body turning on the spit above the fire.

These scenes of consumption lead to the animal's final assumption of human form in a Lucas Cranach's woodcut, *Papal Ass*, where with the exception of her naked torso the animalisation of the figure of a woman is complete (p 27). A woman-ass on its hind legs: an anti-papal satire, but also an exploration of the hybrid in extreme form. In addition to the female torso, the figure consists of the head of a donkey, an elephant arm, a human hand, a cloven hoof, an eagle's claw and a tail with a dragon's head. Scales that resemble chain mail cover its neck and limbs. The eclectic nature of the figure is underlined by the female body, which appears vulnerable and innocent. As in mythological tales of gods transforming humans into animals, the pope-donkey's humanity is preserved. The woman's outer body has been tragically animalised, but she has not assumed the identity of an animal or been transformed from human to animal, thereby entering a new category. The pope-donkey is an unstable form, which in its hybridity and monstrosity avoids—or at least operates at the edges of—what can be defined and categorised.

Disassembly and Reassembly as Curatorial Principle

The slippages, overlaps and cracks between the human and animal in the exhibition are often the result of the disassembly of one form and reassembly of a new. It is totality that is shattered. But instead of gathering the pieces and gluing them back together, a new, heterogeneous and inorganic entity of disparate fragments is created. This is the principle guiding many of the works in the exhibition, but also Carstensen's own artistic practice and the curation that forms the narrative of Becoming Animal. The juxtaposition of the *Papal Ass*, with Carstensen's collages of found materials using illustrations from Kay Blumenthal-Barby's 1986 book on death from a historical, medical, philosophical and practical perspective, *Wenn ein Mensch stirbt* [*When a Person Dies*], glued onto a German school book (p 15) thus seems logical, not only due to the similarity between the yellowing graphics, but also because the hybrid, intermediate state and dismantling of the body relate to collage as a technique. The collage constitutes an impure image, always incorporating some foreign element. It is based on splitting, cracks and difference, realigning fragments to suggest a new whole. Here, the assemblage differs in its three-dimensionality. It often seems less finished, a process that is not complete and may never be completed, like Kurt Schwitters' construction *Merzbau*, which the artist worked on from 1919 to 1937 and that never reached an end. But the structural principle of both the collage and the assemblage—and bricolage and montage for that matter—is always disassembly and reassembly, and involves a rupture with the image or object's status as an organic, discrete whole. For Peter Bürger, this inorganic montage was the fundamental principle of avant-garde art, and he applied the principles of montage as a film technique to the early collages of the cubists, as well as John Heartfield's photomontages.[6] As a technique, he considered it a revolutionary attack on the autonomy of the artwork, but also on the art institution as such and its claim that art can be separated from its social context. Twentieth-century art was dominated by the spread of techniques that make the clash of fragments and the irreconcilable possible. For the Surrealists, the same principle was articulated in the author Comte de Lautréamont's sentence "as beautiful as the fortuitous meeting between a sewing machine and an umbrella on a dissecting table", which they adopted, and that Man Ray visualised in several artworks.[7] The sewing machine and umbrella on the dissecting table incorporate heterogeneous elements that can only be united in an illogical, disruptive form that gives rise to new meanings—like a sexual metaphor in which the umbrella represents the male, the sewing machine the female and the table a bed.

The Surrealists were also the first to use the exhibition itself as a medium in a radical way, incorporating scenography and the installation of works to manipulate exhibits and generate new meanings. The 1938 Paris exhibition *Exposition Internationale du Surréalisme* and *First Papers of Surrealism* in New York, 1942, both made use of elaborate scenography devised by Marcel Duchamp to stage the works. In the former there were supposedly 1,200 coal bags hung from the ceiling in the main room of the exhibition, lit by torches to create a cave-like environment, and in the latter a mile of twine was strung around the galleries, obstructing the visitors' passage and view. The Surrealist exhibitions were highly significant for subsequent generations of artists who experimented with conventions for display.[8] At the same time, exhibitions curated by artists and 'professional' curators alike have presented new formats that challenge classical art-museum displays, which usually present an artist's oeuvre (the retrospective or monographic exhibition), a school or style of art (eg Impressionism), or a theme based on causal connections (eg 'primitivism' in avant-garde art). Today, temporary exhibitions increasingly address far more hypothetical, peripheral and idiosyncratic subjects, and thereby propose different ways of juxtaposing works. These exhibitions, and the particular privileges of the artist-curator, can be understood in the context of a general shift in the role of the curator. The verb 'to curate' comes from *curatus*, which in medieval Latin is the term for a spiritual leader entrusted with the care of souls. *Curare*—again in Latin—means 'to care for', an etymology that fit the traditional role of the curator as the 'caretaker' of objects in a museum. Since the 1960s the role and function of the curator has changed radically, and today curation, as Paul O'Neill for example argues, is a far more mediating and performative activity. For O'Neill it therefore makes little sense to attempt to limit and separate the practice of the curator and the artist. Referring to Raymond Williams, he suggests that a medium—including the medium of the exhibition—is stable but at the same time transformative, and that the work of curation done by this new type of curator can be a transformative, generating and speculative activity. The exhibition represents the reification—to use a Marxist concept—of existing social, spatial and art historical practices, but also generates new institutional practices and rethinks what already exists.[9]

Alongside his artistic practice, Claus Carstensen has curated numerous exhibitions, all of which are based on conceptual and formal connections often overlooked in art history.[10] These exhibitions break down art historical classifications and categories to establish alternative narratives. Like the exhibition *Becoming Animal*, they address a conceptual or philosophical issue, but also embody a formal and morphological investigation of similarities that recur across different periods, media and styles. In Jean-Hubert Martin's exhibition *Carambolages* at Grand Palais in Paris, 2015–2016, the curatorial principle was based on billiards and the *coup double*—the shot where one billiard ball hits two others. The idea was that each work would be contingent on the one preceding it, and anticipate the next through a game of association in which formal similarities guided the transitions between works. Something similar can be encountered in the exhibition *Becoming Animal*, although here the selection of the works is more stringently conceptual.[11] Whereas in *Carambolages* the sequence of eyes in paintings from the seventeenth and eighteenth century, prints by Charles Le Brun and ritual artefacts from prehistoric times could be seen as an entirely motivic investigation based on superficial similarities,[12] or what Hal Foster has critically termed 'pseudomorphism',[13] *Becoming Animal* is bound together by a critical comparison of a series of works and their representations of the relationship between life and death, emptiness and meaning. This is based on the hypothesis that Symbolism and Minimalism,

fig 4, p 108 - Félicien Rops
Satan Sowing Tares
1882

fig 5, p 109 - Max Klinger
Peeing Death
1881

fig 6, p 110 - Jens Lund
The Forest of the Fear of Death
1900

two schools of art that on the surface approached these issues from very different positions, shared the goal of attempting to replace empty transcendence with utopias and concepts of eternity.[14] When a lithograph from 1882 by Félicien Rops, depicting Satan as a giant sowing tares **(fig 4)**, is juxtaposed with Max Klinger's painting *Peeing Death*, 1880 **(fig 5)**, which then encounters Jens Lund's drawing *The Forest of the Fear of Death*, 1900 **(fig 6)**, next to Steven Parrino's painting installation *The Self Mutilation Bootleg 2 (The Open Grave),* 1988–2003 **(fig 7)**, which is accompanied by an etching by James Ensor, *Hop-Frog's Revenge,* 1898 **(fig 8)**, which is exhibited with Gardar Eide Einarsson's abstract painting from 2006 **(fig 9)**, the title of which—*Alone Among Friends*—is also the name of this section of the exhibition, the visual parallels are immediately apparent. If the works are seen in the above order, the first encounter is with death moving across a field, which then becomes death urinating in the lake in two landscapes. The vertical composition of the works and the rounding of the lake continue in Lund's death forest, the abstract and graphic elements of which resound in Parrino's work. Both works spill over into Ensor's figurative scene, where the arena bears similarities to the empty circular forms we have just encountered. Eide Einarsson's painting subsequently becomes an abstraction of the composition that recurs in these images. But the formal similarities are also conceptual, in that they deal with death as a concept and as a figure, traversing period, medium and style. This is done not by postulating any transhistorical or universal concord between them, but by linking the ways death is represented in works that use both symbolic and minimalist forms traversing different periods.

These constellations are based on alliances not filiations, providing different connections than those offered by a classical style history. The difference between the two approaches is the difference between understanding the development of art as a genealogical tree, where the root is solidly planted in one place and the branches grow in a set direction, and a rhizomatic structure. The concept of 'becoming' in the exhibition title is taken from Chapter Ten of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...", in which becoming is understood as a rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari explain the concept as follows:

> **Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree. Becoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with something; neither is it regressing-progressing; neither is it corresponding, establishing corresponding relations; neither is it producing, producing a filiation or producing through filiation. Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, 'appearing', 'being', 'equalling', or 'producing'.[15]**

The rhizome is a non-hierarchical, interconnected and heterogenic structure with no centre, beginning or end. As a model for the exhibition, as well as the reading of it, the rhizome and the concept of becoming provide the opportunity to rethink the connections between works that have otherwise been assigned a specific place in art history, by being categorised within Symbolism or Minimalism, for example. These works are taken out of their usual context and connected in new constellations, which then disintegrate again. This is also part of the curatorial principle of the temporary exhibition: that even though the structure of the specific exhibition can be documented, the works are subsequently separated again to become part of new contexts where they have different meanings.



fig 7, p 111 - Steven Parrino
The Self Mutilation Bootleg 2 (The Open Grave)
1988-2003

fig 8, p 112 - James Ensor
Hop-Frog's Revenge
1898

fig 9, p 113 - Gardar Eide Einarsson
Alone Among Friends
2006

Contagion

Just as death is a central theme of the exhibition, so is the separation of the seeing and unseeing. Under the title "Do It For Van Gogh, Baby", but also in many other sections of the exhibition, the face, the effacement of the face and the gaze represent an intermediary stage in which the human either ceases to be present or is barely present. The section starts with a dream—Odilon Redon's lithograph of his wife with closed eyes **(p 42)**. The motif later became a painting with a foreground like the surface of water reflecting the light coming from the right, sculpting her face. In the lithograph the face is frailer, and next to Wilhelm Freddie's erased portrait of a woman it seems to almost dissolve: an unarticulated non-form in stark contrast to the expressive face we usually see in portraits **(p 43)**. The dream is turning into a nightmare, and the next thing we see is a long quote from *A Thousand Plateaus:*

> **The face is not animal, but neither is it human in general; there is even something absolutely inhuman about the face. It would be an error to proceed as though the face became inhuman only beyond a certain threshold: close-up, extreme magnification, recondite expression, etc. The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start. It is by nature a closeup, with its inanimate white surfaces, its shining black holes, its emptiness and boredom. Bunker-face. To the point that if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to animality, nor even by returning to the head, but by quite spiritual and special becomings-animal, by strange true becomings that get past the wall and get out of the black holes, that make *faciality traits* themselves finally elude the organization of the face—freckles dashing toward the horizon, hair carried off by the wind, eyes you traverse instead of seeing yourself in or gazing into in those glum face-to-face encounters between signifying subjectivities.[16]**

Becoming Animal is thus about something more complex than the transformation from human to animal and the progressive or regressive potential of that shift. For Deleuze and Guattari, the concept of becoming is not connected to the exchange of one identity for another or mimesis, but with the contagion of identity—like the wasp fertilising the orchid. Through its similarity to the genitals of the female wasp, the orchid lures the wasp to pollinate it, but without any resulting progeny (which would be a hybrid between a wasp and an orchid). It is the interaction between the two life forms that represents a becoming and transgression of the boundaries between two species.

The image of the wasp pollinating the orchid is central to Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of becoming, their concept of the rhizomatic, and the idea of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. It has also been extended to rethinking other traditional structures and development narratives; in his article "Curatorship as Bildungsroman: Or, From Hamlet to Hjelmslev", this is the image Donald Preziosi uses in his deconstruction of the basic grounds for curatorship. Preziosi emphasises the connection between the dynamic, processual and fabricating aspects of curating and the rhizome represented by the relationship between the wasp and the orchid. In doing so, he lays out a view of curatorship as "a dangerous practice" that uses objects to think and reckon with, constituting an epistemological technology that is neither harmless nor innocuous but maybe even "terror-inducing".[17] Preziosi shows how the deconstructing and constructing aspects of the process of curation can destabilise knowledge or truths that are taken for granted, thereby occupying a position similar to that of Paul O'Neill. In a footnote, Preziosi also refers to Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of the concept of *merz*, invented by Kurt Schwitters in the context of

assemblages and collages where highly disparate materials are juxtaposed in no hierarchical order.[18] As well as the concept of becoming, the principle of assemblage is fundamental to rhizome thinking and the idea of a network with no centre, beginning or end. The connection between the collage (and the assemblage), the rhizome and the curatorial logic of an exhibition like *Becoming Animal* can thereby be rethought. The zone of proximity Deleuze and Guattari operate with in connection to the concept of becoming is also the zone where the works in the exhibition pollinate each other and generate not a new identity, but a production of meaning that is neither definitive nor capable of being brought to any conclusion.

The idea of curating as a 'dangerous' technology that can be used to deconstruct our preconceptions and generate knowledge in alternative ways is also present in the writings and curatorial projects of Georges Didi-Huberman. In connection with his exhibition *Atlas: How to Carry the World on One's Back* in 2012,[19] which was based on Aby Warburg's visual thinking and *Mnemosyne Atlas*, he explores the visual forms of knowledge expressed in images and constellations of images. He writes about the unique way the atlas functions in its classical book form in his catalogue essay: we might take the atlas off the shelf to find something in particular, but then we see something else that grabs our attention, and new connections, nodes and links emerge as we flick back and forth between the pages. Without any specific goal or intention, we move through the atlas and its "forest, its maze and its treasure"[20] before putting it back on the shelf. The atlas offers the kind of knowledge that according to Didi-Huberman is explosive, due to its amalgamation of the aesthetic paradigm of visual form and the epistemological paradigm of knowledge. This impure form of presentation disrupts the production of knowledge rooted in Platonic philosophy and its attempts to extract ideas from the unreliable domain of phenomena. The result is knowledge beyond boundaries:

> **It [the atlas] introduces the sensible dimension into knowledge, and the diverse, and the lacunary character of each image. Against any aesthetic purity, it introduces the multiple, the diverse, the hybridity of any montage.... The atlas, therefore, straightaway breaks frames apart. It breaks the self-proclaimed certitudes of science, which is as certain of its truths as art is certain of its criteria. It invents, between all of this, interstitial zones of exploration, heuristic intervals. It deliberately ignores any definitive axioms. For it has to do with a theory of knowledge devoted to the risk of the sensible and of an aesthetic devoted to the risk of disparity. It deconstructs, with its very exuberance, the ideals of uniqueness, of specificity, of purity, of logical exhaustion.[21]**

The atlas does not confine the image, opening it instead to montage whereby one image is succeeded by the next, which then latches onto a new image, and continues on without any obvious end in sight. We never encounter the last image, only the dizzying depths of meaning formation and transformation. According to Didi-Huberman, the atlas is a reading machine, not aimed at any clear-cut, conclusive comprehension, but devoted precisely to "the risk of the sensible" and "the risk of disparity". Goya also plays a central role in Didi-Huberman's view of the atlas, bringing us back to the Spanish artist and his prints. For Didi-Huberman, the poetic form of Warburg's atlas is of the series Goya called *Los disparates* [*The Follies*], but he sees the political form of the atlas as more like a collection of historical disasters, thus referring to the series *The Disasters of War*.[22] One work from *The Follies* included in *Becoming Animal*, and that Didi-Huberman also emphasises, is *Feminine Folly*, in which six women hold the edges of a blanket containing a rolled-up man and a goat **(p 24)**. The women shake the blanket, from which two other men have been tossed into the air and are about to disappear in the background of the image. The women smile sweetly, or secretively, whilst the men are inarticulate and featureless: lumps of flesh at the level of the animal. The blanket is, of course, the earth that shakes beneath our feet when categories are no longer fixed and we plummet into the void, the abyss. But there is also the laughter that occurs when our habitual systems of knowledge collapse. A laughter that shakes us until we reach the point of malaise, which for Didi-Huberman is precisely what Goya reveals in his comical yet threatening images.[23]

1 Huxley, Aldous, *Ape and Essence*, first published 1948, London: Chatto & Windus, 1971, p 13. A complete collection of Goya's etchings with a foreword by Huxley was published in 1943: Huxley, Aldous, The Complete Etchings of Goya, New York, NY: Crown Publishers, 1943.

2 The *Los disparates* series was not published during Goya's lifetime. It was published posthumously in 1864 under the title *Los proverbios (The Proverbs)*. Each print was given a Spanish proverb as its title, providing a more moralistic interpretation of their contents. *Young Woman on a Bucking Horse*, for example, was given the title *A Woman and a Horse, Let Someone Else Master Them [The Horse-Abductor]*.

3 This image figures in Georges Bataille's *The Story of the Eye* together with photographs by Bellmer, who also illustrated the short story Madame Edwarda. See Vanskike, Elliott, "Pornography as Paradox: The Joint Project of Hans Bellmer and Georges Bataille", *Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature*, vol 31, no 4, December 1998, pp 41–60.

4 Cunningham, Andrew and Ole Peter Grell (eds), *The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p 69.

5 The text on the print can be roughly translated as claiming that when the devil is out of sorts, he gets up to make food. He summons help from the Lorraine, France and Germany to slaughter his prime stock, which he has fattened with great care in the monasteries, stuffing and seasoning them in the very best manner.

6 Bürger, Peter, "Theory of the Avant-Garde", *Theory and History of Literature, Volume 4*, Michael Shaw trans, first published 1984, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, pp 72–78.

7 Man Ray made a collage and a photo entitled *Rencontre d'une machine à coudre et d'un paraplui sur une table de dissection (Lautréamont)*, 1932–1933. He also made a drawing with the same motif and title that is depicted in *Minotaure*, nos 3–4, 1933. The works are in a private collection in Denmark. See Søndergaard, Sidsel Maria (ed), *Man Ray. Syn og tanke*, Øregaard: Øregaard Museum, 2013, pp 26–28.

8 Filipovic, Elena, "A Museum That is Not", in *e-flux journal*, no 4, March 2009. See also her article "When Exhibitions Become Form: On the History of the Artist as Curator", The Artist as Curator #0 in *Mousse*, no 41 December 2012–January 2013, p 9.

9 O'Neill, Paul, "Curating as a Medium of Artistic Practice: The Convergence of Art and Curatorial Practice Since the 1990s", *The Culture of Curating and the Curating of Culture(s)*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012, pp 88–89.

10 These exhibitions include *Straw Dogs: The Private Collection of Claus Carstensen*, at GL Strand, Copenhagen, 1993; *Action and Remains – Al Hansen & Arthur Køpcke*, at Kunsthal Charlottenborg, Copenhagen, 2008 (in collaboration with Helle Bøgelund and Maria Gadegaard); *The Map is not the Territory*, at Esbjerg Kunstmuseum, Esbjerg, 2008 (in collaboration with Per Aage Brandt); *Café Dolly. Picabia, Schnabel Willumsen*, at the JF Willumsen Museum, Frederikssund, 2013 (in collaboration with Christian Vind and Anne Gregersen); and *Bastard*, at Esbjerg Kunstmuseum, Esbjerg, 2016.

11 In his article in the Carambolages catalogue, Jean-Hubert Martin explains the thought process behind the exhibition and its images. His points of reference include André Malraux's *Musée imaginaire*, and Aby Warburg's *Mnemosyne Atlas*.

12 For a critical review of the exhibition see Nechvatal, Joseph, 'The Pleasures and Risks of Ahistorical Curating' in *Hyperallergic*, June 2016. Nechvatal concludes his review by writing: "As this type of slick, ahistorical, and acontextual show becomes ever more common, one wonders what kind of criticality could possibly overthrow their smooth denial of context. The fruits of strange synchronicity seem here to stay, so we may as well enjoy them for what they are: the free associative pleasures of globalizing spectacle."

13 Foster, Hal, "Preposterous Timing", *The London Review of Books*, vol 25, no 23, 2012. Panofsky was aware of the issue at an early stage, as revealed in his analyses of tomb sculpture first published in 1964. He used the term 'pseudomorphosis' to describe "emergence of a form A, morphologically analogous to, or even identical with, a form B, yet entirely unrelated to it from a genetic point of view." Panofsky, Erwin, *Tomb Sculpture: Four Lectures on Its Changing Aspects from Ancient Egypt to Bernini*, HW Janson ed, New York, NY: Abrams, 1992, pp 26–27.

14 Carstensen, Claus, (pending page reference in CC's introduction or article)

15 Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Brian Massumi trans, first published 1980, London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2015, p 279.

16 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp 199–200.

17 Preziosi, Donald, "Curatorship as Bildungsroman: or, From Hamlet to Hjelmslev", *Curatorial Challenges: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Contemporary Curating*, Folke Henningsen, Anne, Anne Gregersen and Malene Vest Hansen (eds), London: Routledge, 2018 (forthcoming).

18 Preziosi, "Curatorship as Bildungsroman".

19 The exhibition took place at ZKM Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie, Karlsruhe, Stiftung Falckenberg, Hamburg, and Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía, Madrid, from 2010 to 2011. The project is based on Didi-Huberman's long-standing interest in Warburg's thinking, first expressed in *Devant l'image*, 1991.

20 Didi-Huberman, Georges, *Atlas: How to Carry the World on One's Back?* Madrid: Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía, 2010, p 14.

21 Didi-Huberman, *Atlas*, p 15.

22 Didi-Huberman, *Atlas*, p 81.

23 Didi-Huberman, *Atlas*, p 50. Here Didi-Huberman refers to Michel Foucault's writing on laughter in the beginning of *Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines*, 1966.


BABY
R
GH,
DO IT FOR
VAN GOGH
BABY

Odilon Redon
Closed Eyes
1890

Wilhelm Freddie
Untitled
1941



Earlier, we encountered two axes, signifiance and subjectification. We saw that they were two very different semiotic systems, or even two strata. Signifiance is never without a white wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies. Subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies. Since all semiotics are mixed and strata come at least in twos, it should come as no surprise that a very special mechanism is situated at their intersection. Oddly enough, it is a face: the white wall/black hole system. A broad face with white cheeks, a chalk face with eyes cut in for a black hole. Clown head, white clown, moon-white mime, angel of death, Holy Shroud. The face is not an envelope exterior to the person who speaks, thinks, or feels. The form of the signifier in language, even its units, would remain indeterminate if the potential listener did not use the face of the speaker to guide his or her choices ("Hey, he seems angry ..."; "He couldn't say it..."; "You see my face when I'm talking to you ..."; "look at me carefully..."). A child, woman, mother, man, father, boss, teacher, police officer, does not speak a general language but one whose signifying traits are indexed to specific faciality traits.
Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari

The face is not animal, but neither is it human in general; there is even something absolutely inhuman about the face. It would be an error to proceed as though the face became inhuman only beyond a certain threshold: close-up, extreme magnification, recondite expression, etc. The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start. It is by nature a close-up, with its inanimate white surfaces, its shining black holes, its emptiness and boredom. Bunker-face. To the point that if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to animality, nor even by returning to the head, but by quite spiritual and special becomings-animal, by strange true becomings that get past the wall and get out of the black holes, that make faciality traits themselves finally elude the organization of the face—freckles dashing toward the horizon, hair carried off by the wind, eyes you traverse instead of seeing yourself in or gazing into in those glum face-to-face encounters between signifying subjectivities.
Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari

CF Hill
Untitled
undated



CF Hill
Untitled
undated

Thomas Bruun
Ghost – the Painting (for...)
1986

anonymous
Untitled
undated



Herbert Volkmann
Do It for Van Gogh, Baby
2010-2011

**For it is not for this world that we have always worked,
struggled,
brayed against the horrors of hunger, misery, hatred, scandal, disgust
that we were all poisoned,
even though we were all enthralled by these things,
and because of which we finally committed suicide;
for are we not all like poor Van Gogh, men suicided by society!**
Antonin Artaud

**The soul which gave its ear to the
body, and van Gogh gave the ear
back to his very soul's soul,
giving it to a woman to flesh out the
grisly illusion.**
Antonin Artaud

George Grosz
*I Don't Want to Know Anything
About Politics*
undated

Hell/Work
Inset text

Albert Oehlen
Hell/Work
1989



Gardar Eide Einarsson
and Matias Faldbakken
I Am Alive and You're Dead
2005





opposite: **Sam Kiyoumarsi**
Graduate
2008



At least a certain amount of touching is indispensable for a person in order to attain the normal sexual aim. It is also generally known that the touching of the skin of the sexual object causes much pleasure and produces a supply of new excitement. Hence, the lingering at the touching can hardly be considered a perversion if the sexual act is proceeded with.

The same holds true with looking which is analogous to touching. The manner in which the libidinous excitement is frequently awakened is by the optical impression, and selection takes account of this circumstance by making the sexual object a thing of beauty. The covering of the body, which keeps abreast with civilization, serves to arouse sexual inquisitiveness, which always strives to restore for itself the sexual object by uncovering the hidden parts. This can be turned into the artistic ("sublimation") if the interest is turned from the genitals to the form of the body. The tendency to linger at this intermediary sexual aim of the sexually accentuated looking is found to a certain degree in most normals; indeed it gives them the possibility of directing a certain amount of their libido to a higher artistic aim. On the other hand, the fondness for looking becomes a perversion (a) when it limits itself entirely to the genitals; (b) when it becomes connected with the overcoming of loathing (voyeurs and onlookers at the functions of excretion); and (c) when instead of preparing for the normal sexual aim it suppresses it. The latter, if I may draw conclusions from a single analysis, is in a most pronounced way true of exhibitionists, who expose their genitals so as in turn to bring to view the genitals of others.

In the perversion which consists in striving to look and be looked at we are confronted with a very remarkable character which will occupy us even more intensively in the following aberration. The sexual aim is here present in twofold formation, in an active and a passive form.

The force which is opposed to the peeping mania and through which it is eventually abolished is shame.
Sigmund Freud

Thomas Zipp
A.B.: LOOKING
2013

Eugène Cárrière
Elise Laughing
1895

Jutta Koether
The Stuff Is Here, from the Series *In the Sky of the Brain*
1996

Sam Kiyoumarsi
Blind Breastfeed
2006

THE REHABILITATION OF STORM P AS A PAINTER

Claus Carstensen

The reactionary attempt to turn technically determined forms, that is: dependent variables, into constants appears in Futurism in much the same way as in *Jugendstil*.
Walter Benjamin, "Central Park"[1]

It is incredibly perceptive, the latent point in the above, laconic quote from Walter Benjamin. The observation is so self-evident that it hits like a punch. It comes from nowhere, is suddenly just there like the most obvious thing in the world, dividing—like another Fall of Man—this world into a before and after.

And what does it say, the quote? I would claim there is more than a materialistic critique of history hidden here. It is, perhaps, as much about the empty transcendence left in the wake of Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche's dismantling of religion. The attempt to fill a void with meaning again that has its antithesis in a number of apparently irreconcilable and politically divergent movements in art history, all of which attempt to replace this empty transcendence with concepts of eternity and utopias (the 'constants' of the quote) that point back in time to the Pre-Raphaelite ideals of Symbolism and *Jugendstil*, as well as forward in time to Futurism's obsession with speed and technology and monochrome modernism's timeless non-representation (the 'dependent variables' of the quote).

And what does all this have to do with the rehabilitation of the Danish artist Robert Storm Petersen, known as Storm P, as a painter? Not as little as one might think.

Storm P embodies and internalises both these efforts in his painting,[2] but with the crucial and radical difference that he does so in reverse, through what could be called cynical painting—shameless and raw.[3]

The cynicism is not only embedded in how he handles the paint, but equally in his motivation and choice of motif. The

Storm P
Yes – perhaps you might have read more than me – but you see – I have got proper boots!
1919



Storm P
Inventions. The Triumph of Photography
Circa 1941

Cynicism of antiquity was directed against social norms, a lived philosophy practised by figures like Diogenes and Crates. Diogenes is said to have lived in a barrel. One day he was sitting in the barrel when Alexander the Great passed by. Alexander offered to fulfil any wish Diogenes had, to which the philosopher replied: "Move out of my sunlight." According to another anecdote about Diogenes, the philosopher was seen carrying an oil lamp in broad daylight. When asked why, he replied: "I am looking for an honest man." These exchanges could just as well have been written by Storm P. The standard equipment of the begging philosopher of antiquity—a walking stick, cloak, food bag, long beard, long, unkempt hair and often a dog—was also a typical Storm P motif.[4] On their travels, the begging Cynics often approached random passers by, using harsh and provocative language to convince them of the truth of the Cynic's way of life. 'Blunt speech' was one of the characteristics of Cynicism.[5] Which is also the case with Storm P, not least in terms of his indignation, biting sarcasm and absurd sense of irony. Cynicism is one of the many forms irony can take, and it is subversive.[6]

(So much for cynicism in the work of Storm P.)

But to return to the quote above by Benjamin; in his formative years, Storm P was heavily influenced by the dark, *Jugendstil*-inspired version of Symbolism the Danish painters Johannes Holbek and Jens Lund, and Danish sculptor Niels Hansen Jacobsen adopted. But whereas the work of these artists was also borne by visions of utopia and eternity, none of this was on the cards for Storm P. He is radically dysphoric and dystopian, focusing on empty transcendence as reflected in titles like *Body Fishing on the Seine, Broken Strings, The Suicide, The Critic, Fear of Darkness—Fear of Night, Laughter—The Infinite Void, Charon's Boat* and *Pain,* the latter with the verse: *My soul groans / In eternal torment / Hell on earth / An eternal futile battle / Nerve pitched against nerve / Fire everywhere / But without the power / To inure me.*

Another verse on a drawing reads: *I learned in the great silent forests / to use my eyes—my ears— / Startled by the slightest sound / Sensing danger everywhere—Death lurking / Behind the black trunks.*

This inversion or radical transformation—in this case from a Pre-Raphaelite, utopian symbolism to a nihilistic, dystopian *Jugendstil*—is a recurrent and principal pattern in the painting of Storm P. It is also true of his often dysfunctional and absurd Futurism, as seen in a large number of 'inventions' and extremely complicated or deliberately dysfunctional machines, like a spaceship with webbed feet or a pipe-smoking Albert Einstein looking into the viewfinder of a tangled machine.

Storm P's first encounter with Futurism was at the exhibition *Die Futuristen* (*The Futurists*) at Den Frie exhibition hall in Copenhagen in 1912.[7] As had been the case with his caricature in the Danish newspaper *Ekstrabladet* of the Jens Lund exhibition at Den Frie exhibition hall in 1909, here too there is a love-hate relationship. Both are cases of what Nikolaj Brandt has called "artistic patricide".[8] Before he could adapt and use a specific style of painting, he had to ridicule or caricature it in order to 'disarm' it. Maybe because he knew that art history, that grand narrative of art—often, and especially in his case, unjustly—punishes those who 'come too late'. This is the light in which his radical changes should be seen.

Storm P
Modern Science
1910

Storm P
In The Dream Play of Life – Evil Conscience
1915-1920

Storm P
Untitled (Heart Blood)
Approx. 1905–1910

Storm P
Satire
Approx. 1918

Because even though he was demonstrably quick off the mark compared to other Danish artists of the same age, he was still too late. When he finally got to show his work in Berlin—with 21 works alongside the art of Emilio Pettoruti at Der Sturm's 119th exhibition—it was already too late in terms of the international avant-garde's pre-written history of art. In the same year he participated with ten watercolours at Der Sturm's 122th exhibition, with the title *Die jungen Dänen* (*The Young Danes*). It is highly likely that this was where Katherine Dreier, chair of Société Anonyme (where Kandinsky was vice-chair and Duchamp secretary) selected the three works that represented his art at the Société Anonyme exhibition curated at Brooklyn Museum in 1926 under the title *International Exhibition of Modern Art*. An exhibition where Franciska Clausen and Storm P were the only Danish artists, exhibiting alongside artists whose works have been forgotten, like Carl Buchheister, Marcelle Cahn, Finnur Jónsson, David Kakabadze, Ragnhild Keyser and Suzanne Phocas, but also alongside paragons like Archipenko, Arp, Braque, Brancusi, de Chirico, Duchamp, Ernst, Gabo, Kandinsky, Klee, Léger, Lissitzky, Miro, Moholy-Nagy, Mondrian, Pevsner, Picabia and Schwitters.[9]

What is striking about his contribution to the exhibition is that the works are his most international and modern—and least 'Storm P'—watercolours, ie a validation of Dreier's notion of an international movement. But this is not what makes Storm P a cut above the rest in my book. One of the three works, *The Village*, which is reproduced in this catalogue, is of course awkward in its own way, but also entirely innocuous and without drive. And it is precisely this lack of drive and its innocuousness that places much of Danish modernism with William Scharff, Olaf Rude, Karl Isakson, etc, on the parochial side of the international.[10] This watercolour possesses none of the insistence on empty transcendence I see as being the greatest quality of Storm P's best works. It is as if in his 'international' watercolours he tries to adapt to the avant-garde, whereas it is precisely being maladjusted and shamelessly fearless that is his forte. He just cannot see it himself. Either that, or he had hopes of making an international breakthrough by modifying his style.

And this, I think, is the crux of the matter. He is too late with his 'international' style, and too early with his 'late' works.

'Late works' is a concept that first took serious hold with the exhibition *Westkunst* (*Western art*), Kasper König's show in Cologne that drew a lot of attention in 1981. The show was an inventory of post-1945 art in Europe and the US, and included Picabia's polka-dot paintings, de Chirico's model paintings and self-portraits, as well as Magritte's *Période Vache* works—all late works by the artists, which at the time were seen as decidedly tasteless, yet which all possess a high degree of nonchalance.

The problem is that Storm P painted his best works way too early and way too boldly—and was alarmed by his own radicality. Maybe this began with his failed trip to America in the autumn of 1919, when his hopes of an international breakthrough were sky-high. Just like Vilhelm Lundstrøm, whose alarm at his own radicality led to him returning from France to a professorship in Copenhagen and his still lifes. In terms of 'late works' only JF Willumsen—who also had an unsuccessful stay in America behind him—stayed the course with works that are truly bizarre.

As bizarre as Storm P's early works, like all the becomings animal that usually relate to empty transcendence, with the



Storm P
Culture
1908

Storm P
Angst (Syphilis)
1906

Storm P
Not Judging. (Heavenly and Profane Justice)
1947–1949

Fall making humans conscious of death in a way animals are not. From then on, becoming animal is about becoming animal again to escape this consciousness of death—or else it is about a cult of eternity and fantasies of paradise beyond death. All of which are destroyed in Storm P's vast picture machine. In the world of Storm P, animals are grotesque, protosurrealistic monsters, tricksters of human limbs that tear themselves away from the body to live lives of their own. Or else they are limbs *disjecta membra*, carved from the body to be put on display, to be caged away or to be painted with. There are all the Ensor-inspired scatologies, riddled with hangings. All of it low, abject and heterogeneous as hell. No country for old men. Created way too early with an obnoxious nonchalance.

And then, of course, there are the two paintings from 1906 and 1908: *Angst/Syphilis* and *Culture* (*Kultur*), both of which are so cack-handed, impudent and roughly painted that they anticipate the now 40-year-old 'bad painting' debate, which started with the exhibition *'Bad' Painting*, curated by Marcia Tucker in 1978 at The New Museum in New York. The exhibition flirts with the concept of bad painting, but puts the word 'bad' in inverted commas, since all the participating artists were either academy or university educated. Regardless of which, Tucker's introduction to the exhibition catalogue represents a first attempt at a theoretical discussion of the concept.

In the catalogue she quotes Renato Poggioli from the book *The Theory of the Avant-Garde*, who writes: "Classical thinking on art admits of only a single negative category: the ugly. Unlike beauty, which is conceived of as unique and absolute, classicism contemplates the ugly as multiple and relative, in infinite variety and not only verbal variety either (the imperfect, the exaggerated, the disproportioned, the grotesque, the monstrous)."[11]

In a diary entry from 17 April 1916, Storm P writes: "I am prey to constantly changing moods—why stick to a single course—when my imagination overwhelms me with a thousand ideas—I will do whatever crosses my mind—as an artist."[12] He meets Thorvald Bindesbøll at an early stage of his career: "[A] man came to look at my drawings—it was the architect Bindesbøll, and he said, in a very severe tone, that I should stop trying to learn how to draw—then I would be much better at it."[13]

This anecdote anticipates the concept of deskilling, which plays a key role in post-1945 art. The avant-garde renounces—in what could be seen as professional self-stigmatisation—technical skill, because that 'skill' is used to produce mediocre kitsch and is irrevocably corrupted.[14]

So rather the unfiltered brutality of a painting like Storm P's *Culture*.

Despite its unimpressive size, it is incredibly forceful for several reasons—first and foremost because the composition is so brutal. The figure is pushed to the very front of the image, with an almost-monochrome black area that fills half the painting. The demonstrating masses, on the other hand, are pushed so far back that without the red banners they would probably escape notice. These banners magnify the scale, drawing the gaze towards them, and function as a visual counterpoint. Not like the dot of Corot or the poppies in Monet's field, where blotches of paint are reduced to a painterly effect. The poppy-red banners rip the painting apart and give it a 'meaning', a significance that does not stand still,

but slips down over the red hair and red rings around the eyes, to the blood running out of the mouth against the absinthe-green skin. Two equally insistent motifs, simultaneously separate and connected; a relationship reinforced by what must be American high-rise buildings, which constitute the middle ground. The raw, direct brushwork is amplified by the writing of the word *Kultur*, which atypically for the period is entirely artless. This casualness then condenses in something that seems almost shoddy—a scrap of canvas sewn or glued onto the middle of the painting before the application of the last layer of colour.

There are reminiscences of *Jugendstil* arabesques around the head and shoulders. The choice of colour is expressive. The influence of Munch is clear in the brushstrokes of the sky, but especially in the face, which is a virtual copy of the male figure on the right side of Munch's *Woman in Three Stages* from 1894, where the red plant climbing up the pole in the foreground becomes the blood running out of the mouth of Storm P's figure. The painting as a whole has a desperate, defeatist atmosphere.

The following anecdote might not be directly related to this desperation, but given Storm P's uncritical admiration for Munch, the above similarity to Munch's painting and the period in which both were painted, I cannot let it pass.

According to Jens Bing:[15]

During a journey from Warnemünde to Norway in the autumn of 1908, Edvard Munch stopped in Denmark. For ten years he had been living a vagrant life, with addresses in several German and French towns, as well as in Denmark. He had been haunted for some time by hallucinations and paranoia, and friends had advised him to seek help. To calm his nerves, he settled in Hornbæk. During a trip to Copenhagen he spent four days immersed in 'the heavenly mists of alcohol'.[16] When his alcohol consumption became complicated by paralysis in one leg, he realised he needed to seek medical attention.[17] It was during this breakdown that Munch and his fellow Norwegian, the poet Sigurd Mathiesen, climbed the many stairs to the fifth floor and knocked on the door of Storm P's Copenhagen apartment. Storm P was both overwhelmed and honoured—Munch had been his idol for the past three years. From Storm P we know that Munch had fled Dr Viggo Christiansen's private nerve clinic in Copenhagen.[18] We can only guess why Munch felt the need to visit Storm P, who he had been introduced to by the Danish author Helge Rode in Frederiksberg Gardens several days before, but Munch apparently sensed that visiting Storm P would not be an ordeal for his fraught nerves. Storm P remembers their meeting with these words:

'Munch seemed silent and very nervous—Mathiesen dragged him in—a little Italian clown who was just sitting there on a kitchen chair playing the mandolin was discreetly dispatched to the station hotel for beef patties and beer—that cheered things up considerably—but then Munch needed to sleep, and we got him installed on a sofa… where the great artist slumbered—the rest of us had moved four rooms away so as not to disturb him.'[19]

During his time in Storm P's apartment, which probably only lasted the one night, Munch made a charcoal drawing of Storm P, which is sadly no longer to be found, and Storm P made an ink drawing of Munch in a highly uncharacteristic style.[20] Shortly after this, on 3 October 1908, Munch admitted himself to Professor Daniel Jacobson's Copenhagen nerve clinic, where he stayed for the next eight months.[21]

In many ways, the defeatist atmosphere of the painting mentioned above anticipates Freud's *Civilisation and Its Discontents*, 1930, which was written during the run up to the second great war of the twentieth century. Of the book, in the foreword to his collection of essays *Mere byrde til kulturen* (*More Burdens to Culture*), Per Aage Brandt writes:

The phrase 'burdens of culture', the Danish translation of Freud's *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (1930), points to the pressure of neuroses caused by the burden of cultural norms in the face of increasing socialisation. *But who can foresee the outcome?*, as Freud ends his essay, already aware of where a certain German culture was heading. But culture is also civilisation, the exchange of thoughts and information beyond the borders of culture, participation in collective human intelligence, which like art exists beyond politics, language and all other borders.

The burdens of culture cannot be made more bearable by some fantasy of reverting to a culture that crawls at the level of nature, especially when it comes to human nature, which as Freud saw is a particularly malignant form of bestiality. Any alleviation has to come from the cultivation of the ingenious, the refined and the civilised in human, collective and—at best—rational subjectivity. Or at least momentarily rational. We cannot escape what is beyond these momentary glimpses, just as we cannot escape our own social existence; and we will probably end up admitting that being part of the social is and will continue to be our suffering, just as subjectivity itself is suffering, and that both sufferings are one and the same. These sufferings are probably incurable, which means we can choose to give up and abandon ourselves to the things that happen when we cultivate difference, cultural specificity, the national, the ethnic, the racial; or we can make them bearable by grasping and developing the inbuilt potential of the cultural to transcend the idiocy of the specific, to become, quite simply, culture, civilisation, art, form, an unlimited process of translation.[22]

I am not sure whether this entirely covers Storm P's point of view. The painting *Kultur* is far too ambiguous for that. I would say that what we have here is a painting that anticipates the cultural pessimism of Freud's *Civilisation and Its Discontents*, as well as Oswald Spengler's canonical *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (*The Decline of the West*), 1918; a cultural pessimism that makes it impossible to believe that culture is capable of filling the void of empty transcendence. Whilst it might be impossible to tell whether the red banners signal salvation or damnation, there is no doubt that it is about culture as suffering, and this is what distinguishes it from all other painting in Denmark in the early twentieth century. His basic motifs and motivation are already present: modernity and the futuristic (the high-rise buildings, America), social indignation (the banners) and the standing battle between altruism and misanthropy—for once without the irony that later became the vehicle to mediate these oppositions.

And *Culture*, of course, is about the absent or empty look in the eyes, which here and in many of his other paintings are nothing more than holes.[23]

After Storm P's cartoons of Peter and Ping had made him popular in Denmark, in 1931 he agreed to the communist press Monde publishing a selection of his earlier, socially satirical drawings in the journal *Social Kunst* (*Social Art*). The same drawings were exhibited by the Danish radical splinter group The Student's Society. A number of critics took exception to what they saw as the deep split between the two. Bing writes that one of these critics was Poul Henningsen, who cut to the bone by drawing a clear dividing line:

> **If there are plenty of poor, starving children with death's heads in the drawings, then Storm P is an artist with a social conscience. If thousands are entertained daily by his Peter and Ping figures with all their everyday doings, then it is nothing more than a bourgeois, conservative pastime, out of touch with the signs of the times.[24]**

According to Jens Bing, "Poul Henningsen totally underestimated the value of the former— consigning them to Storm P's 'intellectually pubescent works' and dismissing them as 'effluents'. That the latter, however, pleases so many is no surprise in his mind, given that he sees this as home territory for the artist—'Storm Petersen is at heart conservative... uncritical and unsatirical.'"[25]

When Storm P was asked if he agreed with Henningsen's critique and opinion that Peter and Ping were the most valuable and long-lasting thing he had produced, he replied:

> **Let me tell you one thing: The only valuable thing about what I do is that I need to earn money, because I have a large family to support! There is absolutely nothing else of value in what I do. And since I earn more from Peter and Ping than from anything else, I do Peter and Ping.[26]**

More than anything else this sounds like what is called *eine Schutzbehauptung* in German—ie a claim made in self-defence. Maybe not to defend himself against Henningsen and his other critics, but perhaps more to protect himself from himself and his own latent awareness.

The early works from the beginning of the century were definitely not pubescent, rather the contrary: cynical, nonchalantly painted works of 'old age' in the best sense. An insight that can be a heavy burden to bear.

1 Benjamin, Walter, "Central Park", *New German Critique*, Lloyd Spender and Mark Harrington trans, no 34, winter 1985, p 50. Translators' note 6.1 on Jugendstil: "literally, the style of youth, the specifically German form of Art Nouveau", p 56.

2 Since Storm P painted largely on the basis of an idea, rather than being overly interested in the painting as a painting (his style is arbitrary, the end justifies the means) it makes no sense to restrict the concept and medium of painting to oils on canvas. The subject and medium are so closely connected in his works that he would be called a conceptual painter today. So when I use the term 'painting', it can also refer to works in pencil, pen, gouache or watercolour—on cardboard or on paper.

3 Cynic, from the Greek kyon for dog here refers to a contemptuous or block-headed way of painting; direct expression, undaunted.

4 It is interesting how this motif, which Storm P used from as early as 1919, anticipates Samuel Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* from 1949 (first performed as a radio play in 1952, and on stage in 1953). In both acts of the play the set is a bare tree on a deserted country road. Here the tramps Vladimir and Estragon wait for Godot—who never arrives—without knowing why and without even knowing who he is. While they wait, restless, reminiscing Vladimir (called Didi) and sluggish, forgetful Estragon (called Gogo) pass the time talking, arguing, philosophising, singing and playing, all without going anywhere. Their answer to the repeated question of why they have to stay is always the same: "We're waiting for Godot."

5 For an account of the transformation of classical Cynicism as an antidote to power, to the cynicism of contemporary capitalism, see Sloterdijk, Peter, *Critique of Cynical Reason*, Michael Eldred trans, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. Originally published as *Kritik der zynischen Vernunft*, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1983.

6 "Irony rises and subverts; humor falls and perverts." Foucault, Michel, Theatrum Philosophicum, *Critique* no 282, 1970, pp 885–908.

7 The exhibition was arranged by Herwarth Walden, who had published the journal *Der Sturm* in Berlin since March 1910 and who opened a gallery of the same name in 1912. Walden did not meet Storm P during his time in Copenhagen, and was probably given his name by other Scandinavian contacts. In her article "Der Sturm och Sverige", from the catalogue *Nell Walden & Der Sturm*, Jessica Sjöholm Skrubbe writes: "Storm Petersen contacted Der Sturm after the Die Futuristen exhibition (1912 in Copenhagen). In 1913 the Copenhagen press reported that already the same year he was to exhibit at Der Sturm (Mariot Werenskiold, 'Herwarth Walden', 1980, p 148). His participation in the announced exhibition cannot, however, be confirmed. But two of his woodcuts were published in the journal Der Sturm in 1913, and in 1923 he exhibited with Emilio Pettoruti at Der Sturm in Berlin." Sjöholm Skrubbe, Jessica, Annelie Tuveros, Maaike van Rijn and Birthe Wibrand (eds), *Nell Walden & Der Sturm*, Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag / Mjellby Konstmuseum, 2015, p 241.

8 Brandt, Nikolaj, "Storm P. – Johannes Holbek and Jens Lund", *Jens Lund – mesterlige art nouveau arabesker*, Teresa Nielsen ed, Vejen Kunstmuseum, 2014, pp 160-161. The text accompanying the caricature *Jens Lunds Udstilling* [*Jens Lund's Exhibition*] reads,"The vice of the audience: 'Paintings that cannot be understood rightly offend a man like I who cannot, also in artistic matters, be regarded as a complete idiot!'"

9 "she [Katherine Dreier, ed] was eager to explain that the selection of works was the consequence of conversations she had shared with a wide range of European artists over the course of a lengthy scouting trip during the spring and summer of 1926. In the foreword to the exhibition catalogue she thanked, among others, Duchamp, who had accompanied her in Paris and Italy; Fernand Léger, who had shown her the work of his best students in Paris; and Kurt Schwitters, who had introduced her to the community of abstract artists in Hannover." Wilson, Kristina, "'One Big Painting': A New View of Modern Art at the Brooklyn Museum", *The Société Anonyme: Modernism for America*, Jennifer R Gross (ed), New Haven, CT: Yale University Press p 82.

The exhibition was a collective manifestation, aimed at demonstrating that modernism was a universal and transnational language: "No matter what the opinion might be regarding the permanency of the movement presented by this exhibition of paintings and sculpture, it is beyond doubt that the tendency to break away from the tradition of Raphael is not local, nor is it merely the whimsical creation of the moment. It has its exponents and its followers in all countries, and even before the mental and social reactions brought about by the great War, 'Modern Art' made its appearance in many notable exhibitions in this country and in Europe. Without at least a section devoted to works of this category, no contemporary exhibition can claim to display comprehensively the art of today." Katherine Dreier in the introduction to the exhibition catalogue *International Exhibition of Modern Art*, Brooklyn, NY: Brooklyn Museum, 1926.

10 The artists' group De 13 (which later had many more members), which Storm P was a member of, had its first exhibition at Den Frie in Copenhagen in 1909. The core group consisted of Storm P, Georg Thylstrup, Andreas Vinding, Olaf Rude, Christian Engelstoft, Carl Holm, Carl Jensen, Aksel Jørgensen, Jais Nielsen, William Scharff, Ørnulf Salicath, Axel P. Jensen and Einar Utzon-Frank. The group split in 1912, when Olaf Rude, Carl Holm, Carl Jensen, Aksel Jørgensen, William Scharff, Ørnulf Salicath, Axel P Jensen left to form another group.

11 Poggioli, Renato, *The Theory of the Avant-Garde*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968, p 81.

12 Bing, Jens, *Maleren Storm P*, Copenhagen: Storm P Museum, 1985, p 59.

13 Bing, *Maleren Storm P*, p 22.

14 See Krauss, Rosalind, "Der Tod der Fachkenntnisse und Kunstfertigkeiten", *Texte zur Kunst*, vol 20, 1995, pp 61–67.

15 The author is here reproducing a longer passage from Bing's book, incl. notes (see note 16-21).

16 Munch in a letter to Jappe Nilssen dated 17 October 1908, published in Holmboe Bang, Erna (ed), *Edvard Munchs kriseår: Belyst i brever*, Oslo: Gyldendal, 1963, p 24.

17 Eggum, Arne, *Edvard Munch: malerier, skisser og studier*, Oslo: Stenersen, 1983, p 236.

18 Interview with Storm P in the Danish newspaper *Politiken*, 15 May 1927.

19 Interview with Storm P, *Politiken*, 13 September 1947.

20 Storm P's account of Munch staying in his apartment differs. First he says he stayed one night (see footnote 18), then 20 years later four nights (see footnote 19).

21 Bing, *Maleren Storm P*, pp 30–31. On Munch's time in Denmark see Eggum, Arne, "Edvard Munch i Danmark", *Louisiana Revy*, no 1, 1975, pp 23–27; and Rohde, HP, "Edvard Munch på klinik i København", *Kunst og Kultur*, 1963, pp 259–270.

22 Brandt, Per Aage, *Mere byrde til kulturen*. Copenhagen: Politisk Revy, 1991, pp 7–8.

23 On this gaze and faciality Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write:

> '[...] we encountered two axes, significance and subjectification. We saw that there were two very different semiotic systems, or even two strata. Significance is never without a white wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies. Subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies. Since all semiotics are mixed and strata come at least in twos, it should come as no surprise that a very special mechanism is situated at that intersection. Oddly enough, it is a face: the white wall/black hole system. A broad face with white cheeks, a chalk face with eyes cut in for a black hole. Clown head, white clown, moon-white mime, angel of death, Holy Shroud. The face is not an envelope exterior to the person that speaks, thinks, or feels. The form of the signifier in language, even its units, would remain indeterminate if the potential listener did not use the face of the speaker to guide his or her choices ("Hey, he seems angry..."; "He couldn't say it..."; "You see my face when I'm talking to you..."; "look at me carefully..."). A child, woman, man, father, boss, teacher, police officer, does not speak a general language but one whose signifying traits are linked to specific faciality traits.'
>
> 'The face is not animal, but neither is it human in general; there is even something absolutely inhuman about the face. It would be an error to proceed as though the face became inhuman only beyond a certain threshold: closeup, extreme magnification, recondite expression, etc. The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start. It is by nature a closeup, with its inanimate surfaces, its shining black holes, its emptiness and boredom. Bunker-face. To the point that if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to animality, nor even by returning to the head, but by quite spiritual and special becomings-animal, by strange true becomings that get past the wall and get out of the black holes, that make faciality traits themselves finally elude the organization of the face – freckles dashing toward the horizon, hair carried off by the wind, eyes you traverse instead of seeing yourself in or gazing into in those glum face-to-face encounters between signifying subjectivities.'
> Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Brian Mussumi trans, New York and London: Continuum, 1988, p 186, pp 189–190.

24 Poul Henningsen in *Politiken*, 17 October 1931.

25 Bing, *Maleren Storm P*, p 77.

26 Interview with Storm P, *Ekstrabladet*, 31 October 1931.

JEN

IN TÜBING

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IN TÜRING

Gabriel von Max
Pithecanthropus Alalus
1894

Gabriel von Max
The Art Critics, Two Monkeys Looking at a Painting,
1889

Gabriel von Max
Anthropological Teaching
circa 1900

Gabriel von Max
Pain Forgotten (Schmerzvergessen) (III)
1904

Werner Büttner
Welfare State Impression I
1980

Max Klinger
Darwinian Theory
1875

Claus Carstensen
Affenqual in Tübingen
2012

Chunk!
Stop Ape Agony in Tübingen—
Demonstration on the occasion of the International Day for the Abolition of Animal Experiments.
Inset text

Claus Carstensen
and Manuel Ocampo
Chromophobia (The Unseen Power of the Monochrome)
2011

If anyone held the idea that death and suffering are not an integral part of nature, the delusion is corrected. If there was a temptation to treat ritual as a magic lamp to be rubbed for gaining unlimited riches and power, ritual shows its other side. If the hierarchy of values was crudely material, it is dramatically undermined by paradox and contradiction. In paiting such dark themes, pollution symbols are as necessary as the use of black in any depiction whatsoever. Therefore we find corruption enshrined in sacred places and times.
Mary Douglas

The same impulse to impose order which brings them (*the ideas of purity and impurity*) into existence can be supposed to be continually modifying or enriching them.
Mary Douglas

Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt, there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements.
Mary Douglas

... colour is made out to be the property of some 'foreign' body...
David Batchelor

... when colours invade community life, we get a sense of affiliation, privileges and rage.
Per Aage Brandt

HUMAN NATURE AND ANIMAL NATURE

Raymond Tallis

Humans as Organisms

What kind of being am I? It is a question that from time to time exercises all of us. It presents a particular challenge to secular humanists who aspire to make sense of themselves without appealing to supernatural accounts of their origin, their nature and their destination.

One obvious answer is that we are animals; more fundamentally, that we are organisms. As Thomas Suddendorf has put it:

> **Like all living organisms, humans metabolize and reproduce. Your genome uses the same dictionary as a tulip and overlaps considerably with the genetic makeup of yeast, bananas, and mice. You are an *animal*. Like all animals, you have to eat other organisms—whether plant, fungus, or animal—for sustenance. You tend to approach things you want to eat while avoiding things that want to eat you, just as spiders do. You are a *vertebrate*. Like all vertebrates, your body has a spinal cord that leads up to the brain. Your skeleton is based on the same blueprint—four limbs and five digits—as that of a crocodile. You are a *mammal*. Like all placental mammals, you grew inside your mother and after birth received her milk (or someone else's).... You are a *primate*. Like other primates, you have an immensely useful opposable thumb.... You are a *hominid*. Like all hominids you have shoulders that allow your arms to fully rotate. Your closest living animal relative is a chimpanzee.**[1]

That would seem to locate us very precisely in the order of things; but Suddendorf then adds that "it would be prudent of me to call you an ape only from a safe distance".[2]

Such name-calling would not only be imprudent (or indeed impudent), it would be inaccurate. An enormous gulf separates us from the other inhabitants of the animal kingdom, even our nearest primate kin. Neuroscientist VS Ramachandran was not exaggerating when he asserted that humans "transcend apehood to the same degree by which life transcends mundane chemistry and physics".[3] So, while it is true that we are animals, that is only the beginning, not the end, of our story.

It should not seem to be necessary to have to say this. Any arguments on this score could be settled by inviting the 'animalisers' of humankind to open their eyes and see what is in front of their own noses, comparing animal life lived in the natural world with human lives lived in the human world. Things are not, however, as straightforward as this for reasons it is worth touching on before we explore the unique ways in which humans are different from all other living creatures.

There are two main reasons why we might be inclined to deny that we are special. The first is the (false) belief that, if we set aside supernatural accounts of what we are, then we are obliged to embrace naturalistic accounts, which reduce us, ultimately, to pieces of nature. The script (so the story goes), according to which we live our lives, or by which our lives are lived for us, is a biological script. Not only are we generated by biological processes and die of biological causes, but our life course between birth and death is to be entirely, or at least ultimately, explained by the laws of nature. To deny this, it is argued, is implicitly or even explicitly to regress to a pre-scientific, religious account of our nature, and no self-respecting humanist would admit to this.

What is more, the argument continues, we have known since Charles Darwin that the processes that produced *H. sapiens* are identical to those that produce centipedes and blackbirds and chimpanzees. The differential survival and reproduction rates of spontaneous variants permits a process of natural selection that results in ever more complex and sophisticated organisms, culminating in creatures like you and me. To assert our fundamental differences from all other beasts, including those genetically closest to us, seems, so it is claimed, to deny the truth of the most powerful theory in biology. And the explanatory power of Darwin's theory is not in doubt; after all it has been supported by discoveries that had not been made, and by technologies he could not have imagined, when he published *On the Origin of Species* in 1859. Carbon dating, continental drift, detailed understanding of the genetics of natural selection and the demonstration of natural selection at work in experimental models using bacteria, as well as the ever more detailed 'joining of the dots' between species from the fossil record, have all contributed to the justified belief that the Theory of Evolution is one of the most tested, and confirmed, wide-ranging and visionary theories human beings have ever had.

In short, so the naturalisers argue, anything that smacks of human exceptionalism seems: a) to deny our commonality with other living creatures; b) to propose an abrupt break between us and our fellow primates; and c) to resist the overwhelming evidence of a continuous evolution from unicellular to complex creatures like ourselves. In short, they argue, it is to regress to pre-Darwinian biology. There is also the suspicion that our belief that we are 'special' is hardly surprising because it is we who are making the judgement: we give ourselves top marks because we are setting and marking the exam papers. It is also argued that we are less likely to appreciate the extraordinary capacities of other species because we are not privy to them. As Frans de Waal and others have claimed, *we* may not be smart enough to see how smart *they* are.[4] What is more, as Mary Midgley has pointed out, "human beings are judged by their ideal performance, animals by their actual ones".[5]

Even those who do acknowledge our exceptional nature often weaken their case by focusing on skills, preoccupations and faculties that are rarely deployed in everyday life, and are somewhat unevenly distributed among human beings. The capacity for extreme altruism to create art or have a passion for science is, of course, unique to humans; but human uniqueness extends far beyond this. It is wall-to-wall and, as I will discuss, is as evident in ordinary behaviour that we seem to share with animals, such as eating dinner, learning from experience and grooming ourselves.

Our estimates of the size of the gap between ourselves and other animals—notably our nearest primate kin—are affected by how we view the beings each side of the gap. We can narrow the gap by adopting a grossly simplified account of what is going on in human beings as they behave in everyday life. The most extreme endeavour in that direction was popular in the behaviourism that dominated psychology in the first half of the twentieth century. Behaviour was thought to be the product of classical and operant conditioning, acting on human organisms equipped with innate patterns of responses to stimuli. The role of reflective or deliberative consciousness was marginalised, thus closing the gap between human behaviour and that of other organisms.

Alternatively, the gap can be narrowed by ascribing complex modes of consciousness to animals—regulating their behaviour. Darwin speculated that "the senses and the intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc. of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient or even sometimes in a well-developed condition in the lower animals".[6] Suddendorf addresses this by contrasting the approach of the 'killjoys' and the 'romantics'. The killjoys adhere strictly to the 'canon' proposed by the nineteenth-century biologist Conway Lloyd Morgan, according to which we should not ascribe

behaviour to a higher psychological faculty when it can be ascribed to a lower one. The romantics are more inclined to attribute behaviour to higher faculties, comparable to those seen in humans. The appeal to evidence is often insufficient to resolve disputes between killjoys and romantics.

The case for the killjoys—with whom I align myself—is greatly strengthened by examining the overall activity of creatures in which putative signs of higher faculties have been identified—human and non-human animals. It is necessary to look beyond the individual piece of behaviour to connected patterns of behaviour and underlying faculties and capacities, or lack of them. For example, the comparatively simple person-to-person greeting "good morning" is fundamentally different from a friendly exchange of barks between dogs because such greetings draw on complex customs and practices regulating human greetings as well as the abstract notions they entrain, such as the concept of a 'morning'. On the other side of the gap, consider a favourite of the romantics: the caching behaviour of jays and other corvids who hide food for later consumption from competitors. The observation that how and where they hide food and for how long is influenced by the kind of food—perishable worms or stable nuts—has been used as evidence of 'mental time travel' and a sense of the future comparable to our own. If this were true, one would expect other manifestations of an idea of the future. But no such manifestations, nor anything comparable to the extraordinarily complex sense of the not-yet that is expressed in calendrical time, are evident in these species. We shall return to this later when we consider the unique temporal depth of human consciousness and self-consciousness.

One final preliminary point. From the fact that our human lives and human world are remote from the lives of other living creatures in the natural world, it does not follow that we can learn nothing about ourselves from the close study of other species. Jane Goodall, one of the great primatologists of recent years made this point:

> **It is only through real understanding of the ways in which chimpanzees and men show similarities of behaviour that we can reflect, with meaning, on the ways in which men and chimpanzees *differ*. And only then can we really begin to appreciate, in a biological and spiritual manner, the full extent of man's uniqueness.[7]**

Suddendorf has expressed a similar sentiment:

> **The repeated comparison of human abilities with those of other animals will bring into sharper focus what it is about the human mind that sets us apart.[8]**

In what follows, I shall set out some reasons for arguing that we are neither supernatural beings nor entirely part of nature. Rather, we are to a great extent *extra*-natural.

Neuromania and Darwinitis

I have touched on arguments that underpin what I have called 'Darwinitis'.[9] This is an inflamed, or pathological, variant of Darwinian thought. It assumes that Darwinism can explain not only the genesis of the organism *H. sapiens,* but also the human person. It is twinned with the other intellectual ailment of 'Neuromania', according to which the brain is not only a necessary condition for the complex individual and social consciousness and self-consciousness of human beings, but is a sufficient condition, such that persons are their brains. The connection between Darwinitis and Neuromania is obvious: if we are our brains, then we are identical with an evolved organ shaped by the survival imperatives that have dictated the development of other organisms. Because Neuromania is central to the idea that we are essentially animals whose mode of life is explicable in Darwinian terms, it is worth setting out briefly why it is false.

There is a prima facie case for identifying us with our brains. First, there is an intimate relationship between the brain and consciousness and self-conscious activity. At a very elementary level, the world of which I am immediately aware is that part of reality with which my brain is in causal contact. My basic 'where' is determined by the locations of my brain. I am aware of this room because my brain is in this room. The re-direction of my eyes, which are attached to my brain, will alter the visual reality available to me. Of course, I can be located outside of the immediate surroundings of my brain by information mediated through language, still and moving images and a multitude of other signs. But I can access these mediators only through their being in the vicinity of my brain. A book may transport me to the Battle of Hastings, but it can do so only if it falls within my visual field and hence be in the vicinity of my brain. Second, damage to my brain can alter my consciousness to the extent that it is clear that all consciousness—from the slightest tingle of sensation to the subtlest sense of self—is dependent on a functioning brain. So far as we can tell, our minds die with our brains. Thirdly, direct stimulation of the brain can give rise to episodes of awareness, which can sometimes be quite complex.
These observations, however, license only the conclusion that brain activity of the right kind is a necessary condition for consciousness, but not that it is a sufficient condition. The correlation between brain activity and conscious experience does not prove that brain activity causes consciousness and even less that brain activity is identical to consciousness.[10] However, the correlation is sufficient for the advocates of Neuromania to conclude that important similarities in the function and structure of human and other primate brains means that we are fundamentally the same as other primates in all respects that matter. Similar brains will have been forged under comparable circumstances to discharge similar duties. In sum, we are our brains, our brains are similar to other primate brains, so we are—despite surface differences—fundamentally similar to the 'other' great apes.

The flaw in the argument is in the starting assumption that human persons are brains, that personhood is 'brainhood'. It is fundamentally mistaken; the distance between ourselves as persons and ourselves as organisms is opened up courtesy of our brains, which give us access to a culture that we share with others and which has been transformed—and is being transformed at an accelerating pace—in the millions of years since hominins forked off from the other primates. This distance is built into the very nature of human consciousness, into its 'aboutness'. It begins with intentionality, in virtue of which we experience some of what happens in our brains as being 'about' objects and events that are other than themselves. What is distinctive about the intentionality of human consciousness is that: a) its objects are granted an existence and considered to have properties that are clearly separate from the perceiving subject; and b) that experience of them is shared through modes of joined, referential attention that are unique to humans. Such joining of attention is seen most explicitly in the act of pointing, which is both unique to humans and universal to them."[11] There are many other modes of more powerful, complex and layered modes of joining attention, most notably through spoken and written statements. Collectively, through the direct and indirect interaction of individual and groups of human beings over thousands of years, through trillions of cognitive handshakes, there is a fabric of knowledge and practise and understanding and togetherness built up that amounts to a community of minds. We find ever-more elaborate ways to collaborate in meeting our needs or acts of aggression. Chimpanzees get no closer to grand strategies than participants in a spontaneous pub brawl.

It is in the community of minds, not in the organic brain, that we find personhood and the mode of shared being that is central to our humanity. It is remote from, and not defined or constrained by, the characteristics of our biological brains shaped by evolutionary forces. That is why, as Suddendorf points out, it isn't clear "what is it about our brains that causes our minds to be special".[12] To look for our uniqueness in our brains is to be looking in the wrong place, just as those who seek the nature of human emotions such as love, or aesthetic experience, or a sense of justice, by using brain scans to peer into the darkness inside the skull, are looking in the wrong place. The development of the human mind is extracorporeal: in cultural—technological, institutional, cognitive—development gathered up in the notion of 'the human world' experienced through individual participation in a community of minds. The rate of this development accelerates with time, as is illustrated by the pace of change of technologies. Over a million years separates the pebble chopper from the hand-axe while the mere blink of a couple of hundred years separates the discovery of electromagnetism from mobile phones communicating through satellites.

The distance between the activity of evolved brains and the community of minds to which they give us access justifies the claim that we are *not* (just) organisms, or mere parts of organisms (such as brains), but persons, and that we are neither supernatural nor pieces of nature, but *extra*-natural.

That this is not as obvious as it should be is because we tend to apply to brains terms that should strictly be applied only to persons. It is routine to speak of brains 'deciding', 'guessing', 'wanting', etc. Personifying the brain licenses brainifying the person, and paves the way to Neuromania and Darwinitis.

In the sections that follow, I want to illustrate these very general observations concerning the distance between ourselves and beasts by examining various aspects of our human being.

Our Relationship to Our Bodies

As a secular humanist, I must acknowledge that we are in one sense inseparable from our bodies. We are not spirits or discarnate souls temporarily housed in bodies for the duration of a passage through nature from a prenatal to a post-mortem eternity. One way of highlighting the distance between ourselves as organisms and ourselves as persons is to look at the multi-dimensional character of our relationships to our bodies; to look at the 'em' in our embodiment.

There is a sense in which I *am* my body. At the most fundamental level, I *am* most immediately where my body is. My physical 'here' is where my body *is*. If it moves, I move. More precisely, if I move it, I move. The condition of my body—its development, its health, its decay—shape what it is like to be me and what I can do. There are dozens of parameters—cardiac rhythm, serum potassium, level of thyroxine—which, often unknown to me, hugely influence the character and even the

possibility of my consciousness between my body's birth, which is my birth, and its death, which is my death.

Even so, "I am my body" is not translatable to "I is my body" or "my body is my body". My life is not summarised by the material or biological history of my body. I am not a body, but *em*bodied—more precisely an embodied subject.

One dimension of the gap between the 'it' of my body and the 'I' that is me is contained in the relation of ownership: *my* body. My body as my most intimate property has endless personal, sexual, social, political and cultural ramifications. When we are dead ownership belongs to the state, but prior to that we are "the Lords and owners of our faces"—and of our arms and legs, and all the rest.[13] It is expressed in the right not to be touched without consent and the criminal law on assault and battery. Ownership can be compromised by the violations of others in the misuse of power, most intimately in sexual enslavement, most commonly in the other modes of domination by others. It can be extended in many directions, as when I measure and seek to control the properties of my body, instantiated in the common preoccupation with 'my weight'.

Ownership can slip into objectification, where one's body is experienced as an object—in one's own gaze, in the gaze of others, or in one's own gaze tinted by the imagined gaze of others. The body as visible object becomes 'my appearance'—susceptible to being judged as beautiful, ugly, slim, fat, old, young, or more elusively as impressive or unimpressive. This is one of the many places where the outlines of the body as object melt into the person as subject, and physical appearance becomes the figure one cuts and the beginning of a narrative as to how 'I' appear in the eyes of others. This has a complex relationship with one's material presence and what is evident to one's own, and others', senses.

Our relationship to, and hence distance from, our body is also elaborated by our agency. Our bodies—most prodigiously our grasping, grubbing, groping, cupping, catching, pulling, pushing, squeezing, fingering, dabbing, caressing, scratching, waving, threading, twisting, etc hands—are the immediate agents of our agency.[14] While in many of our actions there is no explicit distance between our doing and the flesh with which we do it—we simply walk, say, rather than 'do walking with our legs'—in many instances our bodies are explicit tools. This is most notable when we exploit the physical properties of our body, as when I exploit its opacity by standing up to block your view or mobilise its weight to squash the contents of an overfilled suitcase I am trying to close.

Our bodies are also objects of knowledge. There are many things *I* know about *it*. As humanity advances cognitively, and individuals share in that advance, there is an increasingly fact-based relationship to our bodies. Knowledge of its basic anatomy—that there is an item such as a bladder next to the rectum or even an exotic organ such as the spleen—becomes more widely disseminated. There is also basic quantification—a counted pulse, a height in feet and inches, a weight in pounds and ounces—that underpins self-monitoring. Such factual objectification is massively amplified through the advance of biomedical science generating countless facts about the contents of, mechanisms in and vulnerabilities of our bodies. While few of us are aware of the second messengers operating in our cells, or interleukin-1, most of us will be aware of having a four-chambered heart or a blood pressure. Our knowledge of our body is post-personal awareness of the pre-personal organism that makes our personal existence possible. While the knowledge is about the body, having that knowledge expresses a great distance between 'I' who know and the organism that is known. Incorporated in the seemingly simple thought "my blood pressure is too high" is a huge slice of our shared cognitive heritage.

Which brings us naturally on to another relationship, another aspect of the distance between us and our bodies: our caring for them. Of course, animals care for their bodies. Indeed, the greater part of their lives may be described as self-care; but in humans that care is utterly transformed.

The Transformation of Biological Functions

I earlier flagged up the error of locating human difference in high-end activities such as composing (or listening to) symphonies, arguing over matters of religious doctrine or fretting over transfinite numbers that occupy only a small part of the lives of even those who engage in them. Our human difference is present in every moment of our lives, most tellingly in those aspects in which we seem to be meeting biological needs we share with beasts. The evolution of a distinctively human culture and of a human world as the distinct theatre of our action has left nothing unchanged. Let me illustrate this with three examples: feeding, learning and grooming.

First, feeding. Supposing you invite me out for a meal. Having learnt that you have just taken on a big loan for a house, I choose the cheapest items on the menu and falsely declare that I am full after the main course, so as to spare you the expense of a pudding. A chimpanzee gives a banana to another chimpanzee, who eats it. Those afflicted by Darwinitis would like to say that both the chimp and I are doing similar things because we are both exhibiting 'feeding behaviour'. This identity of description, however, obscures huge differences between the chimp's behaviour and mine.

This is not just a local difference. Anyone who is acquainted with the most routine dinner table—the product of a vast number of deliberate actions on the part of those sitting round it—will be on their guard when they hear the phrase 'feeding behaviour' applied to both humans and beasts. An ordinary meal is the endpoint of a long journey away from biology. The ways in which dining is remote from feeding are protean. Cooking has attracted much attention, but there are many other dimensions to the difference: eating regulated by the clock and the calendar; the complex structure of meals and the grammar of what goes with what; the ritualistic, symbolic and celebratory aspects of eating; the multitude of items of tableware that have come from near and far; the journeys taken by the food to the table; the journeys undertaken by those who gather round the table; and the use of money as the all-purpose commodity to purchase food—these are but a few of the ways in which human dining is distanced from animal eating. These are all increasingly sophisticated aspects of Man, the animal who does things explicitly and whose natural medium is a community of minds extending geographically across the globe and historically into the accumulated consciousness of the race. The laid and laden table draws on four corners of the Earth and great tracts of past and present human understanding.

Next, 'learning behaviour'. Here's a fairly ordinary example: I decide to improve my career prospects by signing up for a degree course, which begins next year. I have a small child. I therefore do more babysitting this year in order to stockpile some tokens. Daisy the cow bumps into an electric wire and henceforth avoids that place. It could be said that both Daisy and I have been exhibiting learning behaviour. As with feeding, the difference between the two forms of behaviour is greater than the similarities.

The example I have just given may seem a little exotic, but it illustrates something important, universal and unique about human learning: it is not something that merely happens—it is *done* and *organised*. This is connected with the fact that humans practise skills and memorisation, while animals do not. What is more, animals do not teach their young, or not outside of Disneyland anyway. There is imitation of examples, but there is no structured teaching and certainly nothing corresponding to a curriculum. To teach another involves a sophisticated sense of where the other is 'at', an intuition of the contents and states of their mind. Human learning is a collective exercise and is mediated by institutions and involves not merely being shaped by experience, but acquiring factual knowledge. What is more, learning for humans is part of a narrative of a life that is led rather than merely lived. This is a far cry from the accidents of experience that are the primary drivers of animal learning.

Finally, the humble activity of grooming. I rise in the morning and brush my teeth. This involves an instrument (a toothbrush), amenities (running water) and materials (toothpaste). The ritual is timed. There are complex intermediaries. The brush is manufactured from synthetic materials and bought and stored in the relevant place. The water is delivered to the tooth-brusher by means of a distribution system that requires a multitude of engineering, bacteriological and other technologies, which engages civil society in cooperative activities to ensure supply and safety, and is underpinned by a system of billing secured by electronic systems that translate monitored consumption to invoices. And the toothpaste has been compounded according to formulae at least in theory based on dental knowledge. I could go on, but it is sufficient to compare all this boundless hinterland behind the morning tooth-brushing with the simple bodily attention involved in a cat licking itself clean, or a chimpanzee removing its fleas or having them removed for it by another.

Being in Time

All material objects—pebbles, trees, leopards—are in time. They endure or change with successive moments. Our bodies are no different. As polyphasic systems in dynamic equilibrium they change within an envelope of relative stability. My body is roughly the same item as it was a few years ago, notwithstanding the cumulative effects of subtle changes. This relatively unchanging organism is the necessary condition for a self that exists in time, but in an entirely different manner. The self has a mode of being in time that is different from that of material objects, and also from non-human animals. This difference is central to the gulf between a person and an organism; more specifically between an enduring body and a narratable, indeed narrated, self.[15]

Consider that body. It has a succession of states at a succession of times. At 12 noon, for example, it may be located in a particular place, exposed to a certain set of circumstances, and in consequence I may be having certain experiences. At 12:05 it may be located in another place, exposed to other circumstances, and I will be having other experiences. Ditto a day, a week, a year later. There is, however, nothing in the bodily states that relates them to explicit times. It is I who

connects the states of my body to particular clock or calendar times. Indeed, those states have no 'at' with respect to time: they are *in* time, but not *at* such-and-such a time. There is another important difference between the mode of temporal being of my body and of my self: memory. I can recall previous states of my body insofar as they were translated into experience. My body may have moved on, but my consciousness can reach back to previous states. Any attempt to explain this away by saying that the recollection is causally related to what is recollected runs into this problem: effects do not typically reach upstream to their causes.

Even less do material bodies rummage among their causal ancestors to identify one of interest, as when I rack my brains to recall something. This so-called 'auto-cueing' of memory is unique to humans. The explicit presence of the past, where individual events are located either in an objective time scheme ("this happened last Wednesday") or in a narrative of one's life ("this happened when I was a shy teenager") is central to personhood. Persons make sense of themselves and of the world from moment to moment by drawing on the past. This, what is more, is what gives explicit and bespoke meaning to our goals and to the future that we populate with anticipated or hoped for events, or outcomes we aim to bring about.

We have already touched on the claim that non-human animals have a comparable sense of past and future to the extent of engaging in 'mental time travelling' and the example of the caching behaviour of certain crows.[15] Where and how they hide their food for future use is influenced by their anticipation of the behaviour of fellow corvids, and this has suggested to some ethologists that they have a sense of a future to which they can travel in their imaginations. But there are alternative killjoy explanations based upon associative learning and that don't require an explicit sense of the future. The romantic explanation would be more persuasive if there were other manifestations of a sense of the future—in particular a shared collective future—in corvids and other creatures; Ludwig Wittgenstein expressed it beautifully, when he asked why it made sense to say that a dog may fear that his master may beat him, but not that he may beat him *tomorrow*. We could contrast the features of a human sense of the future with the smidgeon of futurity that is present in animal consciousness as follows:

Human Future	*Animal Future*
Boundless	Strictly limited
Open	Tied to particular functions
Shared ('our', 'your' 'their' future as well as mine)	Solitary
Extended through language: explicit Ordered through calendars etc.	Not explicit Not ordered

Their temporal depth, expressed in the explicit sense of a life being led rather than merely being (organically) lived, in a relationship to past and future events allocated a place in clock and calendrical time, and the narratives that grow out of, and guide the growth of, our lives, are the most striking of all the differences between persons and organisms.

Some Thoughts on Art

I have focused on basic everyday aspects of humanity to avoid the mistake of confining what distinguishes us from beasts to certain higher-level capacities or even marginal activities. To reiterate: our differences from the other animals, even our nearest primate kin, are wall-to-wall. However, it would be remiss in the context of the *Becoming Animal* project not at least to mention art. This is, of course, a vast topic, but here are a few observations.[16]

Art is above all a celebration of our freedom, of the extent to which we are uncoupled from the material world and the constraints of organic life. It is a celebration of life lived rather than merely endured; of our ability to face the world rather than merely be absorbed in it. Think of a landscape painting: through it, we can visit places without being exposed to them. A portrait allows us to look into the face of another without being ourselves gazed at. Art also enables us to cultivate our emotions—fear, delight, sadness—for their own sake. Such emotions are purified by being gathered up into the perfected forms of music, of narrative, of a canvas. We do other things for their own sake, as when we dance for the joy and spectacle of movement, rather than walking in order to get somewhere.

In art we play with the time that otherwise has a tight grip on us; music connects its successive moments with its beginning and its end creating a journey that is all arrival; the opening and closing of a narrative makes past, present and future co-present. These are different ways of healing the wound in the present tense—where ideas of experience hollow out actual experiences such that what is expected when experiences are sought for their own sake does not match reality—and of giving us fullness of presence, self-presence and of the presence of the world.

None of these functions of art, least of all experience for its own sake, has any biological counterpart. Neuro-aesthetics and evolutionary accounts of art must count as among the most egregious examples of point-missing in contemporary thought.

Summary and Conclusion

Many intellectual and social trends have influenced the way we think of our own nature. Two have been of particular importance. The first is post-Enlightenment secularisation, which challenges the idea that we are to be understood in supernatural terms—as beings only accidentally engaged with the natural world, handmade by God, endowed with immortal souls and having a destiny fundamentally different from that of other living creatures. The second is the spectacular rise of natural science, with increasingly powerful explanations that ignore questions of meaning and purpose. The most pertinent manifestation of the biological science has been the extraordinary success of evolutionary accounts of the origin of species, including *Homo sapiens*, in Darwinian terms. The consequence of these two trends has been a tendency to replace supernaturalism with naturalism and, more specifically, to deny the profound differences between humans and other animals, between humanity and animality.

In this chapter, I have subjected the idea that we are 'just animals' to critical examination and defended the claim that we are unique—and in unique respects. My central thesis has been that we human beings, while not supernatural, are *extra*-natural—a part *of* nature to some degree but, as long as we are alive, apart *from* nature, facing the world and constructing a reality in ways that are not paralleled by other species, not even our nearest primate kin.

I have criticised 'Neuromania'—the idea that we are identical with our evolved brains—and 'Darwinitis'—the belief that Darwinian evolution explains not only the origin and nature of the human organism (which it does), but also the human person (which it doesn't). Neither brain science nor evolutionary theory can do justice to the distinctive nature of the human community of minds, expressed in shared knowledge, norms, institutions and the collective past called 'histories'.

I hope what I have said will have been a useful contribution to setting the agenda for the fundamental challenge of humanism in the twenty-first century; namely to form a clear view of what kinds of beings we are. It is not enough to distance ourselves from religion by seeing its claims in historical and cultural terms, or as a sometimes violent and destructive, sometimes creative and constructive, force in human affairs. We need equally to distance ourselves from the naturalistic scientism that would reduce us to smart chimps. At the heart of such a humanism must be to recognise the extent to which we humans make our own nature.

1 Suddendorf, Thomas, *The Gap: The Science of What Separates Us from Other Animals*, New York, NY: Basic Books, 2013, p 1.
2 Suddendorf, *The Gap*, p 2.
3 Ramachandran, VS, *The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist's Quest for What Makes Us Human*, New York, NY: Norton, 2011, p iii.
4 de Waal, Frans, *Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?*, London: Granta Books, 2016.
5 Midgley, Mary, *Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature*, London: Routledge, 1978, p 210.
6 Darwin, Charles, *The Descent of Man*, quoted in Suddendorf, *The Gap*, p 41.
7 Goodall, Jane, *In the Shadow of Man*, London: Collins, 1971, quoted in Midgley, *Beast and Man*, p 227.
8 Suddendorf, *The Gap*, p 44.
9 The aetiology and manifestations of the condition are described in some detail in Raymond Tallis's *Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity*, London: Routledge Classics, 2016.
10 The idea that the brain is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of human consciousness is shared with a significant minority of contemporary thinkers. One of the earliest and clearest statements of this position is in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *The Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (trans), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.
11 See, for example, Tallis, Raymond, *Michelangelo's Finger: An Inquiry into Everyday Transcendence*, London: Atlantic, 2010.
12 Suddendorf, *The Gap*, p 38.
13 William Shakespeare *Sonnets* 94.
14 See Tallis, Raymond, *The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003.
15 For an extensive discussion of human time—and its relationship to our unique powers of voluntary action—see Tallis, Raymond, *Of Time and Lamentation: Reflections on Transience*, Newcastle: Agenda Publishing, 2017.
16 A more extensive account of the nature of the arts is in Raymond Tallis's (with Julian Spalding) *Summers of Discontent: The Purpose of the Arts Today*, London: Bitter Lemon Press, 2014.

S CRACKS

James Ensor
Strange Insects
1888

Steven Parrino
Hell's Angels
1985

Peter Louis-Jensen
Fragment A
1960

Isa Genzken
Basic Research
1989

Alfred Kubin
Swarm Spirits
1903

Alfred Kubin
The Swamp
1903-1905


WORLDS FORBIDDEN
FORBIDDEN WORLDS

Andy Hope 1930
Robot Empire
2005

Andy Hope 1930
Amazing
2005

The machine of earlier times works in an exactly symmetrical way. If, in the machine of the moderns, the outside is produced through the exclusion of an inside and the inhuman produced by animalizing the human, here the inside is obtained through the inclusion of an outside, and the non-man is produced by the humanization of an animal: the man-ape, the enfant sauvage or Homo ferus, but also and above all the slave, the barbarian, and the foreigner, as figures of an animal in human form.

Both machines are able to function only by establishing a zone of indifference at their centers, within which—like a "missing link" which is always lacking because it is already virtually present—the articulation between human and animal, man and non-man, speaking being and living being, must take place. Like every space of exception, this zone is, in truth, perfectly empty, and the truly human being who should occur there is only the place of a ceaselessly updated decision in which the caesurae and their rearticulation are always dislocated and displaced anew. What would thus be obtained, however, is neither an animal life nor a human life, but only a life that is separated and excluded from itself—only a bare life.
Giorgio Agamben

Andy Hope 1930
X-Medley 19
2012

DA

RWAND

At least fifty mostly decomposed cadavers covered the floor, wadded in clothing, their belongings strewn about and smashed. Macheted skulls had rolled here and there.

The dead looked like pictures of the dead. They did not smell. They did not buzz with flies. They had been killed thirteen months earlier, and they hadn't been moved.
Philip Gourevitch

The killers killed all day at Nyarubuye. At night they cut the Achilles tendons of survivors and went off to feast behind the church, roasting cattle looted from their victims in big fires, and drinking beer. (Bottled beer, banana beer– Rwandans may not drink more beer than other Africans, but they drink prodigous quantities of it around the clock.) And, in the morning, still drunk after whatever sleep they could find beneath the cries of their prey, the killers at Nyarubuye went back and killed again. Day after day, minute to minute, Tutsi by Tutsi: all across Rwanda, they worked like that.
Philip Gourevitch

The talk about Kibeho had started when Alexandre asked me if I had been to the church at Nyarubuye to see the memorial there of the unburied dead from the genocide. I hadn't yet, and although when I did go I didn't regret it, I gave Alexandre what I thought–and still think–was a good argument against such places. I said that I was resistant to the very idea of leaving bodies like that, forever in their state of violation–on display as monuments to the crime against them, and to the armies that had stopped the killing, as much as to the lives they had lost. Such places contradicted the spirit of the popular Rwandan T-shirt: "Genocide. Bury the dead, not the truth."
Philip Gourevitch

Jan Grarup
Rwanda
1994

Jan Grarup
Rwanda
1994

In discussions of us-against-them scenarios of popular violence, the fashion these days is to speak of mass hatred. But while hatred can be animating, it appeals to weakness. The 'authors' of the genocide, as Rwandans call them, understood that in order to move huge number of weak people to do wrong, it is necessary to appeal to their desire for strength - and the gray force that really drives people is power. Hatred and power are both, in their different ways, passions. The difference is that hatred is purely negative, while power is essentially positive: you surrender to hatred, but you aspire to power.
Philip Gourevitch

Even mobs and riots have a design, and great and sustained destruction requires great ambition.
Philip Gourevitch

ISSUES WITH ATHEISM

Frederik Stjernfelt

Introduction

In an era where religion in many guises is once again on the march in the wake of the many secularising movements of the seventeenth to twentieth centuries, non- or anti-theist positions of many sorts face new challenges. This means that atheism, but also agnosticism, secularism, indifferentism (the idea that everybody is blessed in his or her own faith), eclecticism, free-thinking, scientific or liberal world views, even deism and theological rationalism, no longer can assume to be surfing with the tide of progress and evolution, and so look forward to the slow withering away of theistic religion. Non-believers of many sorts find that, once again, they have to argue offensively—and possibly offending—against theist positions, particularly in Christianity and Islam, on some occasions re-experiencing, to their surprise, seventeenth-and eighteenth-century conditions of threats, legal persecution or even violence emerging from radicals among the theists.[1]

This means that explicit atheist criticisms of religion have achieved a new relevance, as documented by the publicity surrounding the famous 'four horsemen' of contemporary atheism, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens.[2] In 2011, the latter died a painful death of cancer, which was not beyond the decency limit of certain believers to exploit: God took his first revenge on a horseman. I fear that we are certain to face similar outbreaks of holy malicious glee when the three others, sooner or later, shall draw their last breath. I shall not here go into the vast amount of arguments against organised religions and their doctrines, which new atheism has produced during the recent decades—much of them well-argued, useful, even with a certain sad necessity. I shall rather investigate the kinds of problems non-believers themselves face in their more or less spontaneous ontology, once the easy way out of answering all ontological and ethical riddles with one holy syllable is cancelled. Defending non-belief not only comes with attacking beliefs, but should also include a sincere attempt to understand the new kind of problems that non-belief entails. Not only because this might add to the understanding of the rage of the believers faced with non-belief, but also because of the fact that such problems have been—and are—attacked, more or less successfully, by a series of different approaches beyond religion: those of the sciences, the arts, political programmes, ideologies and other central domains and procedures of modern liberal societies.

There are indeed many such problems, and I cannot address all of them here, suffice it to pick a couple of the most prominent examples.

The Man-Animal Borderline

How should the borderline between human beings and animals be understood when diverging from divine creation? In theist religions, there is a categorical, ontological distinction between human beings and animals, the former being created in the likeness of the deity—whatever that may mean in terms of degrees of likeness. When that explanation vanishes, the first thing that happens, of course, is that other likenesses, not of that between God and man, but of those between human beings and animals, grow in prominence. Already in antiquity, man could be seen as the 'thinking animal' or 'rational animal',[3] and the many obvious similarities in terms of bodily structure, functions, behaviour and reproduction between higher animals and humans come to play centre stage. The different theories of evolution emerging in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were, of course, the immediate scientific answer to this challenge: human beings, with all their special capacities, were taken to be the result of evolution like all other biological species. This immediately gave rise to different ways of trying to cope with the human-animal difference on new terms—ranging from sociobiology and its promises that all things human can be explained in the same terms as animal behaviours in general, or, complementarily, the idea of biosemiotics: that central capacities of human sign use must already be realised, to different degrees, in higher if not also lower animal species.[4] From the other side, this is met with the impressive growth of cognitive ethology,[5] charting the ever-new, surprisingly complex and intelligent cognitive and communicative abilities of many species, including some species previously considered 'lower', like insects, arachnids or octopi.[6] Conversely, many are philosophical ideas invented to attempt to redefine, in the absence of an eternal soul, what really remains distinctive for human animals as opposed to other beasts: language, symbols, empathy, culture, tool use, society, reflection, prohibitions or even religion itself.

But still, some difference remains, and in modern societies, this difference becomes clothed in political issues: human beings are the only species endowed with the full palette of individual rights, and even if ideas may be ventilated that certain selected animal species or individuals should enjoy certain rights, the political structures of all modern societies basically stick to a rather strict borderline here. Most often, if animals are ascribed rights, it will typically be animals taken as species rather than as individuals that are at stake, as seen in conservationist arguments for the right of existing species to survive in their natural habitats. A recent attempt to argue for the protection of individual rights among great apes, thus making them proper legal subjects, was turned down by a New York court.[7]

As Steve Fuller has recently pointed out, however, the Darwinist and the liberal-democratic principles of such cases may be on an overlooked collision course: there is nothing at all in Darwinist principles that supports any special treatment of our own species. Thus, there is no hindrance to the scientific development of biology erasing the political man-animal distinction, with a potential severe erosion of human rights as a result.[8] Fuller, for that reason, advocates a return to some of the compromises found between religion and the Enlightenment, such as deism or unitarianism, in order to insist on man's privileged status. He argues that the theist principle of the godlike-ness of human beings should be translated into Futurist ideas of the human race as a sort of maieutic assistant of the deity in the process of evolution, in order to grant that the future direction of evolution be oriented toward the spread and enhancement of human values on Earth, in the solar system, even ultimately to the cosmos at large.

Unitarianism goes against standard Christian beliefs in the Trinity, claiming in Fuller's reinterpretation that humans, created in the image of God, are themselves potentially godly—an instrument for taking creation further and perfecting it. Deists claim the existence of a natural deity that has created the world and remains the inspiration for the different interpretations by human religious systems—and that, in some variants, stands back from creation, leaving it to human beings to take its divine blueprint further. In both cases, unitarianism and deism, the assumption is that an overlooked danger of modern science is that it dissolves not only theist deities, but also human beings—by making them into one arbitrary genome sequence among others. Here Fuller is out to defend the special status of human beings, by claiming their privileged connection to the godhead and their role as divine co-creators in the cosmos.

These are science-fiction speculations, of course, but they give a pedagogically clear idea of what is at stake. In the arts, the blurring of the man-animal borderline has given rise to an ever-growing fauna of intermediary creatures with different mixtures of human and animal features—taking man down to the level of beasts, or elevating animals to noble creatures on a par with, or even above, human beings.[9] This is evident across literature, painting, film, popular culture and much else. The whole of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century wave of fantasy fiction can be seen through this perspective, with an entire genre that can be defined as parallel versions of the European Middle Ages, plus a number of very specific provisos. It is not the Middle Ages as such, but specifically the period after the invention of the crossbow and before the invention of powder. Added to this are multiple different humanoid species that are taken from old mythologies or new, and, interestingly, subtracted from this is the theist religion that dominated the real, non-fantasy Middle Ages. In a certain sense, this genre reflects upon how the world would have looked in the absence of a theist deity creating man in his likeness; instead emerges the whole spectrum of men, dwarves, elves, orcs, hobbits and much more. Such scary imagery of a multiplicity of humanoid species, or in-between existences, of half-human, half-animal existences also invigorate much of nineteenth- and twentieth-century visual arts, from Max Ernst to the *Alien* movies. A rich repository of possibilities to be exhumed and reused in such aesthetic experiments, of course, is the strange beings of religions and mythologies, angels, devils, djinns, pixies, etc, with the important proviso that their role now changes fundamentally: no longer distinct beings on different shelves of creation or from different levels of a cosmic battle, but rather disturbing signs of the possibility that any difference between us and them could be a matter of grade only.

The Life-Death Borderline

How should the transition from life to death be imagined in the absence of a soul's eternal life, or the resurrection of the body? Typically, a central facility of theism is its explanation and giving meaning to the disturbing fact of death. The fact that all sexually reproducing species incorporate the death of the individual some time after the age of passing on their genes during reproduction (as opposed to non-sexual reproduction by cell division where the individual in a certain sense escapes death by division and may live forever) obviously clashes with the wishes that the individual may entertain to continue or even eternalise his or her life and projects. While the first human-animal borderline energises a large series of both scientific and artistic attempts to negotiate it in a non-religious setting, science comes off easier in this case: death is seen now merely as the cessation of life, and few of the many scientific types of question in the former case appear here. Here, the focus comes to lie upon the opportunity to extend life as far as possible, playing into the hands of that strange intermixture of science, rules of thumb and technique that is modern medical science. Medicine, along with contributory disciplines in the bio-nanotechnology field of the sciences, is increasingly taking the financial and institutional lead among the disciplines of academia, from which it is not likely to be dethroned in any foreseeable future.[10] If, in a theist frame of mind, death is the passage to the next world, it may be invested with fear and trembling, but for completely different reasons: will behaviour in this life as prescribed by the churchly institutions suffice to grant a pleasant afterlife, or not? This may be frightening enough, of course, to the extent that the alternative is nothing but eternal damnation, but still it is very different from the prospect of entering an intermediary zone between life and death where the ultimate outcome is complete disappearance, not passing a theological threshold. As Woody Allen once said:

> **I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality through not dying. I don't want to live on in the hearts of my countrymen; I want to live on in my apartment.[11]**

In the arts, however, the transformation of the life-death borderline from a threshold to a final curtain has given rise to an obsession with phenomena that are hard to place on the life–death axis, from Edgar Allan Poe's interest in the investigation of the psychology of dying, even of the newly dead, to all sorts of ghosts, severe illnesses, quasi-living matter, etc.[12] Again, imagery from the religions may recirculate—but with quite different consequences. Gone is the moralist imperative radiating from the memento mori pictures—remember, you shall die (so use your life in a way so as to aim for heaven rather than hell)—now, rather: remember, you shall die, period. On this, of course, rather different conclusions may be grafted: remember, you shall die, so make the most of it while you're here, achieve some results that may outlast your bodily being, behave well towards other deadly beings during your short time on Earth—or, do *not* behave, cheat your way through life for there will be no punishment afterwards anyway. There is not any simple answer once the (relative) reassurance of theism has disappeared, which is why the intermediary state between life and death now achieves its own scare, and hospitals rather than graveyards become principal sites of horror in popular

Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde
2013

imagination as well as the arts, such as feature films like *The Hospital*, 2013.[13]

Value and Authority in an Empty Space

How should existence of value and authority in a godless world be founded? In the ingenious semiotic structures constructed by theisms, all of the important and undecided issues of human life are solved in one and the same overarching narrative. The precise answers of course differ in between the many different currents, sects, branches and theologies of those religions, but they share the structure that ultimately the existence of one, humanlike, omnipotent deity affords the coherence of the narrative as well as the details of its answers.

The absence of the foundation of value and authority in a deity is probably what has caused most concern among men of faith. When there's no god, everything is permitted, in Nietzsche's famous aphorism; correlatively, there is the anecdote pitting the English positivist AJ Ayer against a Christian believer. To the latter's question why the philosopher, being an atheist, did not rob, rape and murder, now that he had no faith to hold him back, Ayer answered: "Would you really do that if there were no God?".[14] The implied answer, of course, is "no", but the reason for this no is not easily given, neither is any easy guarantee of its truth. Many are the attempted solutions to find a reason for values and authority in rationality: in the intrinsic dignity of human beings; in the absolute status of the moral law; in the biology of the human species; in tradition; in the procedures of modern liberal democracies; in decisionism and fundamental existential choice and much more. The academic attempt to chart the various value systems and governing structures of different human societies, historical epochs, state types, etc in anthropology, sociology and history provides an enormous empirical array of data documenting how such issues have been solved and motivated in specific societies and cultures. Famously, many—but not all—of such chartings have attempted to abstain from judging between them, ultimately taking the easy way out of relativism.[15] Still, on a lot of basic issues—like the taboo of taking human lives except for in special circumstances—surprisingly many societies agree, while on others, agreement is scarce or wholly absent. So, academia does not have an easy solution here, which makes the issue that more acute for arts and politics—particularly narrative arts like novels, feature films and TV series that are ceaseless in their investigation of exactly these issues. There is no end to the real or imagined societal conflicts that are put to the test in artistic imagination, from Balzac and Thomas Mann to *Game of Thrones*, *House of Cards* and the twenty-first-century TV series that seem, with their long duration, particularly fit to brood over the foundation and fragility of societal value and power. Art forms closer to the instant moment continue to dwell with fascination on revolutions, coups, change of regimes, acts of terror and moments when the death of individuals may or may not be exchanged for political value, development or change.

Modern liberal democracies base themselves on procedural principles determining the ongoing negotiation, realisation and change of such structures—only pushing legitimation one level back, for now the very principles and values of those procedures themselves are what is taken as basic—and consequently investigated. Political theorist Carl Schmitt famously remarked that all modern political concepts are really secularised notions of (Christian) religion, which, if nothing else, grants that all of the basic unsolved issues of theist tradition move along into modern politics.[16] But that does not imply that nothing has changed, for the strong conservative tendency of theistic religious hierarchies and the slow pace of development they allowed for has given way to a much more speedy, and potentially nihilist, vacillation between different basic principles—take the nationalism–globalism distinction that is currently disrupting national as well as international politics, potentially changing, or even obliterating, the standard eighteenth-century distinction between left and right.

Much of what has been said here may border on the obvious. Yet I think, as an overarching structure connecting central issues of art, politics and science since the Western earthquake of the Enlightenment during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this structure allows us to conceive some degree of unity in an era often thought of as enormously complex, faceted, even contradictory—the basic open issues introduced by non-belief.[17]

1 The most conspicuous of such tendencies, of course, are the various current jihadisms stemming from Salafi, or Wahhabi, and Deobandi awakenings in Islam. See Mozaffari, Mehdi, "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, vol 8, no 1, pp 17–33, March 2007.

2 These atheist philosophers became famous for books like Sam Harris's *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason*, 2004, Richard Dawkins' *The God Delusion*, 2006, Christopher Hitchens' *God is not Great*, 2007, Daniel Dennett's *Breaking the Spell: Religion as Natural Phenomena*, 2006. The moniker of the "Four Horsemen" stems from the title of a video featuring all four, from September 2007.

3 See the famous Seneca quote, "*Veniet tempus quo ista quae nunc latent in lucem dies extrahat et longioris aeui diligentia.*" [The time will come when the sun enlightens nothing on Earth, but free human beings, recognising no master but their reason.] Quoted in Tutrone, Fabio, "Veniet Tempus (QNat. 7.25): Stoic Philosophy and Roman Genealogy in Seneca's View of Scientific Progress", *Epekeina*, vol 4, no 1–2, 2014, p 224.

4 See Hoffmeyer, Jesper, *Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs*, Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2008; Stjernfelt, Frederik, *Diagrammatology: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007; and Stjernfelt, *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns*, Boston, MA: Docent Press, 2014.

5 See Allen, Colin and Marc Bekoff, *Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.

6 See, for example, Beckoff, Mark, Colin Allen and Gordon M Burchardt (eds), *The Cognitive Animal. Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.

7 Rosenblatt, Kalhan, "Precedent in Chimpanzee Rights Case could Backfire on Humans", NBC News (http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/lawyer-denying-chimpanzees-rights-could-backfire-disabled-n734566), accessed September 17.

8 See Fuller, Steve and Veronika Lipinska, *The Proactionary Imperative: A Foundation for Transhumanism*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

10 In 2015 the Association of American Medical Colleges predicted a 30 % increase of medical students by 2019; see "Medical School Enrollment to Approach 30 Percent Increase by 2019", Association of American Medical Colleges, https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/newsreleases/431036/20150430.html, accessed 6 December 2017.

11 Allen, Woody, *The Illustrated Woody Allen Reader*, New York: Knopf, 1993.

12 As an example, Poe's short story "The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar" from 1845, in which the dying Valdemar is hypnotised in order to make him narrate his thoughts at the moment of death.

13 There are even top lists of classic hospital horror movies; see "Top 10 Horror Movie Hospitals!", Arrow in the Head, http://www.joblo.com/horror-movies/news/lists-top-10-horror-movie-hospitals, accessed September 2017.

14 The Ayer anecdote is an anecdote in the proper sense of the word (from the Greek *anekdota*, meaning unpublished), as I have not been able to establish a reference.

15 For an argument against cultural relativism, see Eriksen, Jens-Marten and Frederik Stjernfelt, *The Democratic Contradictions of Multiculturalism*, New York, NY: Telos, 2012.

16 Schmitt, Carl, *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, Achte Auflage*, first published in 1922, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004.

17 See Hazard, Paul, *The Crisis of the European Mind, 1680–1715*, first published in 1935, New York, NY: New York Review Books, 2013; or Israel, Jonathan, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.


ONG
ALONE AMO
FRIENDS

Félicien Rops
Satan Sowing Tares
1882

Max Klinger
Peeing Death
1881



Jens Lund
The Forest of the Fear of Death
1900

Steven Parrino
The Self Mutilation Bootleg 2
(The Open Grave)
1988-2003

James Ensor
Hop-Frog's Revenge
1898



Storm P
The Grief
1907



Gardar Eide Einarsson
Alone Among Friends
2006

AT DARKNESS

LIGHT WITHIN

KNESS, HOW

AT DARKNESS

GREAT IS THA

IF THEN THE L

YOU IS DARK

GREAT IS THA

Rudolf Stingel
Untitled
1993

Asger Jorn
Untitled
1961

Steven Parrino
Spin-Out Vortex 2
2000

If then the light within you is darkness, how great is that darkness!
Matthew 6:22
Inset text



Another kind of darkness.

In the beginning of 2008, by a large, red industrial container, behind the Niels Bohr Institute for Astronomy, geo-, particle-, quantum-, nano- and biophysics at the University of Copenhagen on Blegdamsvej, right where the beehives for the City Bees project once were, I found a flat filing cabinet, an office chair, an adjustable desk lamp, and, on an evening a few days later, two blackboards – all to be thrown out. One could still decipher some notes from last night's lecture.

The next day I called the janitor to hear if I could take the discarded blackboards. "They have not been discarded", he corrected, "they have been phased out..."

In May 2008, I was invited to take part in the exhibition *Blacklight* in a basement next to the concert hall VEGA on Enghavevej.

I recalled the blackboards that were now in my basement. But how I was reminded by the sentence from the Book of Matthew, written in chalk on the blackboards, is, so to speak, lost in the darkness. After the exhibition, I wanted to throw out the blackboards, as I was in need of more space. I happened to mention this to Claus Carstensen, who would like to have them instead. I believe I gave it to him as a birthday present.
Christian Vind

Christian Vind
If Then the Light Within You Is Darkness, How Great Is That Darkness
2008

Claus Carstensen
False Light
2007

Tim Berresheim
Ticky Times IV
2005

Tim Berresheim
Ticky Times VI
2005

Tim Berresheim
Ticky Times V
2005

Tim Berresheim
Ticky Times II
2005

ANIMALITY: AN ART OF MOBILE BORDERS AND INVERSIONS

Ron Broglio

Tho' Nature, red in tooth and claw:
With ravine, shriek'd against his creed[1]
Lord Alfred Tennyson, In Memoriam

Animals are agents of a larger than human world. They signal to us that there is more out there than we have planned for in our social systems. Unlike our social plan, nature is "red in tooth and claw". The natural world proceeds without a teleological plan and with no regard for human designs. Consider Francisco de Goya's animals: a bat-owl creature feeds on corpses from the battlefield; demons trim appendages from a body; a carnivorous vulture is run off as a disaster of war; and winged folly takes flight while carrying humans into darkness. These animals mark a space outside of accepted culture. In these artworks the flat or dark spaces beyond the figures serve as the unknown and unknowable. Animals are the prophetic figures pointing to this larger world. Their bodies are strangely organic, with appendages akin to humans, but simultaneously distinct and alien. We almost understand the animal world, but then it is different—with claws and beaks and fur and feathers that show us the limits of our ability to comprehend beyond the human. It is a place of spectres in Goya's *Funeral Folly* **(fig 1)**. The animals and phantoms come from outside our world; unintelligible terrors of an Earth indifferent to human feeling.

We have constructed environments to generally keep us free from the horrors of such animality. We carve out our surroundings to fit our system—then, because we have made this environment, we find inside it that only affirming nods accord to our plan:

> **We civilized men who have produced our own environment see on everything in it the form and shape and species given to the raw material of nature by collective human intentions and effort, which are produced by the practice of rational discourse.**[2]

fig 1, p 24 - Francisco de Goya
Funeral Folly, plate 18, from the series *The Follies (The Proverbs)*
1815-1823

fig 2, p 21 - Terry Atkinson
Ruby (Reading the Guide) and Amber (Examining the Gibbet) at Natzweiler-Struthof Concentration Camp in the Vosges, August 1985
1986

fig 3, p 225 - Werner Büttner
Alongside Faeces and Urine, You Were Pushed Into This World
2014

With the world we build according to our common sense and good sense, with this world affirming our way of dwelling, nothing is foreign to us. Here we are within inalienable rights and certain laws. The world encloses itself within a forum of all that is reasonable.

But what about the alien, the foreign, the outside—the animal—that arrives and does not comply to good sense and common sense, since it does not know our rules nor play by them? What is one to do with the stranger who arrives from the sea of noise to the shores of communication, signal, language and rational discourse? Reason is an island that builds itself upon its own discursive and performative foundations. Reason throws itself; it asserts its ground above and beyond other modes of thinking and dwelling. Reason attempts to function without question as the ground that legitimises its own discourse. We work upon the representations and scaffolding by which culture delineates its environment. We lay markers and masts and signatures and cartography that make the alienness of the outside humanised and rationalised. The outside becomes assimilated as moments within our discourse. These marks of culture foster our remarks, but the marks serve as screens as well, since reason cannot read outside its own markings. The scaffolding of reason is high, and the fall outside its human bounds is abysmal. Art reveals these nightmares beyond reason.

There is an important twist in this way of thinking. In the Goya work discussed above, the creatures that feed on corpses in the battlefield are there because of our wars. The same is true of the carnivorous vulture and the winged beast called 'folly' **(see 19–20)**, And here is the turn: the indifferent outside is in us. We are the ones who kill other humans in war. We sentence others to hang as Terry Atkinson captures in his work *Ruby (Reading the Guide) and Amber (Examining the Gibbet) at Natzweiler-Struthof Concentration Camp in the Vosges* **(fig 2)**. The guide and gibbet are educational reminders of a something within us, a violence that does not come from the outside but from within. This art bears witness to what philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls the "mobile border within living man". It is an "intimate caesura" that we deploy to divide humans and our culture from the wilds of nature, only to find that

> **it is possible to oppose man to other living things, and at the same time to organize the complex—and not always edifying—economy of relations between men and animals, only because something like an animal life has been separated within man, only because his distance and proximity to the animal have been measured and recognized first of all in the closest and most intimate place.**[3]

Here within ourselves is the divided nature between civilised human and bestial animal. Much of the work in *Becoming Animal* is an investigation into this mobile border; how it gets deployed, by whom and to what ends. The artworks I discuss from the collection are ones that play between material animality and humanity's attempt to use culture in order to rise above base physical needs. Following Nietzsche, we often find culture as a veneer or even a camouflaged tool for deep-lurking animal proclivities.

Human Animality

Werner Büttner's *Alongside Faeces and Urine You Were Pushed Into This World* **(fig 3)** reveals the seemingly base physical fact of birth. The title is taken from a quote attributed to St Augustine, who considers this world of the flesh to be a veil of tears. The naked animality of human birth, pushed into the

fig 4, p 206 - John Heartfield
War and Corpses - The Last Hope of the Rich
1932

fig 5, p 246 - Gardar Eide Einarsson
Untitled (Stance)
2008

fig 6, p 89 - Alfred Kubin
The Swamp
1903-1905

world between faeces and urine, levels the cultural layers of humanity. Culture tries to distance us from the messy world of the flesh. Our clothes, utensils for eating, tools for writing and houses for dwelling are cultural and technological ways of distancing ourselves from the friction of naked animality. But Büttner's painting reminds us of our origins. It is a clever manoeuvre where art as cultural artefact turns against culture to remind us of our animal nature. The same can be said about renderings of Adam and Eve in this collection **(pp 198–199)**; we glimpse through art a nakedness that is unaware of its animality but is on the cusp of expulsion and transformation. These works leverage the animal side of the "mobile border within living man".

The section "Affenqual in Tübingen" collects a lineage of art historical paintings placing monkeys in human social situations. Gabriel von Max's *Anthropological Teaching* **(p 71)** is one such painting. Here an adult monkey holds a girl doll while a younger monkey seems to receive instruction about humans. The pieces remind us that culture is still 'monkeying around'—toying with objects while posing as sophisticated culture. Dolls teach children how to be human—or are they merely 'aping' or copying adult behavior that itself is a thin mask covering our animal nature? The real 'anthropological teaching' is what Agamben calls the "intimate caesura", whereby we try to divide ourselves from our animal being only to have it reappear.

State of Exception

Much of the work in *Becoming Animal* centres around who deploys the borderlines between animal and human, why they do so and to what effect. Haunting much of the collection is what Agamben calls the "state of exception"—where the power of the state is itself above the law and makes the law that divides the clean from the unclean, the cultural from the animal and the human-as-animal from the cultural-human. Agamben explains this distinction in his well-known work *Homo Sacer*. He begins by noting a word distinction found in ancient Greek philosophy between animal life [*zoe*] and cultural human life [*bios*]: "The Greeks had no single term to express what we mean by the word 'life.' They used two terms... *zoe*, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and *bios*, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group."[4] The question arises as to who decides which lives fall within animal life and which are proper to human culture. He explains that the state itself makes this determination as to who falls within and who is outside of state protection, law and civil culture. Agamben goes on to trace what he calls "bare life", or the human whose death is not a murder or sacrifice—in other words, one who is an exile to society and pushed outside the law by the sovereign. So, the state that is above the law and makes the laws determines those who are outside the law. Such power can have dangerous consequences, as history has shown. Enemies of the state are often debased as less-than-human. This was famously the case in Nazi Germany where, based on ethnicity, religion, political beliefs or sexual orientation, people were labelled as vermin and outside the protection of the law. These people occupied the position of one who has only bare life—an exile of society and one who can be killed without legal incrimination.

Perhaps the most striking example of this is JF Willumsen's *The Belgian Prisoner* **(p 208)**, where a man is stripped naked and bound while a dog, monkey and a smiling girl look on and an armed man in military uniform stands coldly guarding the debased prisoner. The naked prisoner is animalised, vulnerable and exposed. He is bereft of clothing, which protects us and makes us members of society. He is marked as inhuman. The guard is a stand-in for the larger state apparatus that makes and enforces its judgement upon the man. The girl and guard act as accomplices to the state—acknowledging and approving of its authority. Sketches by Willumsen **(pp 208–209)** reinforce this point as the naked and bound prisoner is drawn alongside monkey and dog as if the three were equivalent.

Artist John Heartfield provides an inversion to this trope of animalising those deemed by the state to be outside the law. In *War and Corpses: The Last Hope of the Rich* **(fig 4)**, Heartfield shows the state, its leaders and the rich-to-be as the dogs of war, standing victorious over the bodies of the dead. These dogs are the sovereign few, exercising bestial power upon all humans. Most relevant here is the work of philosopher Jacques Derrida, who details the connection between the state of exception and animality. He explains that "sovereignty, like the exception, like the decision, *makes the law in excepting itself from the law*, by suspending the norm and the right that it imposes, by its own force, at the very moment that it marks that suspense in the act of positing law or right."[5] In drawing the laws the sovereign makes theirself exceptional—outside the law so as to be able to draw the lines that enclose, protect, encircle or ensnare the citizens. In exerting this power, the sovereign is also a bestial strength beyond the law: "political sovereignty, the sovereign or the state or the people, figured sometimes as what rises... above the natural life of the animal, and sometimes (or simultaneously) as the manifestation of bestiality or human animality."[6] He summarises such a political economy in Thomas Hobbes's phrase, "man is the beast for man".[7]

Violence by the sovereign and sovereignty as violence frame a number of artworks gathered in this collection. The sovereign is above the law and the one who determines the boundaries. The sovereign, even in its animal, brutal violence, proclaims itself social and cultural, and so above animal nature. It is the violence of positional power—an asymmetrical bearing down on others and enforcement of boundaries in the very nature of governance and law giving. As philosopher Walter Benjamin explains; "There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism."[8] Civilisation is an exclusionary principle, one in which some are outside of society as foreigners or criminals. Those outside are important to society as they show the limits of who and what can be included within civilisation. To perpetuate the state, the authorities have to maintain the structures that brought them into power. Where possible they further and strengthen the lines that inscribe inside from outside. We see the darkness and violence as it affects those who are exiled and have only bare life. For example, there is the gibbet where children Ruby and Amber learn the law and punishment for violation of the law in Atkinson's image **(fig 2)**. Aroldo Bonzagni's *The Hanging Tree* **(p 171)** turns what is normally a festive Christmas tree into a reminder of state power against enemies. Manuel Ocampo's recent work *Penetrator Inseminator* **(p 142)** provides another portrait of authority. The smartly uniformed Nazi officer is also the dark double depicted next to him. Ocampo is a Filipino artist known for his socio-political works such as *Why I Hate Europeans*. His art arises from his position as a minority subject to the spoken and unspoken rules of the majority culture: "My work comes from my feeling about my position as an outsider and having a voice that nobody listens to."[9] *Penetrator Inseminator* uses the figure of rape as power. The penetrator is one who invades others and violates their boundaries in an act of conquest. As inseminator, the dominant culture proliferates by burying its seed in another's terrain.

Gardar Eide Einarsson's *Untitled* (*Stance*) **(fig 5)** is an important example of authority as animalistic violence. The work is deceivingly simple with its two plywood pieces each with an epigram: "The Lawman is Human" and "The Object is Control". One can read the two pieces as a single sentiment: the lawman is the human who seeks to control the circumstances. But conversely, the wooden boards can be read as a contrast where the lawman is a human but despite being human, he seeks to control his humanity and that of others. In this second reading, the human-ness of the lawman is the object that the law seeks to control. If the law is successful, then the lawman will reiterate this control by imposing the law on others. Power is positional; it is occupied by the law and those who step into the role of lawman. Chillingly, this could be almost anyone. As the Stanford Prison Experiments show, a random set of people given authority over another random set will exercise power to brutal degrees of intensity. Einarsson's lawman becomes Ocampo's penetrator and inseminator. This is what philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari mean when they say "sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing".[10] The law, or sovereignty, brings humanity under its authority and control; it internalises the human. Laws *make* us human and establish civil society; we are interiorised by the law. The lawman becomes one who

penetrates other cultures and so internalises them, bringing them within the domain of the law.

The power of the sovereign is not simply a power that says no. As philosopher Michel Foucault deftly notes, power is a positive force in that it produces something:

> **What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.**[11]

We may not like what it produces—its penetration and insemination—but it is important to understand that power produces something; it produces and shapes the world in which we live. The "whole social body" is determined by power. So, how we know things and how we talk about them all fall under what is legitimate discourse under the law, be it written rules or social norms. Power is not simply a negative no-saying; it produces our social conventions and all that follows from these conventions.

Outside

In what Agamben calls "the state of exception", the sovereign is inscribed within the law but also is outside or above the law in order to judge and enforce it. This liminal quality of the sovereign is paired with its inverse, bare life of one who has been exiled by the sovereign. This play of figures at the border still remains within a larger construction of power as it functions up to and including its limits within society. What then might be beyond these limits—beyond the sovereign and bare life? This essay started with animal works by Goya, where the animals are the harbingers of an outside. Let us return to this outside; if "sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing", then the outside where power does not reach becomes an important space of exploration. It is the radical outside of animality that haunts Agamben's neatly symmetrical figure of the sovereign, society and the exile. Animality is a spectral force that proclaims there may be something unaccounted for within our system of social and power relations.

Alfred Kubin's *The Swamp* **(fig 6)** gives us a sense of a magical world lurking in the shadows. A woman wades naked into dark, still waters. Immersed almost to her groin, she peers cautiously into the surface of the pool and stands as if sensing an animated presence in the waters. What she does not yet seem to notice, but which we as viewers see, is the ghostly image of three large fish-amphibian swamp creatures hovering just behind her. Their expressions do not seem menacing but rather alert and perhaps bemused by the human intruder. The woman senses and seems aware that something is there, but the something is beyond her range of seeing and knowing. "If only she would turn around", we may think to ourselves. And yet Kubin's playful image turns once again: what if we are like the woman in the swamp? While we see the creatures that she cannot, there are other spectres and animals just behind *our* backs. Her blindness is our blindness.

This is the essential insight of animal studies—that humans and animals share the same earth but are in different worlds. Sometimes these worlds overlap (yielding positive or negative consequences) and sometimes the worlds are adjacent but unseen. The concept of animal worlding was first developed by the early-twentieth-century biologist and founding figure of biosemiotics, Jakob von Uexküll. He asserted that each animal, including humans, perceives the world differently based on its distinct sensory apparatus. A dog, for example, sees fewer colours than humans but has a more developed sense of smell. The dog's world is shaped differently based on its senses. The canine world is complete in itself and fully functional, yet different from ours. Uexküll presents an infinite variety of perceptual worlds that are as different as the animals themselves. Each animal species holds its own point of view and its own distortions of the actual earth. These perspectives reflect how the body of the animal has evolved over ages to adapt to the Earth and to meet the animal's needs. We are left with the understanding that there is no single unitary world and no unified space or time; instead, time moves differently for each species according to the rapidity by which it can take in sensations, and each animal senses and occupies space differently as well.

Uexküll creates the term *Umwelt*, or "surrounding world", to describe the animal's perceptual world.[12] In the opening of his 2010 work *A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans*, he imagines each animal surrounded by a soap bubble, which is its perceptual world. The bubble represents each animal's environment and contains all the features accessible to it. As soon as we enter into one such animal bubble, our surroundings are completely reconfigured. Many qualities that we normally perceive vanish completely, others aspects of our human perceptual world lose their coherence with one another, while new previously imperceptible connections are created. A new world arises in each bubble, each *Umwelt*.

Kubin's swamp creatures remind us of these other worlds. They are an alien way of being on the earth. These are ways

fig 7, p 93 - Andy Hope 1930
Amazing
2005

fig 8, p 160 - Max Klinger
Bear and Elf
Intermezzi, Op. IV:I
1879-1881



fig 9, p 118 - Christian Vind
If Then the Light Within You Is Darkness, How Great Is That Darkness
2008

fig 10, p 172 - Claus Carstensen
It Conquered the World (for Tilli)
2012

of dwelling not domesticated by us and outside our ability to fully understand them. As philosopher Thomas Nagel once noted, we will never know what it is like to be a bat since to know what it is like, we would have to become a bat. We see this alienness in Andy Hope 1930's work *Amazing* **(fig 7)**. The painting gives us a silhouette of a large insect-like creature standing on two limbs at the edge of a forest just in front of a clearing and a cabin. We are almost at home in the clearing in the background, but between us and the bright, clear, open space and the safety of the cabin stands a strange creature. The light from the clearing normally illuminates. In the clearing things are brought to light, and seeing in the light is synonymous with understanding. Here in the light of the clearing we understand the world. In this artwork however, the light of the open field—the light of civilisation and understanding—backlights the animal such that we cannot see it clearly. We can only discern the creature's outline. Here the light of civil space interrupts our seeing and knowing the creature. We normally count on the enlightenment of the social realm, but in this case it casts a shadow, and there in the darkness is that which we cannot see. Yet like the naked woman in Kubin's work, we sense it, or see only its outline without the ability to know it more completely. Interestingly, in both Kubin's *The Swamp* and Hope 1930's *Amazing* the animals depicted are not mammals. The amphibian, fish-like creatures of the swamp and the insect-like creature at the forest's edge seem all the more alien by virtue of their not being mammals, and thus distant from our own humanness. They are far from us and far from the animals that we have domesticated. Instead of the familiar, they are figures from another world and at a distance from the power and political reach of sovereignty. These are figures of a radical outside.

Georges Bataille once characterised the world of animals as "like water in water", or a world so closely tied to the animals and so blended with the animals that the creatures cannot hoist a ladder of transcendence and climb out.[13] It cannot attain a verticality by which it would get outside its world to have a look around. Hope 1930's *Amazing* suggests that perhaps we too are stuck within our world, like water in water, and are unable to hoist ourselves out. Yet art provides us a glimpse of another world. Art suggests that other worlds beyond our own are possible, and the works in *Becoming Animal* provide us a glimpse into such ways of dwelling.

These other worlds are manifest in the work of Max Klinger. The detailed lines and specificity of objects in his work make vivid the imagined worlds beyond our own. We want to believe there is a world where elves play with bears, as in his work *Bear and Elf* **(fig 8)**. Here, the lithe, fairylike creature high in the trees extends a branch down to the dense, dark figure of the bear at the bottom of the etching. The elf seems nimble and adept while the bear seems a bit awkward as it tries to straddle tree limbs. The tension in the work is between the light and heavy at play with one another. Unlike Hope's *Amazing*, here we clearly can see the nonhuman figures in the forest. Klinger invites us to imagine a deeply animated world at work just beyond our reach. There in the forest, at the margins removed from civic space, elves can frolic with bears. We see other ecologies that play by other rules than what we know. Viewing this work we strain our cultural memory for stories about elves, fairies and sprites. What if these mythical beings of the past are explanatory figures for nonhuman dwelling? They are harbingers for an outside and possibilities we have not calculated in the confines of our own civil world.

We see this other world time and again in Klinger's work. *Battling Centaurs* **(p 160)** gives us a sublime stage for wondrous creatures, again, just beyond human space, in worlds we cannot inhabit, strange rituals unfold. In his other centaur work, we see the violence of a landslide and the serene beauty of a moonlit night. Klinger helps us realise that beyond our grasp, whole other worlds and ways of dwelling unfold on this Earth. While we can see mountains, hillsides and forests as natural spaces we might visit, Klinger has done something else. He has animated the open space, the negative space in nature, by placing human-like nonhuman creatures there. They fill the space with their comportment. We feel the speed of centaurs racing in battle across an open field. The field is made alive by the beasts moving through it. The stoic severity of mountain tops are made more intense by centaurs battling at such heights. And the serenity of moonlight becomes even more peaceful as we see these magical beings recline amid the rocks and foliage. By animating the open spaces with wondrous beings, Klinger stirs in us a longing to inhabit such spaces, and awakens an imagination of what it would be like to rest on rocks in the moonlight, speed through open fields or battle upon a mountain precipice. As a brief aside, it is worth noting that Klinger then takes these same techniques for producing wonder and shifts them into speculative futures by providing titles such as *Second Future* **(p 274)**, which invites the viewer to imagine the world in some indefinite future, transformed by time.

Recall Agamben's "intimate caesura", the dividing line within us between our animality and humanity, between our bare life and life as a citizen. Here, our "distance and proximity to the animal have been measured and recognized first of all in the closest and most intimate place".[14] While we cannot know what it is like to be another creature, these artworks play across the distance and proximity of the animality within the human. These works, which straddle the boundaries between human and nonhuman worlding, are meaningful because we cultural humans wrestle with our physical, animal life and our bare life. Perhaps we too are the human-animal centaurs and lithe elves.

Exploring the role of sympathetic connection further, consider again Andy Hope 1930's *Amazing*. The work gives us a dark shadow of a creature whose details are obscured by the light of a clearing behind it. We can enter into sympathy with this darkness. It is like the darkness of Christian Vind's work *If Then the Light Within You is Darkness, How Great is That Darkness* **(fig 9)**. Vind plays with the darkness of a blackboard on which white chalk words and drawings are meant to illuminate the world with knowledge. Yet, what enables the white words is the black background always spectrally present. The title is drawn from the Biblical phrase of the gospels and plays upon inversions between light and dark. Such inversions are similar to the crossing of dividing lines between human animality and civility. Our animality is a dark background by which our civility is revealed. And yet, what if our civility, our light, is a darkness as well? In other words, what if human society exerts a brute power of animality? Here we see again that "man is the beast for man." We might retitle the work thus: *If Then the Human Within You is Animal, How Great is That Animality*.

One example of human and animal darkness is Claus Carstensen's *It Conquered the World (For Tilli)* **(fig 10)**. The title and image are drawn from the 1956 B-horror film *It Conquered the World*. In the film, a disgruntled scientist receives transmissions from intelligent aliens from Venus. Falsely offering to come in peace, the aliens gain the scientist's help. Once on earth, the creatures reveal that they are not peaceful. They disrupt all electrically powered technology and begin transmitting mind control. After the death of those he loves, the scientist sacrifices himself in order to kill the aliens. In Carstensen's image, there is a lithograph of a landscape and some upside-down cottages glued to the lower right part of the painting. The cottage as a place of safety is inverted. There is also a more complex inversion. The aliens can be thought of as a manifestation of the scientist's inner darkness. They come from a darkness of space but are shepherded to Earth by a human darkness, the embittered disposition of the scientist. While the aliens in the 1950s film look like geometric cones with a human face and strange arms, Carstensen has fused their strange, nonhuman form with a more human figuration so that the alien darkness and human darkness come together in the dark animal-alien being of his painting. Interestingly, in the United States this 1950s horror film was paired as a double feature with *The She Creature*. In this other horror film a carnival hypnotist transports a woman through a trance into a regression of her deep prehistoric past. She becomes a sea creature and menaces civilization. In *The She Creature* the alienness is buried deep within the human. Forgotten in our evolutionary past, the creature lingers still in us and waits to be activated. The dark and violent destructive force is both a strange form outside of us and a dark animality within us.

Becoming

With a collection entitled *Becoming Animal*, I would be remiss if I did not mention the origin of the concept in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. They consider species-being as a confining category for the more expansive breadth of living beings. For them, the species categories are static states through which active bodies and forces pass. So one is never fully human, but passes in a trajectory toward or through humanness. But this trajectory may well cross other states, including any range of animals such as wolves, insects or aliens. One moves through these states by some felt intensity that re-configures the body and how it functions. The body as a territory is 'deterritorialised', and then reconfigured according to other states or species. In their book on Kafka as a transformation artist, Deleuze and Guattari proclaim:

> **There is no longer man or animal, since each deterritorializes the other, in a conjunction of flux, in a continuum of reversibility. Instead, it is now a question of a becoming that includes the maximum of differences as a difference of intensity, the crossing of a barrier, a rising or a falling, a bending or an erecting, an accent on the word.[15]**

While Agamben's idea of animality does not seem easily connected to Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-animal, it is possible to think of his "mobile border within living man" as an opening onto becoming other than human. The artworks in this collection open up that border and cross it through degrees of intensity. The human body is re-inscribed with other figures—from wild animals to elves to aliens—and in re-drawing the lines, we are invited to think of a more expansive world than that which good sense would proclaim as human.

Sovereignty and bare life are liminal states circumscribing social life. Through intensity of form, materials and content, these artworks collected here push the limits of liminal states to activate the animality of the sovereign and the exile. The collection asks us to examine the powers that police our society; to repeat Einarsson, the lawman is human and the object is control. Moreover, we are also asked to examine that part of us that lives in exile. We are exposed to our animality that goes unacknowledged but arises, "red in tooth and claw", when summoned by the pressures of a life that makes us move to new limits. Pressed upon, we may seek a space on the other side of the 'mobile border' of animal and human within us.

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2 Lingis, Alphonso, *Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, p 9.
3 Agamben, Giorgio, *The Open: Man and Animal*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, pp 15-16.
4 Agamben, Giorgio, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p 1.
5 Derrida, Jacques. *The Beast & the Sovereign, Volume 1*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011, p 49. Emphasis in the original.
6 Derrida, *The Beast & the Sovereign*, p 26.
7 Derrida, *The Beast & the Sovereign*, p 30.
8 Benjamin, Walter, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in *Illuminations*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968, pp 253-264.
9 Muchnic, Suzanne, "Portrait of the Artist as an Angry Outsider", *Los Angeles Times*, 4 May, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-04/entertainment/ca-31235_1_spanish-colonial-style
10 Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, p 360 quoted in Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p 18.
11 Foucault, Michel, *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, p 119.
12 Uexküll, Jakob von, *A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With a Theory of Meaning*, trans. Joseph D. O'Neil, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010. For a much earlier translation, see "A Stroll through the World of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds" in *Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept*, Ed. Claire H. Schiller, trans. DJ Kuenen, New York: International Universities Press, 1957, pp 5–80.
13 Bataille, Georges, *Theory of Religion*, New York: Zone Books, 1989, p 21.
14 Agamben, *The Open*, pp 15-16.
15 Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka*, p 22.

NT

AGEN

Claus Carstensen
Agent
2012

The split between the eye and the gaze
Jacques Lacan

Niccolò Boldrini
Saint Francis Receiving the Stigmata (After Titian)
undated, a later impression



Jeffrey Silverthorne
Lovers, Accidental Carbon Monoxide Poisoning, Morgue Work
1972-1974

Jeffrey Silverthorne
Young Woman, Morgue Work
1974

Jeffrey Silverthorne
Police Photographers with Husband and Wife Killed on Their Motorcycle by Drunk Driver, Morgue Work
1972-1974

anonymous
The Green Overgrown Skull
undated

Rudolf Stingel
Untitled
1990


NIKE HOOPS
ULAWA
SOLOMON
ISLANDS

Henry Peder Riksted
Indian Suicide
1937

The Winter of 1948-49, Mrs. Riksted called to say that the death sentence had been confirmed and if I could start the appeal process. I thus did - to the minister of justice Helga Pedersen. It was rejected in the sense that I never received an answer. The week before the sentence was to be carried out, she called to hear if I wanted to come to Vestre Jail to say my goodbyes to Riksted. I thus did. In the priest's office. After 20 minutes, the conversation was over. I wanted to leave, but I had to wait until an officer picked him up first. He was stooping as he walked off with the officer. The following week, we heard in the radio at noon that he was executed that morning. He was, I believe, the last but one to be executed. Others, who were sentenced to death, were pardoned with a prison sentence with the possibility of reduction if they 'behaved well'.

According to his own information, the painting portrays an Indian suicide.

Sentenced to death for murder, among other things. Executed on the barracks of Bådsmand, now Christiania, 1949, four years after the liberation.

In 1938 (sic), by Erik Håkansson's request, the painting was given to me, handed over by his widow, Anna Riksted.
Inset text (verso), author unknown

John Heartfield
6 Million Nazi Voters: Fodder for a Big Mouth - And That's the Fish I Elected
1930



With God for Hitler and Capital
Inset text (shark)

David Griggs
The Sort of Black Claymore Paintings #1
2010



OPPOSITE: David Griggs
The Sort of Black Claymore Paintings #2
2010

Hugo Ferdinand Boss (8 July 1885 – 9 August 1948) founded his own clothing company in Metzingen in 1923 and then a factory in 1924 (initially with two partners). The company produced shirts and jackets and then work clothing, sportswear and raincoats. In the 1930s it produced uniforms for the SA, the SS, the Hitler Youth, the postal service, rail employees and later the Wehrmacht.

Boss joined the Nazi Party in 1931, two years before Hitler came to power. By the third quarter of 1932, the all-black SS uniform (to replace the SA brown shirts) was designed by SS-Oberführer Prof. Karl Diebitsch and Walter Heck (graphic designer). The Hugo Boss company produced these black uniforms along with the brown SA shirts and the black-and-brown uniforms of the Hitler Youth. Some workers are acknowledged to have been French and Polish prisoners of war forced into labour. In 1999, US lawyers acting on behalf of Holocaust survivors started legal proceedings against the Hugo Boss company over the use of slave labour during the war. The misuse of 140 Polish and 40 French forced workers led to an apology by the company.

After World War II, Boss was fined for his support of Nazism and was not allowed to vote. He died of a tooth abscess in 1948.

The Hugo Boss Prize is awarded every other year to an artist (or group of artists) working in any medium, anywhere in the world. Since its establishment in 1996, it has distinguished itself from other art awards (e.g. the Turner Prize) because it has no restrictions on nationality or age. The prize is administered by the Guggenheim Museum and sponsored by the Hugo Boss clothing company, which since 1995 has been sponsoring various exhibitions and activities at the museum. It carries with it a cash award of US $100,000 and a tetrahedral trophy.

A jury of five to six curators, critics and scholars is responsible for the selection of the artists. They nominate six or seven artists for the short list; several months later, they choose the winner of the prize. In past years most nominated artists have been little known. In 1996 and 1998, the nominated artists exhibited their work at the now-defunct Guggenheim Soho, where a space on the second floor was named the Hugo Boss Gallery in 1996; since 2000, only the winning artist has shown his or her work.
Manuel Ocampo

Manuel Ocampo
Penetrator Inseminator
2016

Hannes Hirche
Nazi Mothers Are Having a Hard Time
2006

Sam Kiyoumarsi
Untitled
2007

Claus Carstensen
Painting with a Hammer to Nail the Crotch of Civilization – A Group Show of Wall Works and Tattoo Imagery Organised by Manuel Ocampo
2010

Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer
Friedrich Nietzsche

anonymous
County of Los Angeles – Office of Chief-Coroner. Body. Full Length Anterior. Sharon Tate Polanski 1969



THE ANIMALISED AVANT-GARDE

Jens Tang Kristensen

There is nothing so expressive as the eyes of animals—especially apes—which seem objectively to mourn that they are not human.[1]
Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory

The political role animalisation has played in various avant-garde formations throughout art history has received relatively little attention. Animalisation as an avant-gardist and political strategy was, for example, frequently used by the Dadaists and Surrealists of the early twentieth century, and is clearly present in works by artists who are canonised today, like John Heartfield, Georg Grosz and Francis Picabia. Considering Giorgio Agamben's *The Open: Man and Animal*, it is possible to distinguish between animalisation in its political, social and aesthetic senses. It is also possible to differentiate between the concept in its aggressive, active form, versus its passive, almost redeeming form, where it is connected to the realm of utopia and religion,[2] the thesis being that *animalisation* in its passive form is aimed at eternal life, something illustrated by the unity of the human and the animal in the nature of prehistoric times.[3]

... in many hunter-gatherer societies humans and animals are both part of nature. Humans do not live outside of, or as superior to, nature, as we do in the West. In foraging cultures, animals and humans coexist; in ritual, art, and mythology, they often transform themselves into each other.[4]

Before *Homo sapiens* became an animal rationale, the race was *Homo habilis* and *Zoon politikon*, as Emmanuel Levinas accurately shows in his magnum opus *Totality and Infinity*:

The animal fabricating tools frees itself from its animal condition when its momentum seems interrupted and broken, when instead of going of itself to its goal as an inviolable will it fabricates tools and fixes the powers of its future action in transmissible and receivable things. Thus a political and technical existence ensures the will its truth, renders it objective.[5]

In early modernity, which can be seen to start as early as the Renaissance, an aggressive variety of *animalisation* emerged, which meant that from that point on it became possible to dehumanise and repress the other in a hypothetical binary system.[6] The dichotomy between the human and the animal, as Karen Raber demonstrates in *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture,* was connected to the Renaissance individual's interest in anatomy and dissection, and this bipolar human-versus-animal construction can also be seen as early as the Reformation age, when Catholics were often depicted as pope-donkeys or monk-calves on handbills.[7] These arguably pre-propagandist images were later used in Francisco de Goya's famous ass prints (the 'asno' series), in which he used donkeys as a caricature of the ethnic and eugenic mentality that was already gaining ground in eighteenth-century Spain.

The ass print is the first of a sequence of six prints within *Los caprichos,* known as the 'asno' series, in which Goya looks at some of the follies of human behaviour by using asses as stand-ins for humans.... Goya here portrays one ass, yet the presence of other generations is evident, since the caption and family crest reveal that the book the ass is holding up represents his genealogy. In eighteenth-century Spain, it was not uncommon for individuals to trace their genealogies, in order to prove that they were of ´pure´ Spanish blood, or to prove their aristocratic heritage.[8]

That it was equally permitted to dissect criminals and animals in seventeenth-century Europe is a good indication of the juxtaposition of the status of the two. Through public dissections, the 'pact with nature', with the classical ritual of animal sacrifice as an act constitutive of society, was maintained, something William S Heckscher observes in his exhaustive studies of Rembrandt's *Anatomy of Dr Nicolaes Tulp* and the history of anatomy images:

The concept that gives the punishment of the criminal cathartic significance for the people as a whole lurks, as a matter of fact, behind the penal codes of even the most highly civilized peoples. In connection with the punitive anatomy as a fete for which tickets are sold to the public, there comes to mind the scapegoat criminal who is sacrificed at the annual spring festival for the benefit of the people. I cannot think of a more cogent explanation of the seasonal recurrence of the academic *quodlibeta anatomica* and their successors, the public anatomical fetes.[9]

Animalisation in its most aggressive form escalated around the First World War, but culminated during the Second World War, when the Nazis persistently described Jews as rats, insects and pigs[10]—seen, for example, in the anti-Semitic film *The Eternal Jew*, released in November 1940.[11] It should also be noted that this kind of designation of the other through symbolic animalisation can also be identified in the language of a large number of populist politicians today.[12] In 2013, Brian Mikkelsen, former Danish Minister of Justice and Minister of Culture, described Eastern European workers coming to Denmark as grasshoppers, claiming: "We can't have a grasshopper model, where some grasshoppers, in this instance Eastern Europeans, descend on the field, suck all the energy out of it, then jump on to the next field."[13] This aggressive version of animalisation has proven resilient, and the concept is thus an apparently effective tool in constructing the absolute other. All sections of the population thus have the potential to be stigmatised and made analogous to the animals humans eradicate, slaughter and devour.[14] Ron Broglio argues highly cogently how: "The civility and manners of eating are part of a distancing from the body of the animal and its death. Such distance prevents mourning."[15]

Whilst the avant-gardists depicted fascists and Nazis as animals, totalitarian regimes used the same strategy, producing a large number of texts and images depicting avant-garde artists, Jews and communists as animals. This 'process of naturalisation', in which the animal is used to stigmatise the other, and which thereby plays out in a much broader social field, connects to Brian Massumi's theoretical reflections in *Ontopower*:

The perspective developed here refuses to exclude the animal from politics and life, even "inclusively", or to separate in any way human expression from the animality of its body.... There is no *the* law. There are laws, always on the consequent level of natured nature."[16]

Animalisation is thus marked by a unique complexity that can never be entirely separated from the political, even though the avant-gardist also often used the concept in its religious sense. This can be illustrated by the fact that both the Dadaists and Surrealists viewed the animal, nature and primitivism as a utopian, transcendent realm to be aspired to, since nature was shown as being beyond the oppressive structures of practical politics. Some avant-garde formations share the view of Alexandre Kojève, who in his Marxist reading of Hegel claimed that: "If Man becomes an animal again, his arts, his loves, and his play must also become purely 'natural' again."[17] As a result, for many avant-garde artists animalisation functioned as a central, subversive anti-civilising factor, and the basis for an ideal new world order. By extension, the Dadaists also wanted to destroy the system of language, since they believed that people would automatically have a new and better life when every rational order was brought to a halt. In this context, the idealisation of primitive culture, nature, children and animals played a key role—a striking way for the artists to make their rejection of any rationally controlled civilisation explicit.

Dada, Destruction and Reconstruction—Animalisation in Art and War

Around 1915/1916, the international Dada movement developed in Zurich, a manifestation traditionally seen as an artistic collaboration and reaction to the outbreak of the First World War.[18] In 1916 the first of the now-famous Dada seances took place at Cabaret Voltaire, and Jean Arp, one of the main initiators of the events, later emphasised the impact that the outbreak of war had on the avant-garde—something realised in institutionally critical, anti-capitalist, libertarian opposition to the dominant, reactionary view of art and culture at the time. The artists' strategy was to create a new and better society distanced from the destruction of war through bestial and carnivalesque, instinct-driven celebrations. It was thus also about levelling the gap between heaven and hell.

> **Revolted by the butchery of the 1914 World War, we in Zürich devoted ourselves to the arts. While the guns rumbled in the distance, we sang, painted, made collages and wrote poems with all our might. We were seeking an art based on fundamentals, to cure the madness of the age, and a new order of things that would restore the balance between heaven and hell.[19]**

Dadaism can best be described as an insistent and utopian attempt to create different forms of anti-art in the spirit and service of increasingly subversive leftist politics. The political commitment of Dadaism is reflected in Johannes Baader's publication of *Dadaists Against Weimar* in February 1919. Dadaist artists wanted to remove every institutionally contingent barrier between the art object and everyday life in the struggle for a wider social revolution. This meant that works of art were often made as transaesthetic experiments, fusing theatre, poetry, painting and everyday objects. Dadaism gradually came to be seen as an international movement or current enacted in unmotivated, irrational artistic displays or seances, or as Richard Huelsenbeck wrote: "Dada is chaos from which thousands of systems arise and are entangled again in Dada chaos. Dada is simultaneously the course and the content of all that happens in the universe."[20]

In June 1920, the First International Dada Fair was held in Otto Burchard's gallery on Lützowufer 13 in Berlin. In the gallery, which was on the other side of the Landwehr Canal to where Rosa Luxemburg's body had been left the year before, there were works by artists including Otto Dix, George Grosz, John Heartfield, Raoul Hausmann, Hannah Höch, Jean Arp, Max Ernst and Francis Picabia.[21] Most of the works were posters, assemblages, photomontages or collages, and in the middle of the largest room Baader had built a vast assemblage of found objects entitled *Plastic-Dada-Dio-Drama*. Hanging from the ceiling was Heartfield's dramatic work *Prussian Archangel*, which consisted of a uniformed dummy.[22] The dummy had a pig's head and a sign around its torso with the text "Hanged by the Revolution" in German: a work protesting against religion and contemporary politics that criticised both by using animalisation as a symbolic language and order. A similar connection and critique can be seen in Heartfield's works *Hurray Hurray! The Brüning Santa Claus Is Here!*, featured in the socialist magazine *Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung*, [*The Workers' Illustrated Paper*, or *AIZ*], in 1930, and *O Christmas Tree in the German Soil, How Bent Are Thy Branches!*, 1934,[23] in which Heartfield unites Christianity and the political system with clear references to Italian Futurist Aroldo Bonzagni's *The Hanging Tree* (p 171) from 1911, where the figures hung on the tree are dead Turks.

Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, Helmut Herzfeld changed his name to John Heartfield as the ultimate identity protest against the German empire and its slogan "God Punish England".[24] As communists who both refused to perform active service in the war, Grosz and Heartfield also established close links with the Russian Constructivists; other Dadaists—including Huelsenbeck, who changed his name to Charles R Hulbeck in 1936—abandoned the pursuit of art during the 1930s. This was primarily due to Huelsenbeck, like many of his colleagues, being subject to systematic persecution by the Nazis in the run-up to the Second World War. Heartfield continued to work as an artist, not least in collaboration with *AIZ*, where he made a large number of photomontages from the end of the 1920s until he was exiled to London in 1938.

In many of Heartfield's photomontages we see examples of how the Dadaists expressed their opposition to the enemy through an aggressive form of animalisation. This is clearly expressed in works like *War and Corpses—The Last Hope of the Rich* (p 206), the cover of *AIZ*, no 18, in 1932, *Don't Worry—He's a Vegetarian*,[25] *The Peaceful Fish of Prey*, *The Fox and the Hedgehog—An Animal Fable after Lafontaine*, *A Place in the Sun, German Natural History—Metamorphosis*, *The Crisis Party Congress of the SPD—The Veterinarian from Leipzig*, *Death to the Octopus of War!*, *At the Arsonist Trial in Leipzig* and *Illustration for Grimm's Fairy Tale About the Cat and the Mouse*. In the montage *Dialogue in the Berlin Zoo*, Heartfield actually lets a chimpanzee and stork discuss the future placement of the Jews at the zoo, whereas in the montage *It Still Turns* from 1943 Hitler is depicted as an ape.[26] Equipped with a horned helmet, an armband with a swastika, and a sword, Hitler is positioned like King Kong as an oversized being on Earth—reminiscent of HR Hopp's famous recruitment poster *Destroy This Mad Brute*, which was a militant visual defence against the Weimar Republic during the First World War.

In the early twentieth century, animals were frequently used systematically, to designate that the enemies resistance was to be mobilised against. Avant-garde artists did not, however, only use a strategy of animalisation in the context of the contemporary political situation, but also to defy the historical tradition that they saw themselves opposing as artists.

This can be clearly seen in Francis Picabia's *Portrait de Cézanne*, which was published in the journal *Cannibale* [*Cannibal*] in 1921, and depicting a cloth monkey with the text *Portrait of Cézanne, Portrait of Rembrandt, Portrait of Renoir—Dead Nature* [*Natures Mortes*].[27] Like insects and other pests, apes were frequently used as a political symbol to dehumanise the other—a militant, politicised animalisation strategy that was taken over by the extremist nationalistic groups that rapidly gained ground in the wake of the First World War, something Boria Sax follows Sam Keen in analysing:

> **In his study of propaganda images, Sam Keen remarks, "That we regularly use a repertoire of animal, reptile, and insect images to dehumanize our enemies shows the extent to which modern technological societies are rooted in a metaphysic of war against nature."… Such imagery of war is universal, but it was possibly used by the Nazis even more than by their contemporaries. Their enemies were regularly depicted in posters and propaganda as monkeys, leeches, rats, pigs, snakes, and a wide range of other creatures.**

He continues:

> **This sort of rhetoric often mirrors or anticipates military reality. In World War I it became common for both sides to compare their enemies to beetles, ants, locusts, and other pests. At the same time technologies developed for fighting insect pests were frequently transferred to the battlefield, while poisons developed for use against enemies were often turned on bugs.[28]**

Animalisation is to be found throughout the arts during the first half of the twentieth century, not least in literature, where Franz Kafka's depiction of the human animal in *Metamorphosis*, for example, functions as a latent reference to his own father calling Russian Jews pigs and insects. Jews could thus use the same rhetoric against each other as that used by the SS; due to being devoid of humane traits like the expression of emotion and exchange of gazes, insects became the most popular creatures to designate the enemy and have a long history as images of pests par excellence. In 1587 locals in the French village of Saint-Julien attempted to sue a swarm of weevils at the ecclesiastical court in Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne. The court ruled that a large area outside the village be cleared for the weevils, in the hope that the insects would feed there instead. The case stood in contrast to a similar one 40 years previously, when the judge had ruled that all-God's creatures had the same right to feed on plants as humans.[29] So in the Middle Ages, pests could either be condemned or defended depending on whether they were seen as creations of God or as omens and curses from hell. In *Discourse on the Method*, first published in Latin in 1632, and *Meditations of First Philosophy*, 1641, René Descartes made clear distinctions between humans and animals. In both works, Descartes described animals as reflex-driven machines, unlike humans, whom he saw as possessing a rational and self-reflective mind. From then on, animals were seen as literally inhuman, and insects were later added to the list of pests that could be used in racist campaigns, which flourished especially during the Second World War.

The famous exhibition *Entartete Kunst* [*Degenerate Art*], held by the Nazi Party in Munich in 1937, included works by some of the most prominent avant-garde artists, most of whom, like Max Beckmann, Marc Chagall, Dix, Grosz, Hausmann, Heartfield, Johannes Itten, Wassily Kandinsky, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Oskar Kokoschka and Paul Klee, had been highly active around the time of the First World War.[30] The aim of the 'degenerate' art exhibition was to show how closely associated the artists were with the 'primitive' nature and tribal societies they venerated.[31] Adolf Ziegler, president of the Prussian Academy of Fine Arts, opened the exhibition with a speech defining degenerate works as works that "insult German sentiment or destroy or confuse natural form or obviously display a lack of sufficient craft and artistic skill in the finished product".[32] That art was also to be ethnically German can be seen in the Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur's ["Militant League for German Culture", or KfdK] support of 144 art exhibitions in German factories in 1935, where they insisted that all the works be by living German artists.[33] Dadaist art was thus eminently 'degenerate', and it was obvious that an artist like Heartfield would attempt to attack Nazi ideology using the same animalisation strategy the Nazis themselves championed, a strategy that has since been used by many artists across the board of -isms—something Martin Hammer, for example, has identified in his exhaustive studies of the art of Francis Bacon.[34]

The Horse and the Snake—The Danish Avant-Garde and the Second World War.

In 1941, on the initiative of Asger Jorn, a group of Danish artists founded the journal *Helhesten* [*Hell Horse*]. Jorn had decided what to call the journal during a lunch he and the artist Egill Jacobsen had at the home of their colleague Ejler Bille in Birkerød north of Copenhagen.[35] *Helhesten* was a reaction to the Nazi occupation of Denmark in 1940. The name comes from Nordic mythology, where a saga claims that those who see the three-legged hell horse will perish. Egill Jacobsen later recounted that the name seemed like a good way to provoke the Nazis.[36] It was clear that Nazi sympathisers in Denmark had got the message when a piece on 'degenerate' art, by the Symbolist artist Gudmund Hentze, appeared in the newspaper *Fædrelandet* [*Homeland*] on 17 October 1942.[37] In the article, which was illustrated with a drawing by Ejler Bille, Hentze wrote: "National Socialism will grasp such nettles with a firm grip, uproot them and throw them to the flames like the weeds in the garden of art they are. Take my word for it."[38] The communist artists in the *Helhesten* circle held onto their belief that the mythical figure of the three-legged horse could function as a real force of resistance, capable of undermining Nazi ideology and the official cooperation of the Danish government with the rabid politics of the Third Reich.[39]

That opposition to the political situation was not the only basis for artistic activity can be seen by the Danish artist Robert Storm Petersen joining the Nazi association Nordische Gesellschaft ["Nordic Society"] in the 1930s, where he was the highest paid member until 1944. But despite being a member of the Nazi party, he also drew the cover of *Helhesten*, vol 2, issues 2–3, published 10 March 1943.[40] The example serves to show that art was made across the board of ideological sympathies, and could thereby, if only partially, live up to many avant-garde artists' anarchistic demand to undermine the discourses of real politics.

Helhesten disbanded in 1944, although many of the artists continued to collaborate, leading to the formation of CoBrA in 1948. The name CoBrA combined the first letters of the three capitals Copenhagen, Brussels and Amsterdam, formed as it was in opposition to Súrrealisme Révolutionaire by artists and poets from Denmark, Belgium and Holland.[41] As members of CoBrA, the artists continued to operate on the basis of their belief that true art was anti-academic and anti-formalist. As had been the case with *Helhesten*, the artists in CoBrA based their work on children's drawings, primitivism, the art of the insane, folk art, prehistoric monuments and artefacts and popular culture, including cartoons, tattoos and kitsch. In this sense, CoBrA can be seen as continuing the legacy of the internationally minded and organised Dadaists and Surrealists.[42]

The Nazis, however, were also interested in the concept of primitivism, causing the artist Egon Mathiesen to emphasise the need to distinguish, as with animalisation, between the two distinct meanings of the concept. In extension of this, Graham Birtwistle observes:

> **Not only modern artists but also Nazi cultural philosophers had an interest in the primitive and the question Mathiesen posed was: is there any difference between them? His answer was to distinguish "*two kinds of primitivizing* in modern times". Both the progressive artist and the reactionary cultural philosopher use the word 'primitive' indiscriminately, but their intentions are in fact completely opposite. The progressive intention is a form of humanism, understood as a development in the understanding of man's nature and a betterment of his lot, while the attitude of Nazi philosophers is antipathetic to his goal in seeking only a return to the primitively instinctual.[43]**

In his famous text "On a Contemporary Basis for a Creative Art", Ejler Bille emphasised that the spontaneous, artistic imagination is based on the material, physical world, rather than religious, metaphysical and transcendent ideas, which according to Bille made the use of the concept by abstract artists radically different to that of the Nazis.[44] Abstract artists based their work on spontaneous drives and free play, with artists like Jorn and Constant taking Johan Huizinga's concept of "Homo Ludens" as the basis for their art. The theory of Homo Ludens thus also came to play a key role for the Situationist International movement, not least for Constant, who worked from 1959 to 1974 on a utopian city called New Babylon. This new city was to be built as a vast, nomadic structure realised through free play. In this context, it is interesting that Brian Massumi sees play as an unzoned space with clear parallels to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's characterisation of the animal in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where they point to the fact that unlike adults, children move in a horizontally structured, eternally open space.[45] As such, via their play children, can be seen as kindred to animals, something Massumi also observes:

> **In play, the human enters a zone of indiscernibility with the animal. When we humans say 'this is play,' we are assuming our animality. Play dramatizes the reciprocal participation of the human and the animal, from both sides.[46]**

The anti-capitalist ideology represented by Jorn and the other members of CoBrA was expressed fully in their art, where works with endless imaginary creatures were to unite humankind with the child and nature as part of a fundamental critique of civilisation:

> **For many of the CoBrA artists in Europe who melded the ancient, the folklore, and the childlike in a parallel 'primitivism', man was once again considered to be at the mercy of the irrational, and a prey to anxiety and to primal fears.[47]**

An interest in children's drawings was, as mentioned, a key aspect of CoBrA. As soon as the child, as Jean Baudrillard has declared, loses its role as 'the other', ie as something alien to the civilised individual, it can no longer be seen as a child. He also pronounces the death of the Oedipal drama.[48] Jorn too wanted to go beyond Western civilisation and imperialist oppression, which he saw as originating in the Renaissance. In this context, animalisation, like folk art, gained a new significance in his culturally critical theory of art. As he wrote in *Menneskedyret* [*The Human Animal*] in 1950–1951:

> **The human animal is the key problem of European culture. What is, after all, the reason that Darwin's matter-of-fact account of human origin still to this day can cause offense? Why is there such a great emphasis on convincing the animal of the ape family that calls itself the human that he is not an animal, though even a child can see it, something that is perfectly natural and normal in itself? Why are we, who pass through all the animal stages, forced to deny our nature? Why and how did it happen that the old gods of Egypt, India, Persia, America, yet even Europe, half human, half animal, were transformed, during the Middle Ages and recent history, into devilish representatives of evil? Why does the dragon continue to be the holy sign of China and the Orient, while *the dragon killer* has become the most popular symbol of the West, the symbol of the struggle against "evil".[49]**

The animal formations in CoBrA could, however, continue to play a dual role. On the one hand, animals are depicted as imaginary, mythological beings, poetic symbols of freedom like the animal figures that recur in Jorn's 'Didaska' paintings or Carl-Henning Pedersen's many depictions of birds, fish and horses.[50] On the other hand, animals were synonymous with a more activist, dehumanising, anti-academic, anti-capitalist and anti-Eurocentric movement, as seen in some of Jorn's works, several of which can be seen as visual representations of his words:

> **This metamorphosis that I find so important, *the humanization of the animal through love,* has never been described by Kafka. It is a secret, which higher European philosophy has attempted to conceal from us for millennia, and which has only been handed down to us through the most common level of the people.... I started dividing artists into two groups: those who were morally *for* the human animal, and those who were *against* the human animal. On the negative side is Zola, who wrote his pessimistic novel on this subject about the human who loves and puts his demand for love above all else on earth, because this and this alone defines the *human animal*. Sartre and all the other anti-materialists share this position. On the other side, which admittedly, is of greater interest to me, I have first and foremost Balzac with his healthy sense of the values of life, and Picasso with his Franco suite, wherein the superhuman, the toreador, the animal killer, becomes "the evil" and the bull "the good".[51]**

It is not until we take this statement on board that political paintings like *Wounded Beast* [*Såret vilddyr*] or *One Lung, One Reich, One Führer* [*Eine Lunge, Ein Reich, Ein Führer*] make sense, since here Jorn expands and challenges the painting as a realm where the drama between nature and culture continuously unfolds, and it is also from this perspective of destruction that mankind once again becomes animal.[52]

> **Jorn tests humanity to the limit of its spiritual possibilities. Consequently he aims not at the beautiful, but the expressive; and he has created a color harmony, full of individual character, which prevents the picture from being judged according to traditional aesthetic standards. The dramas which unfold on his canvases may in a certain sense be called dream-pictures, but they are not dreamed in a country of fantasy east of the sun and west of the moon. They are played out on this earth, to which they are indissolubly linked by the physical closeness to nature suggested by his colouring. So his pictures can be seen as landscapes peopled by creatures of myth.[53]**

In 1950 Jorn painted *The Golden Pig* **(fig 1)**, a work that in many ways shows how the figure of the animal could also function as a powerful social and political motif.[54]

> **Jorn developed this alternative zoology as far in the direction of the monster, in canvases such as *Falbo,* as in the direction of a fairyland, like that of Carl-Henning Pedersen in *The Moon and the Animals*.[55]**

The painting *The Golden Pig* underlines Jorn's communist sympathies and critique of capitalism, and the work can be seen as a continuation of the historical avant-garde's revolutionary socialist visions and utopias as expressed in many of Heartfield's works, including *6 Million Nazi Voters Nourish A Big Fish*, 1930 **(p 139)**; *How to Make Dollars*, 1931 **(p 28)**; or *Under This Sign You Will Be Betrayed*, 1932. In *How to Make Dollars* Heartfield has placed a golden calf in the middle of a dollar bill, a clear reference to the biblical tale. A contrast to this can be found in Jorn's post-war painting *The Golden Pig*, where, due to its gradual incorporation in art institutions on the terms of post-war capitalist market forces, Jorn can see no real opposition to capitalism in the art world—also a pivotal point in Peter Bürger's now classical analysis of the concept of the avant-garde.[56] In *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, Bürger presents the thesis that there is only one true and glorious avant-garde. For Bürger, it is crucial to understand the avant-garde project as merging everyday life and the art object, ideally suspending the latter. In addition, Bürger's analysis

fig 1 - Asger Jorn
The Golden Pig
1950

emphasises that the confrontation with the art institution and the artwork as fetishised object could only happen once, ie in the period before the Second World War. The historical avant-garde failed, albeit productively and heroically in a Marxist sense, because entirely unintentionally it was incorporated in the exhibition and art institutions it originally opposed. According to Bürger, the authentic and auratic avant-garde differs from the post-war neo-avant-garde, which he sees as merely appropriating the former. As a result, regardless of their many multifaceted internal differences, he sees the work of the later avant-gardists as being characterised by apolitical and counter-revolutionary elements.[57]

Like Constant, Jorn was one of the most prominent members of both CoBrA and the later highly political, radical-left Situationist International movement. In the spring of 1950, Jorn painted his visions of war in *The Golden Pig* and *The Eagle's Share* (fig 2), two works in which he implicitly uses animal motifs as a universal symbol and part of a political programme of agitation and revolution. The same year he wrote to Constant:

> **In fairy tales and myths there are monsters, outlandish creatures and signs. They are always symbols for *humans*, for actual phenomena.... With Darwinism mankind has understood their *animal* nature. A conclusion not yet drawn in art. There are already many *human animals* in *satire* and *humorous* drawing and folk art. Folk art is always outlandish and symbolic.**
>
> **There is Grandville and Walt Disney, and there is us. It is often easier to describe the conflict between *humans*—the essential—with fantastic animals, simple, primitive, *naked* instincts, than to paint a single situation, the battle between the police and workers during the Argenton strike on November 17th, 1946. We need to go beyond this individualism in art to reach symbols that everyone shares. That's what I am working on now.... The grand social visions, Swift, Holberg etc, have all been outstanding. One can only reach the truth by using one's imagination on the most inconceivable visions like those of Bosch and Brueghel, but using *figurative* language, like that of the old Indians, the Vikings, the primitive—not a surrealistic, naturalist language.[58]**

On the basis of these observations, it is hardly surprising that shortly before his death Jorn developed a strong interest in images depicting the transformation between humans and animals. As his daughter Susanne said almost ten years after her father's death:

> **We talked about a project that sadly came to nothing because my father died shortly after. It was about animals depicted as humans. In connection with that I'd found some kind of Japanese scroll with apes, rabbits and hares that appear as people. There was also a contact at Disney I was to look up. But none of it came to anything. By that time my father was already very tired. He slept almost all the time, and didn't look well at all.[59]**

The Political Effect and Impact of Animalisation

The problem with animalisation is that humans still function as the rulers and masters of animals, with theories of territory and the law being emphasised as what distinguishes humans from animals:

> **[W]hat separates Man from the Beast is the Law, the experience of the Law, the Superego, and therefore the possibility of transgressing it in Crime. Basically, as opposed to the Beast, Man can obey or not obey the Law. Only he has that liberty. Only he, then, can become criminal. The beast can kill and do what seems to us bad or wicked but will never be held to be criminal, never be incriminated, one cannot have a beast appear before the law...[60]**

That which separates humans from animals is inscribed in a Hegelian dialectic, in that the dual concept of human/animal also rests on the intransigent and never-ending power struggle between master and slave. The human emerges, as Jacques Lacan observed, in the moment law and crime transpire, even though it cannot be determined whether the law is constituted on the basis of the crime, or vice versa.[61] As

fig 2 - Asger Jorn
The Eagle's Share II
1951

Derrida also noted, the law and the superego can easily be criminal. The Nazi regime represents a resounding example of a situation, albeit not unique, where the law can be seen as infiltrated, ie 'bestial' in the sense of being inhuman. One of the reasons that the animal (here the mammal) should never have been seen in total opposition to the human is also because—as Derrida has shown in *The Animal That Therefore I Am*—we share affective traits with animals, which are capable of feeling fear, hunger, panic, anxiety, love and happiness.[62] This feeling of coexistence is, however, due to us thinking we can read emotions into the gaze of animals—first and foremost mammals and possibly birds. This makes it impossible to avoid Hegel's claim that every interpellation is based on identification with the gaze of the other (a discussion that in animal studies research always includes asking to what extent animals are being anthropomorphised). It would seem obvious that the use of animalisation on this basis would have a relatively limited effect in dehumanising the other. Emmanuel Levinas has described the importance of a stray dog to the prisoners in the concentration camp where he was interned during the Second World War, who they called Bobby. It was the dog's unconditional affection for everyone in the camp, prisoners and guards alike, that meant camp prisoners could maintain a sense of being human.[63] Whereas the deported prisoners usually found themselves in the situation Agamben has described in detail in the figure of Homo sacer, the prisoners were thus humanised at the point at which they could identify with the stray-yet tame dog, which also represented the other. Yet another example of the complex and existential slippages between the human and the animal that politics and art have been witness to throughout history.

1 Adorno, Theodor W, *Aesthetic Theory,* London: Athlone Press, 1997, p 113.
2 Agamben, Giorgio, *The Open: Man and Animal,* California: Stanford University Press, 2004; Carstensen, Claus & Maria Kappel Blegvad (eds), *What's Left (Is Republican Paint) – Nine Sisters,* 2015, Aarhus: ARoS Aarhus Art Museum, p 14.
3 Several poststructuralist and postmodernist scholars have disputed the clear distinction between animal and human. With his critical studies of anthropocentricism, Jacques Derrida, for example, argues that the animal is capable of penetrating the field of politics and ethics, something Brian Massumi has also analysed in his studies of the relationship between politics and the animal. Elsewhere Mary Midgley has focused on the patterns of behaviour humans and animals share, and Steve Baker bases his work on Deleuze and Guattari's theory of becoming animal in *A Thousand Plateaus,* arguing that the postmoden animal negates the existence of a modern or modernist animal in art history. Baker, Steve, *The Postmodern Animal,* London: Reaktion Books, 2000, p 20; Calarco, Mathew, *Zoographies – The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida,* New York: Columbia University Press, p 106 ff; Massumi, Brian, *What Animals Teach Us about Politics,* London: Duke University Press, 2014; Midgley, Mary, *Beast and Man – The Roots of Human Nature,* Brighton: Methuen, 1978, p 45.
4 DeMello, Margo, *Animals and Society – An Introduction to Human-Animals Studies,* New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, p 67.
5 Levinas cited in Atterton, Peter, "Ethical Cynicism", in Calarco, Matthew & Peter Atterton (eds), *Animal Philosophy,* London: Continuum, 2004, p 57.
6 Claus Carstensen has emphasised the way fundamentalist Islamists portray non-believers as dogs and pigs, just as the Hutu portrayed the Tutsi as cockroaches during the massacre in Rwanda in 1994. 800,000 slaughtered Tutsi were left unburied on the streets, and dogs and cats were killed to prevent them eating the bodies, which were left to rot in the sun like vermin. Interview in Carstensen, Claus, & Maria Kappel Blegvad (eds.) *What's Left (Is Republican Paint) – Nine Sisters,* p 14.
7 Raber, Karen, *Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture,* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, p 32.
8 Wolf, Reva, "Goya: Image, Reality and History", in Bjerkhof, Sven (ed.), *Goya's Realism,* Copenhagen: Statens Museum for Kunst, 2000, p 83.
9 Hecksher, William S., *Rembrandt's Anatomy of Dr. Nicolaas Tulp,* New York: New York University Press, 1958, p 115.
10 Theweleit, Klaus, *Männerphantasien,* Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Roter Stern, 1978, Vol. 2, p 144 ff.
11 Kershaw, Ian, *The "Hitler Myth" – Image and Reality in The Third Reich,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p 242.
12 Sax, Boria, *Animals in the Third Reich,* Providence: Yogh & Thorn, 2013, p xx. Such dehumanisation often takes place across the political spectrum. In 2016, for example, the chair of the Danish parliament and former head of the anti-immigration Danish People's Party, Pia Kjærsgaard, called the EU a 'rat's nest', just as Magrethe Auken, Member of the European Parliament for the Danish Socialist People's Party has called the leader of the right-wing populist party UKIP and his cohorts 'rats abandoning a sinking ship' when Farage quit as leader of the party after Brexit. In 2007 Donald Trump called the comedian Rosie O'Donnell a 'fat pig' and 'dog'.
13 Brian Mikkelsen quoted in Engelbrecht, Rune, "Er Brian Mikkelsen en rotte eller en hestehårsorm?", *Politiken,* 'Debat', 11.07.2013.
14 Bataille, Georges, "Animality", in Calarco, Matthew & Peter Atterton (eds), *Animal Philosophy,* London: Continuum, p 35.
15 Broglio, Ron, "Incidents in The Animal Revolution", in Blake Charlie et al (eds), *Beyond Human – From Animality to Transhumanism,* London: Continuum, 2012, p14.
16 Massumi, Brian, *Ontopower – War, Powers, and the State of Perception,* London: Duke University Press, 2015, p 48.
17 Kojève cited in Agamben, ibid, p 9.
18 Hugnet, Georges, 'Dada' in Barr, Alfred, *Fantastic Art, Dada, Surrealism,* New York: The Museum of Modern Art/Arno Press, 1968, p 15.
19 Jean Arp cited in Richter, Hans, *Dada – Art and Anti-Art,* London: Thames and Hudson, 1997, p 25.
20 Huelsenbeck, Richard, "An Explanation of the Dada Club", in Kuenzli, Rudolf (ed), *Dada,* London: Phaidon, 2011, p 222.

21 Willett, John, *Heartfield versus Hitler,* Paris: Editions Hazan, 1997, p 15.
22 Adkins, Helen, "Der Sträfling': Monteur John Heartfield', in, Pachnicke, Peter & Klaus Honnef (eds), *John Heartfield,* Cologne: DuMont Buchverlag, 1991, p 260.
23 Pachnicke, Peter & Klaus Honnef (eds), *John Heartfield,* Cologne: DuMont Buchverlag/Bonn: VG Bild-Kunst, 1991, plate 92a; Heartfield, John, *Photomontages of the Nazi Period,* London: Gordon Fraser Gallery/Universe Books, 1977, p 88.
24 Selz, Peter, "John Heartfield's Photomontage", in Heartfield, p 7.
25 Heartfield's work is an appropriation. The position of the arms in the two works refers to the pro-Polish election poster from c. 1920 *Nur die allerdümmsten Kälber wählen ihre Schlächter selber* ['Only the most fearful calves choose their own butcher'], a slogan that also inspired Bertolt Brecht's 1944 song *Der Kälbermarsch* ['March of the Calves'], which also parodied the Nazi election slogan "Hinter der Trommel her trotten die Kälber" ("Behind the drum trotted the calves"). I see the election poster as a key source of inspiration for both Heartfield's *Don't Worry – He's a Vegetarian* and Claus Carstensen's 2015 work *Uneasy Among People, Homeless Among Animals.*
26 Heartfield, p 73.
27 Richter, 1997, p 176 ff.
28 Sax, p 9. p 22?
29 Ferry, Luc, *The New Ecological Order,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp ix-x.
30 Grimm, Dagmar, Peter Guenther & Pamela Kort, "Die Kunstwerke in der Ausstellung Entartete Kunst", München 1937', in Bluemler, Detlef, (ed), *Entartete Kunst – Das Schicksal der Avantgarde im Nazi-Deutschland,* Munich: Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin/Hirmer Verlag, 1992, p 193 ff.
31 An example of the veneration with which avant-garde artists regarded primitivism can be seen in Roland Dorglés having a monkey paint works under the pseudonym Boronali for *Salon des Indépendent* in the early 19th century. Dorglés' painting monkey inspired many later avant-garde movements, both within and beyond Europe. The 1912 exhibition *The Donkey's Tail,* for example, inspired the young Max Ernst to make a drawing with the same title. Baker, George, *The Artwork Caught by the Tail – Francis Picabia and Dada in Paris,* Cambridge: MIT press, 2007, p 98.
32 Von Lüttichau, Mario-Andreas, "Crazy at Any Price – The Pathologizing of Modernism in the Run-up to the *Entartete kunst* Exhibition in Munich in 1937", in Peters, Olaf (ed.), *Degenerate Art –The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany, 1937,* New York: Prestel, 2014, p 37.
33 Steinweis, Alan E., *Art, Ideology & Economics in Nazi Germany – The Reich Chambers of Music, Theatre, and the Visual Arts,* London: The University of North Carolina Press/Chapel & Hill, 1993, p 77.
34 Hammer, Martin, *Francis Bacon and Nazi Propaganda,* London: Tate Publishing, 2012, p 62 ff.
35 As well as Jorn, *Helhesten* (which also functioned as an exhibition association) included a lot of the artists who would later form CoBrA, including Else Alfelt, Carl-Henning Pedersen, Svavar Gudnason, Henry Heerup and Egill Jacobsen, as well as the art historian Jan Zibrandtsen and architect Robert Dahlmann Olsen.
36 Jacobsen in Jespersen, Gunnar, *De abstrakte: Linien, Helhesten, Høstudstillingen, CoBrA,* Copenhagen: Berlingske Forlag, 1967, p 103.
37 As well as illustrating the Danish Nazi newspapers *Fædrelandet* (Homeland) and *DNSAP's Maanedsbreve* (National Socialist Worker's Party of Denmark's Monthly), Hentze also designed the Danish Nazi Fritz Clausen's ex libris. In 1940 Hentze joined the Danish Nazi Party by publicly declaring his support of Nazi race theory and the attack on the Soviet Union.
38 Hentze cited in Jespersen, p 103.
39 In 1941 Denmark signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, marking the nation's active cooperation with Germany during the first years of the occupation. It is also striking that 7,000 Danes joined the SS, the equivalent of the number of Jews that were transported illegally to exile in Sweden. In 1946 the artists from *Helhesten* described the importance of their activities as being based on their opposition to both Nazi rule and the police state of Denmark. Greaves, Kerry, "Helhesten – The Forgotten History of a Wartime Avant-Garde", in Henger, Sue (ed), *War Horses – Helhesten and the Danish Avant-Garde During World War II,* Florida: NSU Art Museum Fort Lauderdale, 2015, p 22 ff.
40 Olsen, Dahlmann Robert (ed), *Helhesten,* Year II, issue 4, pp 61-96, Copenhagen: Athenæum, n.d. [1943].
41 Shield, Peter, "A Short History of CoBrA", in Shield, Peter et al (eds), *CoBrA – Copenhagen – Brussels – Amsterdam,* London: National Touring Exhibitions/ Hayward Gallery, 2003, p 15.
42 Kristensen, Jens Tang, "Miró and the Danish Avant-Garde – A Protracted Dialogue", in Weitering, Katja & Lieke Fijen (eds), *Miró and CoBrA – The Joy of Experiment,* Amsterdam: CoBrA-Museum, 2015, p 57.
43 Birtwhistle, Graham, *Living Art – Asger Jorn's Comprehensive Theory of Art between Helhesten and CoBrA, 1946-1949,* Utrecht: Reflex, 1986, p 29.
44 Birtwhistle, ibid, p 29.
45 In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari write that the child has the capacity for becoming other than human. In play, the child thus does not separate itself from the game, something in which identification with the animal plays a crucial role. Deleuze, Gilles & Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus – Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* London: Bloomsbury, 2015, p 301 ff, p 319 ff.
46 Massumi, p 8.
47 Cooke, Lynne, "The Resurgence of the Nightmind: Primitivism Revivals in Recent Art", in Miller Susan (ed), *The Myth of Primitivism – Perspectives on Art,* London: Routledge, 1991, p 138.
48 Baudrillard, Jean, *Screened Out,* London: Verso, 2014, p 111.
49 Jorn originally called the text "Kafka og Menneskedyret" ("Kafka and the Human Animal"), but Jorn subsequently changed the title to "Menneskedyret" ("The Human Animal". Jorn, Asger, "Menneskedyret", in Hansen, Per Hofman, *Bibliografi over Asger Jorns skrifter,* Silkeborg: Silkeborg Kunstmuseum, 1988, p 22. Jorn, Asger, "The Human Animal", in, Krauss, Rosalind et al (eds), *Asger Jorn,* October no 141, summer 2012, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012, p 56.
50 Kristensen, Jens Tang, "The Wheel of Life is a Roundabout in Herning – An Introduction to Carl-Henning Pedersen's Decorative Art", in Gether, Christian et al (eds), *Carl-Henning Pedersen 100 Years,* Ishøj: Arken Museum of Modern Art, 2013, p 86 ff.
51 Jorn, p 57.
52 Kristensen, Jens Tang, "Den kontrollerede afmagt – Arne Haugen Sørensens navigation mellem kitsch og klassik", in Villumsen, Anne-Mette et al. (eds), *Arne Haugen Sørensen – Lys og Mørke,* Viborg: Skovgaard Museum, 2015, p 50. *Eine Lunge, Ein Reich, Ein Führer* ("One Lung, One Reich, One Führer") clearly refers to the famous Nazi propaganda poster *Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer* ("One People, One Reich, One Führer") from 1937.
53 Kjærholm, Hans, *Asger Jorn Malerier,* Silkeborg: Silkeborg Kunstmuseum, 1964, p 89.
54 According to Jorn, *Guldsvinet* ("The Golden Pig") is based on an old folk tale about a bread bun that rolls into a forest and ends up being eaten by a fox. The work, which also exists as a pen drawing, was originally the title vignette for his brother Jørgen Nash's poem "Solsvinets kantate", published in the book *Vredens Sange.* The dollar sign on the snout of the greedy beast was a criticism of the Marshall Plan that was to generate economic growth in Europe, but also make Denmark a capitalist vassal state of the US. Andersen, Troels, *En biografi – årene 1914-53,* Copenhagen: Borgen, 1994, p 200.
55 Lambert, Jean-Clarence, *CoBrA,* Humlebæk: Louisiana Museum of Modern Art, 1983, p 45.
56 Bürger, Peter, *Theory of the Avant-Garde: Theory and History of Literature, Vol. 4,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.
57 Ibid.
58 Jorn cited in Andersen, p 200.
59 Susanne Jorn cited in Ågerup, Jørgen & Atkins, Guy (eds.), *Asger Jorn som vi husker ham,* Silkeborg: Galeri Moderne, Silkeborg, 1986, p 47.
60 Derrida, Jacques, *The Beast and the Sovereign,* Vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009, p 102.
61 Ibid., p 102.
62 Derrida, Jacques, *The Animal That Therefore I Am,* New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, p 63 ff.
63 Levinas, Emmanuel, "The Name of a Dog, Or Natural Rights", in Calarco, Matthew & Peter Atterton (eds), *Animal Philosophy,* London: Continuum, 2004, p 47 ff.

HEARSE

PUPPY FEEDY

STOCKADE

L TRAP

(EXISTENTIAL

ERREAK(S)

FOR SPEED F

Steven Parrino
Stockade (Existential Trap for Speed Freaks)
1988-1991



Artist Steven Parrino has died after a motorcycle accident, Newsday reports. Parrino, forty-six, died at Bellevue Hospital in Manhattan early Saturday. He was returning from a New Year's Eve party when he lost control and fell off his red Harley Davidson motorcycle in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, not far from his home.
Artforum

Max Klinger
Cupid, Death and the Beyond
plate XII, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881



Max Klinger
Bear and Elf
plate I, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881

Max Klinger
Battling Centaurs
plate V, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881



Max Klinger
Landslide
plate VI, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881



Max Klinger
Moonlight
plate IV, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881

Max Klinger
Simplicius Writing Lesson
plate VII, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881

Max Klinger
Simplicius in the Wilderness
plate X, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881

Max Klinger
Simplicius Among the Soldiers
plate IX, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881

Max Klinger
Fallen Rider
plate XI, Intermezzi, Opus IV
1879–1881

The division of life into vegetal and relational, organic and animal, animal and human, therefore passes first of all as a mobile border within living man, and without this intimate caesura the very decision of what is human and what is not would probably not be possible.
Giorgio Agamben

Max Klinger
Pursued Centaur
plate III, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881

Max Klinger
By the Sea
plate II, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881

Max Klinger
Simplicius at the Hermits Grave
plate VIII, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*
1879–1881




QUET
SWAN BANQ
AT R

Written in Danish at the top of the drawing are the words:
The Swan Banquet on Ward B
Henny's birthday, 23 February 1907.
At the bottom of the drawing:
My beloved Henny
Middelfart Psychiatric Museum received the drawing as a bequest from Henny Brodersen's daughter, Elisabeth Brodersen, who died in the summer of 1995. Elisabeth Brodersen stated that since the drawing had been made at the hospital, it should be donated to the institution. On the back of the drawing are the words:
SK Painter, a patient at Middelfart Mental Hospital.
Also written is "The State Hospital in Risskov is to have this picture when I die", but this has been crossed out.
Middelfart Psychiatric Museum

In the winter of 1907, when PS Krøyer was a patient at Middelfart Mental Hospital, he was in a euphoric state and had a strong urge to be active. He was given permission by the head doctor to leave the hospital, and drove around in a small, open carriage; he was wearing a red Florentine cloak and a cap with a foxtail.

On one of his trips he saw a shot swan hanging outside a shop in Middelfart; he bought it and brought it back to the hospital. Here he proposed to Dr Lange that it be served on Ward B, where he had been admitted. The consultant gave him permission to talk to the cook about how it should be served, complete with wings and neck, and he approached the caretaker who fabricated a metal frame to support it.

The party was arranged on Mrs Kæmner Brodersen's birthday, and was held in her honour. After drawing the table, he drew the swan: on the table Mrs Kæmner Brodersen's photograph was placed in front of Krøyer's place setting. Krøyer and Dr Lange can be seen in the foreground; the other patients and doctors participating in the dinner can also be seen.

For the dinner Krøyer wore his finest attire, with an embroidered waistcoat, a flapping white silk tie, black silk trousers and socks, and shoes with bows.

After the meal Krøyer played the cello.

Orange juice was served with the meal, and used to make a toast to Mrs Brodersen.
A Thune Jacobsen, one of the dinner guests and Senior Registrar at the Hospital, Risskov, 31 August 1947.



PS Krøyer
Swan Banquet at B
1907



Egebjerg
Law and Order
1940's

One side of the script contains a number of records of, among other things, law texts, crime statistics and a list of police officials and concludes with a short biography. The other side includes a series of letter transcriptions sent from Middelfart Psychiatric Hospital in the period 1939-1940, descriptions of proof reader's marks, transcriptions of various alphabets and scriptures as well as an overview of the signs of the planets.
Majken Nørup

Middelfart Psychiatric Museum, founded in 1988, owns a painting called The Pixie Ship by the self-taught painter Vilhelm Hansen, known as Balla, who lived from 1864 to 1964 and was admitted to the hospital on several occasions.

On a stony beach, with bushes surrounded by pine forests on both sides, there is a view of a bay with a four-masted schooner. From the ship, a long, winding line of pixies walk across the ice carrying sacks, baskets and packages. Their hats are red (although the colour has faded) and their clothing is made of coarse grey cloth. There are perhaps over a hundred pixies.

The first pixies have already reached the shore, so they are seen at close quarters. There is no doubt that the painter has portrayed his fellow patients. He apparently painted the work for them; the faces are lifelike and rendered with care.

The psychiatric ward was located in the same rooms that house the museum today. There were apparently not many Christmas decorations, which is why Hansen painted the picture. It is not known when he did so, but probably at some point during the 1930s or 1940s. In Hansen's medical records it is mentioned in passing that "he paints a lot of pictures". From those who knew him we have been told that in later life (when he was in foster care in Middelfart) he went into the countryside with his painting essentials in all kinds of weather.
The Museum Committee of Middelfart Psychiatric Museum

Vilhelm Hansen
The Pixie Ship
1930's

Aroldo Bonzagni
The Hanging Tree
1911

Claus Carstensen
It Conquered the World (for Tilli)
2012

Gardar Eide Einarsson
Psychobuildings
2012

OPPOSITE: **Rune Christian Clausen**
Schizophrenia
2005

Hans Ulrik Larsen
Europe – The Book of Revelation World War I
Donatello
1978



All writing is pigshit.
People who leave the obscure and try to define whatever it is that goes on in their heads, are pigs.
The whole literary scene is a pigpen, especially this one.
All those who have vantage points in their spirit, I mean, on some side or other of their heads and in a few strictly localized brain areas; all those who are masters of their language; all those for whom words have a meaning; all those for whom there exist sublimities in the soul and currents of thought; all those who are the spirit of the times, and have named these currents of thought - and I am thinking of their precise works, of that automatic grinding that delivers their spirit to the winds—
are pigs.
Antonin Artaud

Antonin Artaud
Portrait of Jacques Marie Prével
1947

Jens Lund
The Flower of Horror
1898



Jens Lund
Composition
1900

Annette Kjær Jensen
Untitled
1975



Annette Kjær Jensen
Untitled
undated

Annette Kjær Jensen
Untitled
undated

Annette Kjær Jensen
Untitled
undated

Antonin Artaud
The Theatre of Cruelty
1946

Antonin Artaud
Self Portrait
1948

Antonin Artaud
The Blue Head
1946



Unica Zürn
Untitled
1962

Hans Bellmer
Portrait of Unica Zürn
1954

Unica Zürn
Untitled
1960

Unica Zürn
Untitled
1956

BECOMING AND THE ANIMAL: TWO APPROACHES

Sven-Olov Wallenstein

In the following I will contrast two approaches to the human–animal relation: the first developed by Jacques Derrida, the second by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In focus will be the idea of becoming [*devenir*], which, even though it is a theme only in Deleuze and Guattari, will serve to highlight two different ways of approaching the problem. For Derrida, the question pertains to a difference that, in being already implicated in the subject, places us before a demand situated at the limits of phenomenology and experience. For Deleuze and Guattari, the concept of becoming points to a 'zone of indiscernibility', or space of transformation. For both this implies an ethical injunction, though of different kinds: for Derrida, ethics means to respect a distance that not only separates the self from the other, but also the self from itself; for Deleuze and Guattari, the self–other distinction is transformed into a becoming of multiplicities—which inhabit any identity from the outset—so that the ethical demand rather lies in allowing this multiplicity to unfold its power.

While here addressed primarily in terms of the human–animal relation, these two approaches can finally also be taken as indicating different ways of understanding philosophy as movement, or as a becoming of thought itself.

Derrida and the Two Limits of the Polis

Derrida's reflections on the problem of the human–animal relation emerge in the early 1980s, with the analysis on the theme of *Geschlecht* in Martin Heidegger, and has ever since been a recurrent theme, leading up to his late lectures at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, from 2002 to 2003. In print they are represented in *Séminaire: La bête et le souverain*,[1] and the posthumously edited volume, *L'animal que donc je suis*, 2006.[2] As unfinished texts, tentative and fragmentary as they are, they do not present us with a systematic body of thought. Yet they indicate a problem that has profound implications for the idea of deconstruction.

In the 2002–2003 lectures, from which I will extract only a few significant points, this issue is staked out in terms of a political philosophy. In *The Beast and/is* [*et/est*] *the Sovereign*, the reader cannot help to notice the significance of the odd couples, the copula or coupling. In the eleventh session, Derrida presents us with a marvellous scene, where in 1639 Louis XIV assists at the autopsy of an elephant in his menagerie in Versailles. The body of the beast is meticulously dismembered, analysed and laid out in front of the sovereign's gaze, which for Derrida also indicates that both the animal and the sovereign are joined together at the limit of death, in a "necropsy of sovereignty".[3] This tantalising and, to Derrida, "vaguely totemistic" scene illuminates the entirety of his investigation, and furthermore produces a whole series of couplings between man, animal, beast, the sovereign and God. With this illumination Derrida suggests a profound and enigmatic link between the one who exceeds the domain of politics, and the being that is situated below the threshold of politics.

The first animal to appear in Derrida's bestiary is the wolf, who has haunted, and perhaps even petrified or rendered speechless the political imaginary of the Occidental world, since the violent and lycanthropic irruption of Thrasymachus in the first book of Plato's *Republic*.[4] Tracing the image of the wolf through a series of complex figures that run through political thought—the Germanic figure of Wotan; Machiavelli's strategic advice to the prince not to fear a degradation to animality, but to rather choose between the model of the lion (bravery) and the fox (cunning) as two complimentary defences against the sheer violence of the wolf;[5] La Fontaine's fables that include both wolves and lions; Thomas Hobbes' famous use of the proverb "man is the wolf of man" in *Leviathan*, which Derrida traces back to Plautus; and on to Freud's wolf-man—Derrida sets the scene through a genealogy of the wolf, a "genelycology", for the questions that will occupy him through the text:[6] what is the status of the *zoon*, the living being, as in Aristotle's famous definition of man in the beginning of the *Politics* as a "political animal" [*politikon zoon*]? And furthermore, how should we correlate this political animal to reason, as in the other and equally famous formula: man as an animal endowed with reason, *zoon logon echon*? When we speak of the beast and the sovereign, Derrida suggests, we tend to do so in terms of an analogy that holds them together, and even establishes the 'is' of a strange identity. Clarifying this analogy however does not mean to reduce one to the other—for instance, by integrating the political order into a natural and biological life—but instead requires unearthing the hidden logic that enables the analogy.

As Derrida notes at the outset of the seminar, both the animal and the sovereign are located at the limits of the law and of the polis, the animal being situated below the space of legality, the sovereign beyond it, and in their interplay they give space for the human being—the one who is neither below nor above. Another case of this, sometimes echoing in the texts of Greek antiquity, would be the sovereign as the one who is "beyond the polis and deprived of *polis*", the *hypsipolis apolis* of Sophocles's *Antigone*.[7] This conception was crucial for Heidegger's interpretation of the play in *Einführung in die Metaphysik* [*Introduction to Metaphysics*], where the animal, as the figure of a life that seems to escape political determination, becomes its counterpart: repressed in philosophical discourse, and thus perpetually returning to haunt it. Beyond and below respond to each other; they communicate over the vast distance that spans this political order.

The analogy between the two thus unfolds on the basis of the most radical difference, but a difference that contains an equally profound identity, since beast and sovereign relate to each other as inverted mirror images of the outside: neither of them respect the law—the beast since it does not know it, nor has any relation to it, the sovereign because he transcends it, and can be taken as the very origin and condition of the possibility of law.[8] An animal or a God, such would be the condition of the one who resides outside of the *polis*, as Aristotle proposes,[9] and Derrida's question will first be how we should understand the human as located in-between these "apolitical" entities, and then how we should locate a sovereignty that seems to accrue to both of them, on the one hand as that which elevates itself absolutely beyond natural life, on the other hand as an absolute immanence in nature, as a "manifestation of human bestiality and animality".[10] This is an ambiguity than can be traced back to the oscillation in the Greek idea of nature [*physis*], which was strategically manipulated by Plato and the Sophists alike. Should we understand the space of right and legality as emanating from the law, as a system that refers only to itself with no ulterior ground, or as a space disclosed by a primordial force, a writing that produces an 'archi-violence' that would precede and condition between fact and norm, *de facto* and *de jure*—a theme addressed by Derrida three decades earlier in *De la grammatologie* in his reading on Lévi-Strauss's "writing lesson", or even earlier, in the first discussion of the relation between violence and metaphysics by Emmanuel Levinas in 1964.[11]

These initial questions—the answers to which obviously could, and indeed do, fill entire libraries—are then developed

in a reading of Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Derrida proposes it can be understood as an "animal-machine" designed to awaken fear, but it is also an idea of the state as prosthesis, or *prothétatique*.[12] This prosthetic state first implies that political sovereignty is the "proper" condition of man, that by which he transcends nature and attains to the level of conventions, a prosthetic that is a protection against the threat of relapsing back into a state of nature; second, that the protective prosthetic poses sovereignty as essentially indivisible; and third, that this conventional prosthesis, the contract out of which sovereignty flows, excludes God and beast. No treaty can be signed with a god or a beast, first and foremost because both are not endowed with *logos*—reason, word, speech—the way we other humans are—they are not able to respond in acts of language that create a community of understanding, and in this they can also be understood as irresponsible. Thus the beast does not know the difference, we could say, whereas the sovereign is indifferent to it.

In this sense, Hobbes remains a Cartesian, and neither beast nor gods can form part of society. But at the same time, Derrida notes, this non-responsiveness is also part of the definition of the absoluteness of the sovereign: he has no need to 'respond' to anyone, to explain the motives for actions—his is an "absoluteness that absolves, releases him from any obligation to reciprocity," he is the one "who always has the right not to respond", and he suddenly appears as yet another figure of the structure 'god-beast'.[13]

This is why, Derrida notes, a certain modernity will question sovereignty as proper of the human being; its very achieving of its essence as a *zoon politikon* and *logikon*, in the name of humanity and the rights of man, is questioned in modernity. This is what Hobbes rejects more than anything else: the claim that one has signed a personal pact with God (or any value or instance that would transcend the confines of the commonwealth) can be nothing but the most despicable fraud, and it is what threatens to tear the state apart. On the one hand, the political is what is most proper to man, his universal essence as a political animal; on the other hand, he must be able to transcend the political in the direction of another essence and another universality—an antinomy that resonates strongly in current debates on the possibility of universal citizenship in the age of globalisation, and on which Derrida provides a thoughtful take. The inconclusiveness of his writing testifies to the complexity of the issue at hand.

On the opposite side of sovereignty, we find the animal. The main protagonist that lurks on the background is Descartes, for whom the animal was a simple other, a mechanic entity devoid of soul, mind, reason, etc. Derrida however enters the problem via Lacan and the status of animality in psychoanalysis, which in this reading inscribes itself firmly in a Cartesian trajectory. For Lacan, the animal has no access to the symbolic and the signifier; it remains sealed in the domain of the imaginary, and the human subject still has all the priorities accorded to it since the Classical age. Consequently, for Lacan the animal can have no unconscious, and it is outside the 'fraternity' that can only be based on a community of 'equals'.

This reading of Lacan's decentring and subversion of the subject as caught up, even one of the ultimate foundations for, an anthropocentric or phallocentric discourse that puts man—the male subject—at the centre, has a long precedence in Derrida, and we can see it germinating in the reading of Lacan's seminar on Edgar Allen Poe's *The Purloined Letter*, presented in *La Carte postale*, 1980. More surprising is the inclusion of Deleuze—the thinker of becoming-animal, to which I will return in next section—in such a humanist legacy. Derrida's textual evidence is mainly drawn from the chapter on the "image of thought" in *Différence et répétition* (thus curiously ignoring the later theory on becoming-animal developed with Guattari) and the passages on "stupidity" [*bêtise*], which Deleuze, in Derrida's reading, understands as a particular privilege of man. Deleuze wants to raise the question of stupidity to a 'transcendental' level, but in performing such a Kantian gesture, no matter how bent he is on transforming the very idea of the a priori into a "transcendental empiricism" that tears the Kantian subject apart, he significantly excludes the animal once more, Derrida suggests. For Deleuze, as read by Derrida, the *bête* cannot be *bête*, it has no access to stupidity, precisely because stupidity is first and foremost not in the other, but in me—in an ego determined on the basis of a living being that first and foremost has voice, reason and language [*logos*], and thus also the capacity to renounce it. In this Deleuze in fact remains close to Lacan; what both Deleuze and Lacan finally agree upon as the essential property of man, Derrida concludes, is aligned with a traditional humanist gesture that points to a "sovereignty of the self, capable of responding freely and not only of reacting, which preserves a relation to freedom, to the indetermination of the ground".[14]

In passing it must be noted that the passages in Deleuze analysed by Derrida indeed have a great rhetorical force, and their attack on a certain 'rectitude' of thought reaches a high level of polemics [*polemos*]—it is almost as if we could hear the voice of the Sophists once more behind the Platonic smokescreen, viciously attacking Socrates and his feigned

Ideas with weapons drawn from the everyday language of passions, affects and shifts of perspective—all of which Deleuze would later call a pragmatics of the multiple. But colourful as they may be in their aggressive energy, to my mind they remain an impasse in Deleuze, first in the way they oppose all of philosophy as if it were based on "one single image", as he says, against which one could pit the idea of an "imageless thought". Later—in fact, I would argue, already from *Logique du sens* [*The Logic of Sense*], 1969, onward—Deleuze would acknowledge a necessary multiplicity of such images, just as the idea of animality, as we will see, would expand and acquire a whole new dimension.

It is however in the subsequent, posthumously published *L'animal que donc je suis* [*The Animal That Therefore I Am*] that Derrida treats the theme of animal in a way that draws it closer to the problem of subjectivity and experience. Here as well, Descartes and Lacan are key references, but the fundamental issues derive from a long debate with Heidegger that takes us into the heart of phenomenology. What does it mean to encounter the animal face to face, to have an exchange of sorts with an entity whose proximity to and distance from us is an essential enigma, which in the end also is the enigma of what we ourselves are?[15]

Derrida draws on Heidegger's analysis of this problem in the 1929–1930 lecture series *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt—Endlichket—Einsamkeit*, where it is developed in terms of the phenomenological concept of "world". In the famous analysis in section 59, Heidegger situates the animal in a position between Dasein—the condition of existing, or 'being there'—and the lifeless thing. If the stone on which the lizard rests is 'worldless' [*weltlos*], and Dasein, the one for which the scene unfolds in terms of the 'what' of its constituent parts, ie in the structure 'as' [*als*] that provides access to an understanding of essences and concepts, the stone as stone, is 'world-formative' [*weltbildend*], then the animal, strangely suspended between sheer absence of world and world in the proper sense, is 'poor in world' [*weltarm*]. The question that immediately arises, and to which Derrida devotes considerable attention, is what this poverty means, and to what extent it can define the particular world of the animal. On the one hand, the animal takes part in our world; it is in some sense akin to us, and yet on the other it is deprived of the features that constitute its proper sense—or even sense in general—as dependent on the 'as' structure.

We share certain parts of the world with animals, and yet their mode of participating has an obscure side to it, which for us appears as a deficiency; it is this proximity, this sharing in the mode of a non-sharing, that for Heidegger opens an abyssal question: the stone is simply outside of sense, whereas the animal *in some sense* partakes in sense, although in a way that escapes our understanding of what it means to make sense. With and against Heidegger (as always, deconstruction is not a critique, but a way of uncovering inner tensions that force us to think further), encountering this limit of sense can be understood not just as an external limit, but more as intrinsic to thought itself; a mode of otherness that always inhabits it. To think means to have a world, and yet a full sense of the world—our world-formative power—must include that which withdraws from our grasp of the world in order to be what it is; an absence we must share with those beings that are deprived of such formative power. This (and here I simplify and schematise what Derrida presents as an extended study) would be an equally ontological and ethical aporia that any thought of the properly human, the proper state of the human, must face: it must encounter, try to understand and make sense of that which necessarily escapes the encounter, defies understanding, and only partakes in sense in the mode of a withdrawal. Thus, for Derrida—while not being reducible to a set of rules, but instead hinging on an encounter with the other as a limit of grasping and understanding (and in this he is close to Levinas)—this other cannot be limited to the human or the transcendence of the face (and in this he departs from Levinas), but emerges already at the level of the living being in general.

Deleuze, Guattari and Becoming-Animal

If Derrida's problem, at least in this particular context, has to do with an otherness that inhabits the subject, the idea that traverses the writings of Deleuze and Guattari is 'becoming' [*devenir*] and transformation. First, the emphasis on becoming can be read as a fairly straightforward attack on our inherited notion of the world as made up of substance, or essence, which would take us back to Greek philosophy and the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Even though the Greek terms that are at the origin of our modern vocabulary (*eidos*, *idea*, *ousia*, *hypokeimenon*) display a richly proliferating network of significations and associations not to be pinned down to one single sense, it is nevertheless true that, while often accommodating change and transformation, these terms tend to be understood in relation to an *origin* and an *end*, for which the circle offers itself as a spontaneous model.[16] In Plato and Aristotle, movement is generally seen in view of a goal [*telos*] that was potentially there from the start and secretly guides it toward a state of completion, in which it is 'having' itself in its end [*entelecheia*]. While this

Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde
2013

obviously does not mean that all change arrives at its goal, it is significant that a process that fails to do so (the acorn that falls in a barren soil; the budding tree struck by lightning) is understood as 'deprivation' or 'corruption' [*steresis*, *phthora*]. Generally, by its very nature, movement accomplishes an essence that already lies in the thing; it actualises what was there as a possibility and a tendency from the start.

Many concepts suggested in Deleuze's early work, and then in his later collaborative writings with Guattari, seem to be bound up with a general polemic against such a view: for instance, the essences that he discovers in Marcel Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* are not generalities that subsume particulars under forms that make them possible, but differences that are extracted from experience—perspectives that allow us to enter into new worlds. Or, closely linked to essences, the virtual, which aspires to find a third path beyond mere logical and teleological possibility, and instead proposes an idea of development as a differentiation that does not resemble, or lie dormant within, a form that would precede it. Similarly, the event, which occurs in many shifting forms in Deleuze—from his early writings on the Stoics, to the later analysis of the event in Alfred North Whitehead's writings and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz' baroque—extracts a different dimension outside of bodies and actions, a sphere of extra-being that belongs to the time of infinite becoming, but also lets us see any entity as a 'prehension', a temporary modulation rather than a form imposed on matter as if by a mould. Or, the ideas of the moving-image [*l'image-movement*] and time-image [*l'image-time*] of film, which describe a movement that takes place in an any-space [*espace quelconque*], that does not solidify into the 'poses' of ancient ontology.[17]

Many other concepts could be cited, but here it may suffice to note that they share a common tendency to destabilise form, to see entities as temporary cuts in a flow, to understand being as a becoming. Without attempting to set up a deductive order between these and other similar terms—they appear, disappear and reappear throughout Deleuze's writings; some features fall away while others are added to in a process of constant redefinition—they are all aspects of a more general dimension of becoming, a dynamism that disrupts the schemata of substance–accident, origin–end, ground–grounded. Becoming is what has always already begun. It unfolds in an in-between; in a milieu, or multiplicity, that envelops the potential terms or positions. It does not take us from A to B—so that A eventually becomes or turns into B—but rather becomes part of their element, a 'zone of indiscernibility' in which both terms capture each other in a process of mutual metamorphosis.

The shifts in vocabulary notwithstanding, if we piece together a series of statements from the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, we may find scattered elements of a general definition of becoming.[18] And even though, one must add, there is something paradoxical in defining that which *becomes* rather than *is*, this paradox is itself not foreign to Deleuze's own project to develop a logic of sense that discovers a kind of inner differential in the Platonic tradition that overturns it from within. Furthermore, if philosophy—as Deleuze and Guattari famously suggest in their last work—is the creation of concepts, this means that concepts are always specific to a problem, both local and in the making, and cannot be defined once and for all.[19]

First, becoming must be understood as a verbal infinitive, and not as a noun.[20] Second, becomings always form a block;

they are not passages from one thing to another, but join several elements in an asymmetric evolution: "... it is rather an encounter between two kingdoms, a short-circuit, a capture of a code in which both are deterritorialized".[21] Third, in tracing trace a line of flight that opens an intensive space and forms a milieu, becomings have a relation to geography.[22] Fourth, they ultimately tend towards a becoming-molecular—the dissolution of molar identities—and in the tenth plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus* they appear to be aligned in the direction of a general thrust toward formlessness, so that imperceptibility would be the final state to which they all aspire. Fifth, becoming does not amount to an imitation or a reproduction of a model. In becoming-animal the human does not imitate an animal, but both are transformed by entering into a particular kind of proximity that passes though some particular trait: voice; gesture; movement.

Throughout the writings of Deleuze and Guattari we find a wide variety of examples of such becomings that point toward mutual captures of pre-existing classes of entities (becoming-animal; becoming-woman), but also those that seem to introduce more abstract notions, like becoming-intense and becoming-imperceptible. Here I will however stick to the specific idea of becoming-animal, since it is the one in which a dialogue with Derrida seems most pertinent.

Becoming-animal is first introduced in *Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure* [*Kafka: For A Minor Literature*] (co-authored with Guattari in 1975), in which the stage is set in the first chapter by a reading of Franz Kafka's *The Metamorphosis*. Generally, if Kafka's work for Deleuze and Guattari forms a rhizome, a burrow, this is to trick the enemy; to keep the signifier away, in a process that never reaches a definite end. Instead, what we find is a cartography, the mapping of a terrain staked out by these various escape attempts, and in this sense Kafka's work is a continual experimentation: always seeking to prolong itself, but constantly reaching new impasses that must be overcome. This is played out on three levels: the letters, the stories and the novels. Each level introduces a new set of problems, blockages and escape routes, and the higher stage (as it were) absorbs the tension of the lower, to the effect that it is only the three major novels that present us with the social machine in its full complexity—where the impasses fully become part of the proliferating movement, rather than leading it to turn back on itself.

Becoming-animal essentially belongs to the second level—that of stories—and even though it constitutes a powerful way of opening the subject to otherness and process, it is nevertheless an incomplete opening, fraught with risks of ending in an impasse. Thus, if Gregor Samsa's transformation is a line of flight that traces a way out of the symbolic order (the family; the world of bureaucracy), leading him onward by the vibrating sound of the violin, away from the all-too-symbolic portrait of the woman in fur, just as his voice is transformed into a non-human growling—what interests Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is neither the voice nor organised music, but rather "pure sonorous material" as a vector of deterritorialisation—in the end, the family triangle closes in upon him, the apple sinks into his back and his becoming-animal terminates in death.[23] While this may be taken as simply the ending of one particular story, for Deleuze and Guattari it points to a general characteristic: even if the animals that populate his short stories—all of which are 'animalistic', even though not all of them contain animals—to be sure are not "archetypes that would represent Kafka's imaginary, his dynamic, or his bestiary", since "the archetype works by assimilation, homogenization, and themes, whereas the rule that we seek works only where a small, rupturing, and heterogeneous line appears", their deterritorialising force yet remains relative.[24] If they supersede the danger of the letters, where the duality of sender–receiver always threatens to turn back on the sender, then the experimentation of the stories is hazardous in a different fashion, in running the risk of becoming blocked and congealing into symbolism; the animal, as it were, (at least in Kafka's case) still too much on the side of form, becoming entangled in a dialectical opposition to the human.

The stories always attempt to trace a line of flight and of escape, a map of intensity where everything is a metamorphosis from the start, but their shortcoming resides in an inability to open up toward a more general social outside. This is the achievement of the more complex literary machines of the novel, which ideally are interminable, an infinite process of postponing the verdict, the judgment and the law—all of which are undoubtedly present, but only as immanent partial objects and temporary crystallisations of the flow, never as transcendent structures. The brevity of the stories is in a way a function of their very perfection, of their closing in upon themselves, whereas the open-ended, proliferating form of the novels results from the overcoming of this limit. To the extent that a becoming-animal develops, the story becomes a short story, but if the animal traits succeed in being integrated into a larger social machine, a novel results where vestiges of animality sometimes

reappear—although now absorbed into larger and more encompassing assemblages.

In later works, notably *Mille plateaux* [*A Thousand Plateaus*], becoming-animal is developed in a much broader fashion no longer connected to the specific architecture of Kafka's work (even though here too, in a way that was perhaps unnecessary to emphasise in an analysis of Kafka as writer, it is bound up with the idea of creation in an artistic sense).[25] Becoming-animal is now tied to a particular form of multiplicity, 'swarms', 'packs' of wolves, rats, etc. Deleuze and Guattari generally have a distaste for domestic animals, which are too close to us humans, already beset with projections of unity.[26] It is oriented towards minority; it is always a becoming-minor (a theme that was already set forth in terms of a 'minor literature' in the third chapter of the authors' earlier book on Kafka), which is also why it carries with it a kind of proto-politics. There is a becoming-animal of the human that is not mirrored in a becoming-human of the animal, since the human functions as the marked upper-hand term—unity in relation to a multiplicity that it aspires to subjugate, but in fact never will and never has, since the one is only erected within the many as a temporary and unstable form. This is just as much an ethical claim as an ontological one: minority is not an arithmetic or statistical concept, but the result of oppression and "abominable sufferings", which is why any majoritarian existence always involves the "shame of being human", which in turn constitutes an ethical imperative, not based in law, but in the experience of suffering.[27]

Here too, just as in Kafka's stories, becoming also has a destructive side that cannot be simply eradicated; in order for something to result, we must find a line of flight that breaks the circle (which is why the kind of becomings involved in drugs and excessive drinking in the end are unproductive), a 'desubjectification' or rupture that does not simply abolish the subject. Becoming always runs the risk of a pure dispersal where nothing happens, or where everything begins to turn in circles. The task is one of invention of plural subjectivities, not their eradication, which is why in the end it is a problem of creation of other experiences, just as philosophy is the creation of concepts.

Humans and Animals: Conclusion

In Derrida as well as in Deleuze and Guattari the question of the animal pushes toward the limits of human subjectivity, it challenges our notions of ethical autonomy and superiority as rooted in the Cartesian *res cogitans* in any of its versions (subject, consciousness, spirit, etc), of desire subjected to the law as a higher end, of Dasein and its world-forming power. The exclusion—which is always also a particular kind of inclusion, the animal being excluded as that which as a negative foil, underwrites the autonomy of the human being—traces a particular line through the history of metaphysics, in all of its various version: Kantian, Hegelian, Heideggerian, etc. In all of them a line is drawn against animality, perhaps not only *since* the beginning of philosophy, but even *as*, or at least as a crucial moment *of*, this beginning.

The question remains what an undoing of this limit implies. The metaphysical, ethical and political consequences are formidable, and the two approaches delineated—both located in a continental tradition that they nevertheless inhabit differently—are obviously not the only ones.[28] And yet the two approaches under scrutiny can be taken as paradigmatic: for Derrida, the challenge is to enter into a relation with an otherness that is not simply external but already inhibits my interiority, and to do so in a non-violent, non-reductive fashion; for Deleuze and Guattari, it is not a question of self and other, but one of a becoming-animal that dissolves both poles, yet does not bring about mere fragmentation and dispersal.

1 Derrida, Jacques, ***Seminaire: La bête et le souverain: Volume 1 (2001–2002)***, Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet and Ginette Michaud (eds), Paris: Galilée, 2008. Henceforth cited in the text as BS with pagination.
2 Derrida, Jaccques, ***L'animal que donc je suis***, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (Paris: Galilée, 2006).
3 Derrida, ***Seminaire***, 393
4 In ***The Republic*** (336b) Socrates's opponent, the sophist Trasymachus enters the debate on the nature of justice "like a wild beast" (***hoster therion***), and Socrates's response in 336c makes an allusion to the Greek popular belief in comparing him to a ***wolf***, whose sight was believed to deprive humans of their speech: "And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice (***aphonos an genesthai***)." The rest of the ***The Republic*** could then in a certain way be seen as the gradual recovery of the power of ***phone*** and ***logos*** in the face of this threatening animality and aphonia. Curiously enough, this wolf does not appear in Derrida's otherwise so ambitious and far-reaching lycology.
5 (***The Prince***, chap. 17).
6 (p 142).
7 (v. 356).
8 Here Derrida encounters Carl Schmitt, to which he also devoted substantial discussions in ***Politiques de l'amitié*** (Paris: Galilée, 1994) where the problem of animality also appears at many crucial junctures.
9 See Aristotle, ***Politics***, 1253a 4.
10 Derrida, ***Seminaire***, pp 49–50.
11 See Derrida, "Violence et métaphysique", ***L'ecriture et la difference***, Paris: Seuil, 1967.
12 Derrida, ***Seminaire***, p 68.
13 Derrida, ***Seminaire***, p 90.
14 Derrida, ***Seminaire***, p 247.
15 As Derrida notes, ***the*** animal is already as such a problematic expression that subsumes all animality under a definite article and represses its inherent diversity.
16 The classic case would here be Plato's ***Timaeus***. For Deleuze's comments, see "Sur quatre formules poétiques qui pourraient résumer la philosophie kantienne", ***Critique et clinique*** (Paris: Minuit 1993). Derrida makes a similar point in "Ousia ett grammè: Note sur une note de ***Sein und Zeit***", ***Marges de la philosophie*** (Paris: Minuit, 1972).
17 On essences in Proust, see ***Proust et les signes*** (Paris: PUF, rev. ed. 1976); the virtual is a recurrent theme, first set forth in ***Le Bergsonisme*** (Paris: PUF, 1966); for the event in Stoicism, see ***Logique du sens*** (Paris: Minuit, 1969), in Whitehead, see ***Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque*** (Paris: Minuit, 1988); for cinematic movement as opposed to "poses," se ***Cinéma 1: L'image-mouvement*** (Paris: Minuit, 1983).
18 These criteria are suggested in Roberto Sasso and Arnauld Villanu, ***Le vocabulaire de Gilles Deleuze*** (Paris Vrin, 2003), p 103 f. See also François Zourabichvili, ***Le vocabulare de Deleuze*** (Paris: Ellipses, 2003), pp 29-31 and the discussion of the political aspect of the term, in Paul Patton, ***Deleuze and the Political*** (London: Routledge, 2004), chap 4.
19 See the comments on Plato and the problem of unlimited becoming in ***Logique du sens***, esp. the appendix, "Renverser le platonisme." For the idea of a creation of concepts, see Deleuze and Guattari, ***Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*** (Paris: Minuit, 1991).
20 ***Dialogues*** (with Claire Parnet) (Paris: Flammarion, 1977), p 82, p 86.
21 Ibid, p 55.
22 Ibid, p 8.
23 ***Kafka: Pour une literature mineure*** (Paris: Minuit, 1975), p 11.
24 ibid, p 13
25 For this idea, see Leonard Lawlor, "Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal in Deleuze and Guattari", ***SubStance***, vol. 36, no. 3 (2008): pp 169-187. Lawlor notes (p 185, note 7) that Deleuze and Guattari in one passage in ***Mille plateaux*** suggest that this idea may have its origin in Proust.
26 At one point they note that this division is functional, and that any animal, even cats and dogs, can be treated as a pack or a swarm, which however only underlines the denigration of domesticity. For Derrida, on the other hand, the animal seems to be placed in an originary yet enigmatic proximity to the human (his examples are normally drawn from the domestic sphere), which is another way of saying that the anthropomorphization, or the reduction of swarms and packs to packs of ***one***, the subjugating game of One-Many, has always already begun.
27 Deleuze and Guattari, ***Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?***, p 105; p 102. Deleuze and Guattari's proposals here intersect with Adorno, when the latter suggests that negative dialectics is ultimately motivated not by a theoretical critique of conceptual subsumption, but by the demand to give voice to "suffering" (***Leiden***). Here too the ontological (a term that Adorno to be sure would reject, since he connects it almost exclusively to Heidegger) crosses the epistemological, the ethico-political, and the aesthetic in ways that to my knowledge have not yet been explored. Foe Adorno on suffering an animals, see Camilla Flodin, "Of Mice and Men: Adorno on Art and the Suffering of Animals", ***Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics*** no 2 (2011): pp 139-156.
28 Important cases of this would obviously be the long-standing work of Peter Singer, and, more recently, Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson, ***Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

ALL

THE FA

Jens Lund
My Black Flower
1898



Gardar Eide Einarsson
Anti-Social (Female)
2004

Jens Lund
Adam
1912



Max Klinger
Adam
1893

Max Klinger
The Snake
1893



Jens Lund
Eve and the Snake
1913

CF Hill
The Earth Was Filled with Violence
undated

CF Hill
Untitled (Eve Tempting with the Apple)
undated

Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
Of what forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world, and all our woe...
John Milton



Félicien Rops
Transformism 1
undated

Paul Gauguin
Design for a Plate (Leda)
1889


NGREL
MON

"Pour le Profit" instead of the real wording "Pour le Mérite" is inscribed on the medal round the neck of the hyena. This photomontage was a contribution to the struggle against the danger of a new world war; the Japanese militarists had attacked China in the Autumn of 1931, and in early 1932 German imperialism had forcefully demanded the right to re-arm."
Walter Wimmer

John Heartfield
War and Corpses - The Last Hope of the Rich
1932

Claus Carstensen
Puppy
2015

Fucking dog, fucking whore. You're going to die, puppy. You dirty whore. I want so much to kill you. Fucking cut you into tiny little pieces, bum. Hope I'll see you one day then I'll show you hell.
Inset text



JF Willumsen
Two Dead Soldiers
1917

JF Willumsen
The Belgian Prisoner
1918

JF Willumsen
Untitled Sketch for The Belgian Prisoner
1918

JF Willumsen
Untitled Sketch for The Belgian Prisoner
1918

JF Willumsen
Untitled Sketch for The Belgian Prisoner
1918

Thy wild dogs want liberty; they bark for joy in their cellar when thy spirit endeavoureth to open all prison doors.

Still art thou a prisoner—it seemeth to me—who deviseth liberty for himself: ah! sharp becometh the soul of such prisoners, but also deceitful and wicked.
Friedrich Nietzsche

The facial expression of the dying has been described by Hippocrates as follows:

Brown wrinkled and dry. Eyes deep-set. Nose pointed, lips edged with black .... face often distorted and unrecognizable.

The face of the dead. Death can add to the above: The skin takes on a yellow colour, a waxen colour. The muscles relax. The eyes remain half-open. The pupils dilate. The expression on the face varies. Some dead faces are serene and mild. Others show suffering or apathy ... Later a greenish colour appears around the stomach as a result of the beginning of decomposition.
JF Willumsen

KAUM FLEISCH

Nurek: Beck's Bier, Benetton und Adidas, aber kaum Fleisch

Martin Schongauer
Untitled
1469-1484

When Albrecht Dürer on his first long hike in 1492 arrived in Colmar in Elsass in order to be a copper engraver apprentice, learning from (Martin) Schongauer, Shongauer had already been buried for two years. Oddly, Dürer had not heard that the much admired master was dead.
Helmuth Duve

In the end, (Willy) Gretor was not far from his spiritual role model, Friedrich Nietzsche, when Nietzsche, at this point suffering from progressive paralysis, the state before insanity, arranged for the princes of Europe, the pope and himself to have a meeting in Rome. At the same point, Nietzsche wrote a number of letters to friends and princes. Among these were Strindberg, Cosima Wagner and Georg Brandes. To the Danish writer he wrote: "– To the friend Georg. – After you discovered me, it was no longer an art to find me: The trouble is now how to get rid of me... the crucified. – "(Stamped: Torino 4.1.89).
Ernst Mentze



Martin Schongauer
Untitled
1469-1484

Martin Schongauer
Untitled
1469-1484

Martin Schongauer
Untitled
1469-1484

Claus Carstensen
Kaum Fleisch
2012

Street slaughtering in Nurek: Beck's Beer, Benetton, and Adidas, but hardly any meat.
Inset text

Martin Schongauer
Untitled
1469-1484

In showing the difference between physics and the being of Physis, between biology and the being of life, what is at issue is to effect the passage from being in itself, the objective being, to the being of the Lebenswelt—And that this passage already indicates that no form of being can be posited without reference to the subjectivity, that the body has a Gegenseite of consciousness, that it is psycho-physical.
Merleau-Ponty

Bjarne Melgaard
Untitled
2005



PETIT TRAITÉ DE MORALE

Hans Bellmer
Untitled
1946

William Mortensen
Human Relations
1932



William Mortensen
Untitled (Male-Female 2)
Circa 1926

For us, Mortensen was the anti-Christ
Ansel Adams

William Mortensen
Untitled (Incubus Variation 3)
circa 1926

Throughout his career, JF Willumsen several times experienced that his work triggered major scandals. The first was the largest, and the subject of the scandal was a small etching entitled *Fertility*, which is a little drawing of an ear of corn and Willumsen's pregnant wife accompanied by the following text: "The ancient art has its ancient language, which can slightly gradually be learned to understand. A new art has a newly formed language that must be learned before you can understand it." It was exhibited at Den Frie in 1891 and sparked a heated newspaper debate, which immediately made Willumsen known as the enfant terrible of Danish art and was so much a scandal success that it ensured the economy of Den Frie that year.
Editor's comment

JF Willumsen
Fertility
1891

Hans Ulrik Larsen
8 Weeks Abortion
1978

Fog is a dreaded omen there but lightning spells universal good and parents hang swaddled infants in trees during thunderstorms.
Seamus Heaney

Werner Büttner
Alongside Faeces and Urine, You Were Pushed Into This World
2014



Hans Bellmer
Small Moral Treaty, Crimes of Love
1966–1968

The pollution resulting from birth is milder than the pollution consequent on death.
Mary Douglas

In the case of the animal, it is obviously exactly the same. The process of nourishment is a constant generation; the process of generation is a higher power of nourishment. The pleasure that accompanies procreation is a higher power of the agreeableness of the feeling of life. On the other hand, excretion, the constant exhalation and throwing off of matter, is the same as what at a higher power is death, namely the opposite of procreation. Now, if here we are always content to retain the form without lamenting the discarded matter, we must behave in the same way when in death the same thing happens at a higher potential and to the whole, as occurs every day and hour in a partial way with excretion. Just as we are indifferent to the one, so we should not recoil at the other.
Arthur Schopenhauer

Claus Carstensen
Dead Sheep Giving Birth – Somewhere between Dagebüll and Neukirchen, May 2009
2009

Anton Hansen
Child Coffin
circa 1920

George Grosz
Circe
undated

Hans Bellmer
Untitled
1946

Johannes Holbek
Death
1898

Johannes Holbek
Art Is Form of Life
1898

E

PLAGUE

Theodor Kittelsen
The Plague Is Coming
1896





Gardar Eide Einarsson
The Plague
2008

Gudmund Hentze
A Body Collector Hands Over a Baby to a Vulture
1921

JP Jacobsen
Untitled (JP Jacobsen's blotting pad)
undated



ANCHE OUVRIT
ANDS YEUX ET
RE FIT LA MOUE

LA BLA
DE GRA
LA NOI

Mens Milliarder af Kloder gaa til Grunde

Victor Hugo
Consciousness Before a Bad Action
1866

Victor Hugo
The Spirit of the Storm in Front of Gilliatt
undated

Victor Hugo
The White Opened His Eyes Wide and the Black Pouted
undated

Storm P
Afraid of the Dark - Fear of the Night
circa 1907

Jens Lund
Oh Darkness which Devours the Worlds
1904



Jens Lund
And I Saw the Sky Open... The Apocalypse
1900

Jens Lund
While Millions of Planets Cease to Exist, Our Planet Floats Like a Smiling Soap Bubble Through Space
1899

Jens Lund
Fire Ball
1899

STORIES

AW THIS LA

MAN IS HUM

Gardar Eide Einarsson
Untitled (Stance)
2008



Jens Lund
The Chimera from Nôtre Dame de Paris
1909



Alfred Kubin
Power
1900

Gardar Eide Einarsson
Only Because It's Against the Law
2007

New – true – thrilling
Personal adventure stories
I ate human flesh
Inset text

Eat your Dasein!
Jacques Lacan

Zven Balslev
Untitled
2008

THE ART OF BECOMING ANIMAL AND THE NON-TRANSCENDENCE OF ARTISTRY

Donald Preziosi

A divine teleology secures the political economy of the Fine-Arts.[1]
Jacques Derrida, *Economimesis*

There is a fundamental indeterminacy about art or artistic practice, suggesting that any direct or indexical link between what are conventionally distinguished as form and content is itself a function of the contextual circumstances within which it appears. Moreover, any assertion about artistry entails an engagement with issues, problems, paradoxes and conundrums of signification. Art is an epistemological technology: a craft of knowledge production. Any adequate and effective engagement with it should be based upon a critical understanding of the historiography of the semiotic question of how phenomena signify—both generically, and in specific social and cultural circumstances—as investigated and powerfully articulated decades ago by the distinguished Danish linguist and semiotician Louis Trolle Hjelmslev.[2]

The curatorial statement of the 2018 exhibitions at Den Frie Centre of Contemporary Art in Copenhagen and the Museum of Religious Art in Lemvig, Denmark, implies that the 'languages' of the art movements known as Symbolism and Minimalism shaped the past century's exploration of relationships between life and death, emptiness and meaning. It further states that empty transcendence is confronted by "a series of apparently irreconcilable and art-historically/politically divergent movements, all of which ... attempt to replace this empty transcendence with ideas of eternity and utopias".

I will take a perspective on these problems that, relative to some of those being articulated in other contributions to this catalogue, may be somewhat oblique or possibly contrary—particularly with respect to what is referred to as 'transcendence'.

I want to first call attention to the claims of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their 1991 text *What is Philosophy?* that the principal task of philosophy is the deconstruction—which I will take to mean the *critique*—of the notion of transcendence. Second, I will engage with the obscure and mostly overlooked or suppressed theological nature of the discourse on art and transcendence, concurring with the remarks above about art and religion by Jacques Derrida. By the term 'critique' I mean the detailed foregrounding of the particular ways in which a phenomenon's constitution or fabrication takes place: how it is justified and accounted for, as well as how it often subverts its ostensible aims and motivations.

Modern and modernist notions of art, artistry and artifice—especially in the institutionalised practices of 'art history', 'art theory' and 'art criticism', along with their historiographies—have been and today continue to be theological or religious in orientation and methodology, both implicitly and explicitly. It is important to understand that many of the perspectives in these areas of inquiry replicate, often unwittingly, a number of ancient philosophical and theological discussions, debates and social and cultural crises regarding the proper or desired relationships of art—particularly the mimetic or representational arts—to civic or social life; that is, what may be considered fitting or decorous about artistry's place within these spheres.

Oriented as we commonly are to the fact that existential issues of art practices through the past centuries "address major, existential issues"[3] as the curatorial statement for *Becoming Animal* asserts, it is nonetheless essential that we understand that apparent aesthetic or stylistic change is not necessarily an index, metaphor or symbol of social, cultural, ideological or historical change. They are semi-autonomous: related, to be sure, but dynamically so, and often obliquely or indirectly.

That these are issues that have had very ancient antecedents is commonly forgotten, or ignored, in modernist discourse on the arts. Nevertheless, they constituted matters of very direct and pressing concern in a wide variety of ancient Greek texts, beginning with the dialogues of Plato in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.[4]

Artistry simultaneously fabricates and deeply problematises hegemonic political and religious powers that might be imagined to be materialised, embodied, presented or 're-presented' in and as a people's forms and practices. Which, according to the exhibition's assertions, is unlike what is thought to be the case with animals, who "see an open, limitless, timeless landscape with no 'before' or 'after', and therefore have no consciousness of death have no consciousness of their own existence and of the fact that their lives will end".[5] Such a parochial assertion, I would claim, is manifestly untrue, according to a wide variety of contemporary sources on animal ethology.[6]

Historically, many of the claims to human uniqueness are themselves artefacts of specifically religious and especially monotheist beliefs designed to foster social and political hierarchies in the post-antique European world, where, generally speaking, 'creatures' were understood or staged as material 'embodiments' or 'creations' of an immaterial force or divinity, or 'creator.' Such controversies are threaded throughout the history of the competing Levantine monotheist religious traditions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism, in their multiple variations and transformations over the past three millennia, and many of the controversies surrounding the efficacy or adequacy of each tradition centre upon the role of art (however that notion is understood) in its relation to the life and politics of a community. Art is at the core of human behaviour; of becoming human.

In addition, such controversies are frequently linked to very specific and often quite disparate understandings of how things, including those identified as artistic or aesthetic, might *signify*. There has been a major divide in this discourse between direct or indexical signification (where X = Y under any circumstances) and indirect or semi-autonomous signification. But modern and contemporary understandings of semiotic practice typically distinguish among a wide variety of modes of meaningfulness, usually depending upon the circumstances and contexts of practice. And typically, contemporary understandings of signification regard such practice among humans as multimodal, multifunctional and multidimensional. That is, humans signify in multiple modalities that have diverse or multiple functions—any one of which may dominate in a given context—while such practices commonly have a variety of dimensions or levels of production.

Conventionally, in the history of signifying practices, indexical meaning—namely the assertion of factual contiguity between a signifier and what is signified—is contrasted with iconic signification, which is an assertion of factual similarity between signifier and what is signified, and symbolic signification, which entails an alleged or imputed contiguity between signifier and signified. The late Roman Jakobson expanded this tripartite system of signification in 1960 to include an implied fourth contrast—that of alleged or imputed similarity, to which he gave the name 'artifice'.[7]

One effect of understanding this multiplicity has been a greater and more nuanced appreciation of the actual complexities of 'human' versus (at least in part, as far as we can tell) non-human (or 'animal' and vegetal) signifying practices, although it is also the case that distinctions seen as hard and fast between humans and animals in the Aristotelian tradition of thought—within Western scholarly tradition at any rate, as notably investigated by Thomas Aquinas[8]—have more recently been seen as a matters of degree rather than of kind.[9] Such issues are taken up by contemporary anthropologists, ethnologists and other scientists including, for example, Jane Bennett, whose work on 'sensate matter' is also particularly noteworthy for problematising hard and fast distinctions between animals, humans and material entities and phenomena.[10]

In short, over time the notion of 'consciousness' has come to be seen as not uniquely human, nor necessarily uniquely 'animal'. A deeper appreciation of such issues moreover leads to an awareness that the issues and problems engaged with in the exhibition are more effectively and adequately dealt with contextually and historiographically. Such attention also suggests that all sensate modes of intelligence are best understood, or critically and theoretically engaged with holistically, as coexisting and co-determinate. Every human sensory channel is semi-autonomous and appears designed to function in concert with other modalities.

For these and related reasons, it has become increasingly apparent that the art-critical observations from Walter Benjamin's *Zentralpark*, quoted as a 'motto' in Becoming Animal's prospety from our contemporary perspective appear more than a little parochial, conflating art-historical style with historicity.

†

All the preceding is intended as a prologue to the following. Every text, every spoken utterance, is the construction of a certain reality or a world—an instance of what I will now call 'worlding'. But no realities or worldings are autonomous, as all are staged for certain purposes and functions, in specific contexts, and invariably take place in concert with multiple other modes of signification. Similarly, the phenomenon of 'becoming' exists historiographically; that is, in a space-time continuum. So when we speak of 'becoming animal' such a notion best makes sense *relationally*—relative, for example, to 'becoming human', or becoming vegetal, mineral or material more generally—all in diverse relationships to what we consider 'material' to be. Which is also linked to what is framed or staged as *im*material, or in some traditions as 'spiritual'. But again, the latter opposition is itself historically relevant primarily from a Western or Eurocentric perspective. In other traditions, places or times, other perspectives are relevant.

Bearing all this in mind, I'd like to call attention to this image, which ostensibly shows a human individual behind a non-human, or humanoid, mask **(fig 1)**.

The creature appears in a colourful costume apparently masquerading as a non- or not-quite-human individual. A devilish facade; a person of indeterminate age or gender becoming, or just having become, 'another' creature. Someone with a large, round mask carrying a pitchfork, coming in our direction, possibly from the colonnaded brick building on the hill in the background. An edifice with tiled roof, resembling a massive and perhaps ruined or abandoned church or castle. There are tire tracks on the path, and a large body of water on the far right. An empty, even 'haunted' landscape, with a fantastic creature on the move. Behind them is a small stream emptying into a bay. Is this creature's 'becoming' performed by the act of coming our way? Or is this some piece of 'theatre', a masquerade?

I will put aside for the moment the conundrum or paradox of masquerading—the idea that there is no masquerading because there is nothing that is not a mask; that is, a work of art or artifice—and focus more explicitly upon the issues noted in the stated premises of the *Becoming Animal* exhibition: namely, the link between 'art' and 'consciousness', and the allegation that both are unique to humans. As touched upon in the preface to this essay, I would argue that this is a manifestly untrue notion, at odds with what is currently understood in diverse social, cultural, critical and theoretical contexts. 'Creatures' of many different kinds construct, assemble and fabricate their environments, in concert with specific local environmental and climatic conditions. A whole modern discourse on 'zoo-architectonics' exists, devoted to investigating the massive field of animal architecture, which has its own historical origins in speculative writing on the origins of fabricated human environments.[11]

Human artefacts are paradoxically both unique and non-specific to human animals. So 'becoming animal' is inextricably connected to, and defined in relation to, what is distinguished as 'becoming human'. Either definition is dependent more fundamentally upon whatever 'art' is thought to denote. Indeed, art is not what you think it is—to use a phrase that served as the title of a book Claire Farago and I co-authored a few years ago, the key point of which being, as we argued at length, that 'art' is not a 'what' in the first place, but more fundamentally constitutes a 'when' and the marking of a process; an activity.[12] The following is devoted to the task of reckoning with artistry.

I just used the phrase 'reckon with' very deliberately because of its ambiguity: it simultaneously means to contend with, think upon or struggle against a given state of affairs—thinking as a struggle, just as 'being' animals and humans entails struggling. Reckoning is also an activity oriented toward the future, to the extent that the traditional Latin phrase for our species—*homo sapiens* or the 'wise human'—may perhaps more usefully be understood as *homo* '*prospectus*'—a creature (whether human or animal or otherwise) living in a world of future possibilities, opportunities and affordances. Authors such as Giorgio Agamben (*The Open: Man & Animal*, 2002), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 1980), Friedrich Nietzsche (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 1886), not to mention Walter Benjamin, devote much of their work to reckoning with such issues as well as with the phenomenon of reckoning itself.[13]

Reckoning, particularly as a cognitive or mental engagement, also has another dimension: the problematics of its implicit ends or goals; the ideal of *purity*—an aesthetic/religious phenomenon. Terrorism, to use one example, is a mode of action in a wide variety of social and cultural contexts, and it has been and remains essentially an art of purity. This phrase includes at least two claims that are intended as provocations for discussion. It is also a simple affirmation about the non-neutrality of any fabrication, any artistry.

Terrorism, at base an art of purification, is a proactive art of social hygiene. The implication is that 'terrorists' aim to purify, often by extreme means, whatever is deemed to be *im*pure, *im*proper, blasphemous, sinful, or in general wrong-headed—whether the agents of such terrorism are Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or nativist, indigenous or aboriginal. Terrorisms practiced by whatever means are potentially the most effective and dramatically palpable acts of purification, including murder by maiming, dismembering, rape, beheading or crucifixion; collective racial and ethnic genocide; class and sectarian warfare; or in general, the banishment and physical elimination of those professing 'beliefs' considered by those holding or desiring power as antithetical to their own, either actually, potentially or even retroactively. It is the practice of creating fear in those over whom one might want to have power and to control, manipulate, transform, banish or convert to one's own social or political philosophy or religion.

The second part of my claim is that although its agents may be individuals, terrorism is a social activity—the practice of a systemic or institutional artistry, neither neutral nor natural, but rather a learned craft; a social performance and a manufactured and disseminated phenomenon. Terrorising is the art of fabricating fear on the part of those whom one seeks to radically change. Even if it means terminating them in the 'name' of an imaginary absolute or transcendent Ideal: a god, or gods. Indeed, even if it means sacrificing a portion of one's own self that is deemed impure or unworthy—something familiar in jihadist self-sacrificial behaviour.

Artistry, then, is a pro-actively transformative event; more performance than commodity; less a kind of thing than a method or technique of using things—potentially any things, persons, events or phenomena, whether (to use a conventional distinction) 'material' or 'virtual'; whether physically palpable or not. Such a view is more in line with the original ancient Greek or Roman notion of ars or tekne; terms referring to kinds of activity rather than types of entities or things. In trying to reckon with what follows, my aim is to deal with such events and phenomena holistically or even stereoscopically: in awareness of multiple, co-existing and co-determined realms of knowledge-production; multiple dimensions and epistemological technologies.

Ordinary 'everyday' life is multidimensional, multimodal and multifunctional. In contrast to conventional 'disciplinary' knowledge, which by definition is fragmented and dispersed. We navigate at every moment in such a densely full environment, and our survival always everywhere entails interacting with and reckoning with a diverse set of moral imperatives.

Human behaviour might be characterised or epitomised as the tendency to answer a question with another question. The ancient Greeks claimed such behaviour was a sign of what distinguished them from—and made them uniquely more intelligent than—all other peoples on the planet. But in point of fact, critical discernment is a generally shared human ability; a survival technology, unless constrained politically and theologically. Perception is not passive but proactive: a mode of actively reckoning, creatively contending with and struggling so as to transform and

Cristina García Rodero (bold)
Cristina García Rodero photographs
of Spanish festivals
circa 1975-1992



Timothy Takemoto
Lacan's Borromean Knot
2012

change the world and fabricate suitable environments; more fitting realities.

At the same time, artistry might also be said to be queer: potentially problematising what is taken as unquestioned, natural, real, true, sanctioned, customary, fixed or even universal, and by consequence it is, by nature, fundamentally dangerous. Unless, that is, it can be made numb and dumb by being *sanctified*; by being reified—staged and framed—as seemingly politically benign and impotent (or only faintly and unthreateningly potent). As an item of luxury: what is still referred to as 'fine art'. Explicitly and implicitly, the art market is designed to detract from the awareness of art's danger.

I deliberately just used the term 'sanctified'—made sacred—to call attention to the artifice of what is staged as belief or religion: a social and cultural artistry or craft. Art is dangerous and truly terror-inducing precisely because it calls attention to the constructedness, contingency and 'ficticity' of what is promoted by those holding or desiring power as factual, natural, true, eternal, divinely-inspired or inevitable. Such a claim is also a very ancient one, appearing in the oldest documented treatise on the multiple roles, functions and effects of artistry in civil society, the text by Plato 2500 years ago called *Ta Politeia* (or 'concerning civic matters'), known in English as *The Republic,* which referred to the 'divine terror' or 'holy fear' and confusion (*theios phobos*) provoked in the minds or souls of ordinary citizens by the 'representational' arts of painting, sculpture and theatre.[14]

But the act of bringing to consciousness what the historian Hayden White once aptly referred to as "the fictions of factual representation", simultaneously renders any given religious claim to truth as but one story among many possible modes of narration.[15] Once something is made, however or wherever it is done, it becomes available for appropriation and transformation. Art problematizes the fiction of social and political hegemony.

But how can the claim that art is dangerous square with the paradox that many believe (and indeed are taught or coerced into believing) that art is—or even should be—impotent? That the arts do (or should) exist in the margins or sidelines of civic life, constituting a harmless bubble apart from the 'realities' of social interaction and the hard world of economic 'realities'. It is precisely the very desire of plutocratic and hegemonic professions and institutions to co-opt and neutralise art in advance that belies and queers the assumption of its impotence. Neither art nor democracy are ever neutral, and democracy, where it might exist, is above all the self-consciousness of the artistry of worlding; of reality-making.

To practice a belief in democracy, in other words, is to queer, and thus render problematic, what might have been staged as natural, fixed or eternal in social life. To affirm that social reality is a contingent human phenomenon rather than an unaccountable or universal eternal truth; that what we distinguish as art and religion are co-constructed, constituting something like a romance of unknown siblings. Recall that Plato's *Republic* articulated a fear that once citizens became aware of the contingency and arbitrariness of social and cultural life, they might become empowered to change things in ways their leaders disapprove of.

Another issue is relevant to these observations—the problem of the hypothetical distinction between (what might be staged and fabricated as) 'material' and 'immaterial' orders of existence. This has for millennia been one of the most enduring and intractable conundrums in many religious and philosophical traditions. And much of the discussion and debate on the nature of that relationship was played out and reckoned with precisely in terms of the truth and falsity of art itself; one of the most famous or infamous disputes being that between iconophilia and iconoclasm—the love of imagery and the destruction of idols—in seventh- and eighth-century CE Byzantium. The iconoclasts held that once a sacred person—a 'god' or divine spirit—was materially depicted or represented, viewers could then imagine that representation (and thus the person or force) otherwise, thereby lessening the powers of sacred imagery. The statue or painting becomes one possible version of (the) god.

What was also at stake here was the unity and integrity of the human subject, whether divine or mortal. In the post-Freudian psychoanalytic researches and theses of Jacques Lacan, 1901–1981, regarding the fractal composition and social fabrication —the artistry—of the individual self, a model of the subject (one part of which was directly or 'consciously' unknown and knowable only by its effects or symptoms), Lacan demonstrated that such effects were not simple but multidimensional. He used a particular kind of knot as a model of such complexity; the Borromean Knot **(fig 3)**.

A distinguishing feature of the knot (called 'Borromean' after the coat of arms of the powerful Borromeo family of Milan) is that if any one ring is severed, all three come apart. Lacan used this and similar models in his weekly seminars in Paris in the 1970s, to reckon with what he posited as the tripartite nature of the subject: those dimensions or 'orders' that he termed the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic, each with its particular geometry not of what things mean but *how* things mean.

These dimensions were also Lacan's way of avoiding the notion of fixed and universal hierarchies in the composition of the self: the kind of almost religious determinism that hitherto dominated Freudian psychology and psychiatry; subjectivity or identity not as a thing or entity, but as a process, a *becoming*. I won't go any further into what are in fact quite complex issues, but will simply mention that Lacan was developing his psychic topological model of the human self during the years in Paris when Deleuze and Guattari were publishing their famous psycho-political volumes *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. In their major manifesto *What Is Philosophy?*, as mentioned earlier, the authors defined philosophy as essentially "the critique of the fabricated notion—the artistry—of transcendence": a realm or horizon of existence beyond the material; philosophy as the critique of the artistry of religiosity.[16]

This was also a time when Derrida had begun his lifelong deconstructive critique of the foundations of Western metaphysics, and the heritage of Platonic idealism: what he termed the 'onto-theology' of Western philosophy. As he put it at the time, it was "a divine teleology (that) secured the political economy of the fine arts".[17] But his provocative claim evokes its opposite—that a divinely tethered artistry secures (and indeed makes possible in the first place) the political economy of religion. Art and religion haunting each other as if each other's ghost. Art as a religion and religion as art.

For those familiar with modern art history and theory, this is neither new nor unique. For the artists that came to be known as the Russian Formalists in the 1920s and 1930s, art practice was understood very explicitly as *ostranyenye*—the practice of 'making [things] strange': the self-consciousness of the materials and methods of craftsmanship; the 'facture' of artistry. Queering, making strange, was the foundation of the multifunctionalist philosophy of art that came to be called the 'Prague School' of linguistic and aesthetic philosophy in the 1930s: a movement that gave rise to the multidimensional, multifunctional aesthetics of Jakobson's poetics in the 1960s, and which in turn provided the armature of a variety of poststructuralist and postmodernist theories of the 1970s and 1980s.[18]

Such variants of modernism as Surrealism, Futurism, Symbolism, Dada, etc, ostensified or brought to awareness the fictitiousness—the art—of artistry itself. All of this is rather more than an academic parlour game; a polite diversion or entertainment. It's not only deadly serious but utterly essential, ethically and politically: a conjuring of an absolute need to radically reinvent whatever we might call 'art history' or 'visual or material culture'. A close, critical attention is needed to the constitution of the material and pragmatic artistry of our thinking—our epistemological technologies—so as to avoid merely abstractly rethinking, refurbishing and commodifying art and its histories and theories as fashion statements, window-dressing or 'style'.

I argued recently in a study of the artistry of religiosity (*Art, Religion, Amnesia: The Enchantments of Credulity*, 2014) that our critical work as artists, or curators or historians, also evokes a need to engage directly and politically with

anonymous
Pyongyang, North Korea: Museum of the Revolution
undated

a seemingly uncanny problem: the crisis or conundrum of suicide-bombing and the jihadism necessarily associated with it. I'm referring to the sacrificing of one's own flawed and abject selfhood, one's sinfulness, to an imagined entity, or being of absolute purity and transcendent perfection; a tribal divinity or god. The sacrificing thus consists of the destruction of that portion of our individuality by foregrounding what I will call the *dividuality* or its fragmentary and incomplete nature; ie our fragmented selfhood that by definition is imperfect and deponent, not to mention impure. Offering up one's own imperfections as a way of affirming by negation the perfection of an absolute divinity or transcendental spirit; paying homage to an unapproachable 'Ideal' that is knowable only through its absence. That which is all that everything else is not. The not-nothing, literally named as such in some monotheist traditions—for example Islam: god as the not-nothing. As the former pope Benedict XVI wrote, "art's imperfections are to be encouraged precisely because they evoke a need for the absolute"; for the transcendence of divinity.[19]

This is part of what is meant by some about the only compelling vision of the future being the failure of the present. Like the power and artistry of museology to transform lives and convert small children into great heroes of the revolution, as shown in the next image from The North Korean Museum of the Revolution, Pyongyang **(Fig 3)**—in other words, into sculpture. Children are brought into this museum and exit as ideal beings; artworks.

Art history, theory and criticism owe their existence to the hypothesis, the willed belief, that artefacts offer significant insights (and works of 'fine art' finer and even *more* significant insights) into the mind and character of their makers, as well as their users—that fineness of form a direct sign, symbol and index of the depth of the mentality of the artist. The notion that the character of individuals or peoples is homologous with (and more than circumstantially necessitates) their products and possessions is a reflex of the lingering theological desire: that there really is, or should exist, a concordance between them, as between all things under a heaven imagined to have fashioned them in the first place; the world imagined as a 'creation'; the cosmos as the artefact of a divine artificer.

This is the projection of a cosmic decorum. Subjects are imagined as inextricably linked to the forms, materials and affordances of their object-worlds. You 'are' your stuff, and the form of your stuff is the figure, or 'spirit', of your truth. The problem of the origins and evolution of this transformative thesis that posits art and museums as modes of demonstrating and delineating identities—as an art of framing and staging memory and history, and as an art of weaving together and superimposing ethics and aesthetics—is entailed at every juncture, with ongoing and dynamically changing projections of its possible futures or fates. Every 'history' of art points both to an absent past and an imagined future, imagined ideal communities, just as every museum stages itself—implicitly, if not explicitly—as a fragment of an imagined totality that is its future horizon of fulfilment.[20] The stagecraft and dramaturgy of every museum is shaped with that horizon lurking just around the corner.

What I'm suggesting, specifically, is a reconfiguring of our definitions of art and religion so that (1) 'art' refers to a way of meaning-making that is dynamic, evolving, mutable, context-specific and more aligned with hypothesis and the projection of possible worlds—with worlding—while in contrast (2) (institutionalised) 'religion' is on the side of direct (indexical) representation and fixed equivalence between idea and form, in accordance with the etymology of the word religion itself: *re-ligio-*, a 'strong binding-together (of a community's members)'.

Plato was supremely aware of the 'ficticity' of what is taken as fact. But his solution to the dilemma was not to replace art with something different, but with more *better* art—art that was 'better' because it was more closely aligned with what he believed was the structure and order of the universe and the cosmos; a cosmic decorum, a universal commensurability or fittingness of all things.

Identity, in short, is entailed in the mechanisms of its artistry; in the complex space-time of its pragmatic facture or material production—a fitting illustration of what I've called terrorism as the artistry of purification. It is why art is always impure and queer, and in being so, is always dangerous—unless anesthetised; made numbly unfeeling; dumbed down. This is what happens when the dynamic performance that is artistry is reduced to being a mere thing; a commodity. A denial that art is always already a prospectus for the future: a becoming. A becoming-human.

All asserted above has been intended as a series of provocations to excite response, discussion and opposition.[21] And so I'll end with something that embodies much of what I've been clumsily trying to articulate all along—a statement from Lacan, evoking the essential link between art and life:

I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an object. What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming.[22]

1 Derrida, Jacques, "Economimesis", *Diacritics*, Richard Klein trans, vol 11, 1981, p 9.
2 Louis Trolle Hjelmslev (1899–1965) studied comparative linguistics in Copenhagen, Prague and Paris, and in 1931 founded the Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague, developing a structural theory of language which he called "glossematics", a further development of the semiotic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure. His most famous work is *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, Francis J Whitfield trans, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961. Hjelmslev's theories and lines of inquiry were taken up most famously by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Brian Massumi trans, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
3 [Add citation of Claus' cencus]
4 See Plato, *The Republic* (*Ta Politeia*), Paul Shorey trans, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953, parts 2.607c; Agamben, Giorgio, *The Man Without Content*, Georgia Albert trans, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, p 6.
5 [Add citation of Claus' cencus]
6 See two books especially: Bennett, Jane, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010; Massumi, Brian, *What Animals Teach Us About Politics*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014.
7 See Preziosi, Donald, *Brain of the Earth's Body: Art, Museums, and the Phantasms of Modernity* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp 143–146; Figure 40, p 144.
8 Aquinas, Thomas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle: Volumes 1 and 2*, John P Rowan trans, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1961, VII.L6: C1381–1416.
9 A useful discussion of this issue may be found in Steinberg, Michael, "Cognitive Scientists and Philosophers" *The Fiction of a Thinkable World: Body, Meaning, and the Culture of Capitalism*, New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2005, pp 55–76.
10 Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, see Chapter 5, "Neither Vitalism nor Mechanism", pp 62-81.
11 On animal architecture and 'zoo-semiotics, see Noeth, Winfried, *A Handbook of Semiotics*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990, pp 435–439.
12 Preziosi, Donald and Claire Farago, *Art is Not What You Think It Is*, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.
13 Benjamin, Walter, *Selected Writings: Volumes 1 to 4*, Michael Jenning ed, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. See also Weber, Samuel, *Benjamin's -abilities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
14 For references see Plato, *The Republic*; Agamben, *The Man Without Content*.
15 White, Hayden, "The Fictions of Factual Representation", *Tropics of Discourse*, Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, pp 121–134.
16 Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell trans, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp 1–12.
17
18 For discussion in particular detail, see Jakobson, Roman and Krystyna Pomorska, *Dialogues*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983, pp 152–158.
19 Former pope Benedict XVI: statements from a conference in Cork, Ireland in 2009, recorded in the book by D. Vincent Twomey SVD and Janet Rutherford, *Benedict XVI and Beauty in Sacred Art & Architecture: Proceedings of the Second Fota International Liturgical Conference 2009*. Dublin: Four Courts Press / New York: Scepter Publishers, 2011 Quoted in Donald Preziosi, *Art, Religion,Amnesia: The Enchantments of Credulity*, London: Routledge, 2014, p 133.
20 See Bhabha, Homi K, *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994.
21 For a more detailed investigation of such issues, see Preziosi, Donald, "Godless in Copenhagen: Theses Corollaries, Consequences", *Art, Religion, Amnesia: The Enchantments of Credulity*, London: Routledge, 2014.
22 Lacan, Jacques, *Ecrits: A Selection*, Alan Sheridan trans, New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1977, p 93. See also Lacan, "Of the Gaze as *Objet Petit a*", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1981.

ED

VOLKSLIE

Romeo Lee
Goli
2004

Ursula Reuter Christiansen
At Bakkehøjgård
1977

Self-portrait as a goat by the feminist painter and filmmaker Ursula Reuter Christiansen – executed in the year of epidemic self stigmatization, 1977.
Editor's comment





Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts
by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde
2013

Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts
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2013





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2013



RN

SATUR

Michael Ostendorfer
Mars Saturn
1533, early 19th century impression

Odilon Redon
There Was Perhaps a First Vision Attempted in the Flower
1883

Alfred Kubin
Saturn
1937



Odilon Redon
The Misshapen Polyp Floated on the Shores, a Sort of Smiling and Hideous Cyclops
1883

Odilon Redon
When Life Was Awakening in the Depths of Obscure Matter
1883

Paul Gauguin
Dramas of the Sea - Descent into the Maelstrom
1889



Jens Lund
Forest of the Madness
1900

Werner Büttner
On Evil I
1983

Werner Büttner
Art. 16, "Ones German Citizenship Can Not Be Deprived"
1983

Werner Büttner
Art. 19, "No Fundamental Right Can In Its Essence Be Violated"
1983

Werner Büttner
Art. 4, "The Freedom of Faith, Conscience and Religion Is Inviolable"
1983

Max Klinger
Second Future
1893



Max Klinger
Third Future
1893

Claus Carstensen
Defaced Poster
2011

AP Hansen
Untitled
2006



Pia Olsen Dyhr
Investment in the Human Being
2015

Matias Faldbakken
The Name of a Person That I Want Dead Written in X's
2006

Matias Faldbakken
One Line for Every Enemy #10
2008-2009



P.P.P.

A MONTAGE OF CITATIONS AND TEXTS ON THE DEATH OF PIER PAOLO PASOLINI[1]

Claus Carstensen

On Easter Monday 2006 I was invited to a christening. What I do remember of the priest's sermon are the following three fragments: *it is done; empty grave; to be called by name.*

A month before I had bought the catalogue *P.P.P., Pier Paolo Pasolini: Pier Paolo Pasolini and Death*, published on the occasion of the exhibition *Pier Paolo Pasolini and Death* at Pinakothek der Moderne in Munich.[2]

The catalogue (like the exhibition) is based on a single premise: that the murder of the film director Pasolini in Ostia in the early hours of 2 November 1975 was actually martyrdom—suicide staged as murder. The murder was committed on All Souls' Day—a significant day for Catholics and the day after All Saints' Day—which is dedicated to commemorating the dead. The equivalent in German, albeit not on the same day, is *Totensonntag*.

It may seem abstruse, but the catalogue is based on the painter and graphic designer Guiseppe Zigaina's long-standing investigation of the case. Zigaina was a close friend of Pasolini and had known him since meeting him in their home region of Friuli in northern Italy as early as 1946. He has worked intensively on Pasolini's work and life.

In a conversation with Peter Kammerer published in the catalogue, Kammerer asks Zigaina about his claim that Pasolini's death was actually the work of an auteur: planned and hinted at throughout his writings and film oeuvre, before finally being staged and carried out in Ostia.

Zigaina replies that this is precisely the case:

> **That's the framework in which, coordinated perfectly logically, Pasolini's "live novel" should be read as long as you accept the following premises:**
>
> **1. Pasolini was not talking about death in general, but only about his own violent death, of which he was the author, not the victim.**
> **2. As a "martyr director by choice," Pasolini wanted to bear witness to his "belief in the reality and efficacy of myth," the archetypal myth of Jonah, which he proclaimed in the film *The Gospel According to St. Matthew*.**
> **3. Pasolini communicated his "death project" to the world as a "discourse of jargon", i.e. in a cryptic language that has to be decoded.[3]**

And, he continues:

> **A look at the perpetual calendar, which Pasolini consulted from the early 1960s on, reveals that in the critical period of his life Pasolini had only two dates when he could be killed according to the liturgical scheme he had planned. In order to underline the sacramental nature of his "cultural rite" he chose a day when All Souls (the Day of the Dead) fell on a Sunday (the Lord's Day). This was only the case in 1969 and 1975.[4]**

Elsewhere in the catalogue, Zigaina says that Pasolini's faith is like that of primitive Christianity in which the Kabbalah, magic and alchemical transubstantiation play important roles—a view of transubstantiation in which the consecrated Eucharist is the actual body and blood of Christ. Here, for Pasolini, "A saint also speaks in silence, with his body and his blood."[5]

Zigaina:

> **Pasolini did indeed always write that he would have killed himself in spring, i.e. during the time of death and resurrection at Easter. But when he read Mircea Eliade, he discovered that '[the] myth' was to be celebrated in a night between fall and winter, on an especially holy day such as All Souls, when it falls on a Sunday.[6]**

In a poem, Pasolini writes:

> **The yellowing grass that survives every season,**
> **and the smooth stones, that is my theatre...**
> **Just because it's a holiday.**
> **I wish to die of humiliations out of protest.**
> **I want them to find me with bared genitals,**
> **and with trousers stained with white semen.[7]**

To further strengthen his case, Zigaina quotes central passages from Pasolini's poetry:

> **Actions of life are only communicated,**
> **and they are themselves poetry,**
> **because, I repeat, there is no poetry except real action.[8]**
>
> **Death lies not in not being able to communicate but in no longer being understood.[9]**
>
> **In dying, Kennedy expressed himself through his last action.[10]**
>
> **Death makes a brilliant montage of our lives.[11]**

To this Zigaina responds: "for him death had the same function as the director's cut, editing a film."[12] He validates his claim with the following strange incident:

> **A few hours before his death, Pasolini sent me a "linguistically precisely describable" message to announce that the "editing of his last film" was complete. The news—which at that point I did not recognise as such—was formulated in neither writing nor speech, but consisted of the original rolls of film for *Salò, o le 120 giornate di Sodoma* in six metal cans, which someone had left at the entrance to my house in Cervignano. During the night of 5/6 November 1975. The same evening I called my friend Guido Botteri, who at the time was editor-in-chief of Rai [Radiotelevisione Italiana], in Trieste, to ask him for advice. Botteri immediately sent someone to collect the film, and got it screened at the Capella Underground club there. I was also asked about the film by Salone Pier Lombardo (now the Teatro Franco Parenti) in Milan and later had it delivered to the director there. On the evening of November 8, 1975, *Salò, o le 120 giornate di Sodoma* was confiscated by the judiciary after a screening in Milan, and a discussion about censorship in Italy followed (in which Piero Ottone, Carlo Ripa di Meana, Giovanni Testori and Judge Pulitano took part).[13]**

In his chanting, elegiac poem *Patmos*, where Pasolini cites the apocalypse in the Revelation of St John the Divine (hence the title), he commemorates the victims of the first major (presumably Fascist) terrorist attack in Italy after the Second World War. On 12 December 1969 a bomb exploded outside Banca dell'Agricoltura in Milan, killing 17 and injuring 85. The Italian authorities started a smear campaign against anarchists and left-wing terrorists. The anarchist Giuseppe Pinelli, who was later proven innocent, was arrested and 'fell' out of a window to his death during police interrogation.

In the poem the bombing victims are listed by name, followed by a short biographical note. Many of the names are followed by the word *Presente!*

Zigaina:

> **Pasolini recalls the 'Fascist Saturdays', when the war dead were called out by name, whereupon a loud *Presente!* was heard. This ceremony was the evocation: "You are alive in our hearts, even if you are dead forever." On the slopes of the karst, above the plain of Friuli and the Gulf of Trieste, is the military cemetery of Redipuglia with the graves of 70,000 Italian dead from World War I. Over the grave recesses, the names of the dead are listed alphabetically, each name having a large *Presente!* in horrible bronze lettering. Pasolini evokes this memory for the dead in Milan... to confess with a certain diffidence his "faith in the reality and efficacy of the myth" of dead [sic] and the resurrection.[14]**

This kind of roll call is not ideologically restricted to the right wing, having also been used by the Marxist resistance in El Salvador, among others. Martin Luther's real presence as representation may also play a role: the dead are present, as in pre-death, through resurrection in memory.

"But to have lived for that once, even if only the one time / to have been human, been mortal, stands fast and seems / irrevocable", as Rainer Maria Rilke writes in the ninth of the *Duino Elegies*.[15] There is but one life and one death.

"The elegy leads from the future to the past", comments Peter Szondi in his excellent afterward to the German edition of Rilke's *Duino Elegies*. He continues:

> **Memory in the eighth elegy is not the random past, but rather a bond to the past beyond all things past, namely the first home of life before birth. This is what is longed for in a life lived in an attempt to bridge painful isolation. Here there is no abyss dividing the world into one's own and the unknown, between the inner and outer. Distance to one's neighbour is not created by consciousness of death, but of birth.[16]**

Rilke, he writes, "does not see memory as a subjective, emotional bond to the past, but as an objective link between the spaces of existence before and after birth".[17] "There is a life after birth" was the slogan of the Situationist International.

Death is perhaps less the individual leaving of life, and more the long farewell to life itself. As Rilke writes: "so we dwell here, forever taking leave."[18] Opposite this we have the extreme view of death's avant-garde, of vanquishing death with what Pasolini called "real action", or "suicide by society", to paraphrase Antonin Artaud.

It is obvious that for Pasolini his extreme film *Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma* could only be transcended, atoned for and signed by suicide, martyrdom, death. Art is a work that ends with death. For artists other than Pasolini, art is rather an attempt to defer death by pushing itself between death and life. *P.P.P. – Prose, Pornography, Parable* is of one of the chapter titles in the Pasolini catalogue. *Preaching, Polemics and Propaganda* is the heading for Martin Luther's life and work at Lutherhaus in Wittenberg—Luther, who Thomas Müntzer called "Brother Fatted Pig with his shitty obsequiousness".

Or, in the words of Albert Oehlen: life kills art. Apocalypse. Apocatastasis.

> **The tide on the shore here:**
> **things are split.**
>
> **Not least the limiting form**
> **of death itself,**
> **in which every work of art**
> **plays a part.**
>
> **Soap runs down her leg.**
> **Outside the wind whips**
> **the branches of exposure**
> **against the windowpane.[19]**

1 The entire P.P.P. montage was originally published in Danish in Carstensen, Claus and Christian Vind, *En rejse til Trieste*, Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2009, pp 265–270.
2 Schwenk, Bernhart and Michael Semff (eds), *P.P.P., Pier Paolo Pasolini: Pier Paolo Pasolini and Death*, Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2005.
3 Peter Kammerer, in conversation with Guiseppe Zigaina, "In the Firing Line: Pasolini's Signs of Life and Death", *P.P.P., Pier Paolo Pasolini*, p 157.
4 Kammerer, "In the Firing Line", p 158.
5 Zigaina, Giuseppe, "Pasolini and Death: A Purely Intellectual Thriller", *P.P.P., Pier Paolo Pasolini*, Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2005, p 35.
6 Kammerer, "In the Firing Line", p 159.
7 Kammerer, "In the Firing Line", p 170.
8 Kammerer, "In the Firing Line", p 171.
9 Zigaina, "Pasolini and Death", p 30.
10 Zigaina, "Pasolini and Death", p 35.
11 Zigaina, "Pasolini and Death", p 32.
12 Kammerer, "In the Firing Line", p 158.
13 Zigaina, "Pasolini and Death", p 32.
14 Ibid., pp 162-163.
15 Rilke, Rainer Maria, *Duino Elegies*, Stephen Cohn trans., Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989, p 71.
16 Rilke, Rainer Maria, *Duineser Elegien*, Berlin: Bibliothek Suhrkamp, 1994, p 79.
17 Rilke, *Duineser Elegien*, p 80.
18 Rilke, *Duino Elegies*, p 69.
19 Carstensen, Claus, *Z.T.*, Copenhagen: Borgen, 1989, p 51.

Pier Paolo Pasolini
Two stills from *Salò, or the 120 days of Sodom*
1975

WORKS

Cover **Jeffrey Silverthorne**
Lovers, Accidental Carbon Monoxide Poisoning, Morgue Work (detail); 1972–1974; photograph; 40.5 × 50.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

12 **Ditlev Blunck**
Nightmare (detail pp 10–11, thumbnail p 33); 1846; oil on canvas; 49 × 62 cm | The Nivaagaard Collection; Image courtesy: The Nivaagaard Collection

13 **Francisco de Goya**
The Consequences, plate 72, *The Disasters of War*, 1810–1820; etching; 14.4 × 18.5 cm | The National Gallery of Denmark; Image courtesy: The National Gallery of Denmark; © SMK Photo

14 **Francisco de Goya**
Of What Ill Will He Die?, plate 40, *The Caprices*; 1799; etching and aquatint; 21.5 × 15 cm | Holstebro Art Museum; Image courtesy: Holstebro Art Museum
Francisco de Goya
They Spruce Themselves Up, plate 51, *The Caprices*; 1799; etching and aquatint; 21.5 × 15 cm | Holstebro Art Museum; Image courtesy: Holstebro Art Museum

15 **Claus Carstensen**
Donkeys and Mules (Read, Depict, Understand Nothing); 2006; collage; 23.1 × 16.2 cm| Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg
Claus Carstensen
Dying Human Being (Read, Depict, Understand); 2006; collage; 23.1 × 16.2 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

16 **Francisco de Goya**
Might Not the Pupil Know More?, plate 37, *The Caprices*; 1799; etching and aquatint; 21.5 × 15 cm | Holstebro Art Museum; Image courtesy: Holstebro Art Museum
Francisco de Goya
Neither More nor Less, plate 41, *The Caprices*; 1799; etching and aquatint; 21.5 × 15 cm | Holstebro Art Museum; Image courtesy: Holstebro Art Museum

17 **Francisco de Goya**
And So Was His Grandfather, plate 39, *The Caprices*; 1799; etching and aquatint; 21.5 × 15 cm | Holstebro Art Museum; Image courtesy: Holstebro Art Museum;
Francisco de Goya
Pretty Teacher!, plate 68, *The Caprices*; 1799; etching and aquatint; 21.5 × 15 cm | Holstebro Art Museum; Image courtesy: Holstebro Art Museum

18 **Francisco de Goya**
Big Booby, plate 4, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*; 1810–1820; 22 × 31.3 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

19 **Francisco de Goya**
The Carnivorous Vulture, plate 75, *The Disasters of War*, 1810–1820; etching; 15.4 × 19.8 cm | The National Gallery of Denmark; Image courtesy: The National Gallery of Denmark; © SMK Photo

20 **Francisco de Goya**
Flying Folly, plate 5, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*; 1815–1823; etching and aquatint; 21.8 × 32 cm| Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas
Francisco de Goya
It's a Hard Step!, plate 14, *The Disasters of War*, 1810—1820; etching and aquatint; 22.5 × 27 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

21 **Terry Atkinson**
MANET – MAP – GOYA – HIROSHIMA – TRANSMISSION; 1986; graphite on paper; 30 × 40.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg
Terry Atkinson
Ruby (Reading the Guide) and Amber (Examining the Gibbet) at Natzweiler-Struthof Concentration Camp in the Vosges, August 1985; (detail p 123); 1986; graphite and collage on paper; 30 × 40.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

22 **Francisco de Goya**
Carnival Folly, plate 14, *The Follies (The Proverbs)* (thumbnail p 123); 1815–1823; etching and aquatint; 21 × 31.3 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas
Francisco de Goya
Furious Folly, plate 6, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*; 1815–1823; etching and aquatint; 21.7 × 31.3 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

23 **Francisco de Goya**
General Folly, plate 9, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*; 1815–1823; etching and aquatint; 21.5 × 32 cm | Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

24 **Francisco de Goya**
Funeral Folly, plate 18, *The Follies (The Proverbs)* (thumbnail p 123); 1815–1823; etching and aquatint; 21 × 31.4 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas
Francisco de Goya
Feminine Folly, plate 1, *The Follies (The Proverbs)*; 1815–1823; etching and aquatint; 21.6 × 31.4 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

25 **Francisco de Goya**
The Kidnapping Horse, plate 10, *The Follies (The Proverbs)* (thumbnail p 33); 1815–1823; etching and aquatint; 21.3 × 31 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

26 **Peter Flötner**
Allegory: Tyranny, Usury and Hypocrisy Fighting Common Sense, Justice and the Word of God detail above; undated, later impression; woodcut; 16.6 × 39.8 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas
Lucas Cranach
Regnum Satane et Papae; undated; woodcut; 21.9 × 15.6 cm | Kupferstichkabinett; © bpk/Kupferstichkabinett, SMB; Photo: Dietmar Katz

27 **Lucas Cranach**
Digna Merces Papae; undated; woodcut; 21.9 × 15.6 cm | Kupferstichkabinett; © bpk/Kupferstichkabinett, SMB; Photo: Dietmar Katz
Lucas Cranach
Papal Ass; undated; woodcut; 14.6 × 10.5 cm | Kupferstichkabinett; © bpk/Kupferstichkabinett, SMB; Photo: Dietmar Katz

28 **John Heartfield**
How to Make Dollars; 1931; offset; 64 × 48 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © John Heartfield/VISDA; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg;

29 **Claus Carstensen**
Uneasy Among People, Homeless Among Animals; 2015; acrylic, posca marker and spray paint on canvas; 190 × 130 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

30 **anonymous**
Devil Eating Priests and Shitting Lansquenets; undated; drypoint; 26.9 × 19.9 cm | Kupferstichkabinett; © bpk/Kupferstichkabinett, SMB; Photo: Dietmar Katz

31 **F Hildenberg**
In the Devil's Cookshop; undated; drypoint; 19.0 × 23.5 cm | Kupferstichkabinett; © bpk/Kupferstichkabinett, SMB; Photo: Dietmar Katz

42 **Odilon Redon**
Closed Eyes; 1890; lithograph; 31.2 × 24.2 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

43 **Wilhelm Freddie**
Untitled; 1941; oil on canvas; 50 × 45 cm | Collection Anne Marie Michelsen & Søren Mygind; © Wilhelm Freddie/VISDA; © Photo: Torben Eskerod

44 **CF Hill**
Untitled; undated; ink on paper; 34 × 20.5 cm | Malmö Art Museum; © Carl Fredrik Hill, reproduced by Johanna Rylander/Malmö Konstmuseum

45 **CF Hill**
Untitled; undated; ink on paper; 34 × 41 cm | Malmö Art Museum; © Carl Fredrik Hill, reproduced by Johanna Rylander/Malmö Konstmuseum

46 **Thomas Bruun**
Ghost—the Painting (for...); 1986; acrylic and lacquer on canvas; 150 × 100 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

47 **anonymous**
Untitled; undated; oil on canvas; 58 × 40 cm | Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; Image courtesy: Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: Geir Hauksson

48 **Herbert Volkmann**
Do It for Van Gogh, Baby (detail pp 40–41); 2010–2011; oil on canvas; 80 × 100 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

49 **George Grosz**
I Don't Want to Know Anything About Politics; undated; book print; 20 × 16 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © George Grosz/VISDA; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

50–51 **Albert Oehlen**
Hell/Work; 1989; linocut; 44 × 63.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

52–53 **Gardar Eide Einarsson and Matias Faldbakken**
I Am Alive and You're Dead; 2005; offset; 84 × 60 cm each; Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artists; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

54 **Sam Kiyoumarsi**
Graduate; 2008; photograph; 46 × 30.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

55 **Thomas Zipp**
A.B.: LOOKING; 2013; oil and lacquer on canvas; 75 × 65 cm | Private collection

56 **Eugène Carrière**
Elise Laughing; 1895; lithograph; 33 × 23.5 cm | Private collection, Berlin; © Musée Eugène-Carrière

57 **Jutta Koether**
The Stuff Is Here, from the series *In the Sky of the Brain*; 1996; acrylic on canvas; 160 × 120 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

58–59 **Sam Kiyoumarsi**
Blind Breastfeed; 2006; photograph; 30.5 × 46 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

61 **Storm P**
Yes—perhaps you might have read more than me—but you see—I have got proper boots!; 1919; indian ink on paper; 31 × 25.5 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum
Storm P
Inventions: The Triumph of Photography; circa 1941; indian ink and graphite on paper; 28.5 × 34.5 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum

62 **Storm P**
Modern Science; 1910; indian ink, watercolour and crayon on paper; 38.4 × 50.9 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum
Storm P
In The Dream Play of Life—Evil Conscience; 1915–1920; indian ink on paper; 34 × 24 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum
Storm P
Untitled (Heart Blood); circa 1905–1910; indian ink and watercolour on paper; 41.5 × 26 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum
Storm P
Satire; circa 1918; indian ink on paper; 15.5 × 20.2 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum

63 **Storm P**
Culture; 1908; oil on canvas; 68 × 53.4 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum

64 **Storm P**
Angst (Syphilis); 1906; oil on cardboard; 50.2 × 38.1 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum
Storm P
Not Judging: (Heavenly and Profane Justice); 1947–1949; oil on canvas; 119 × 99 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum

70 **Gabriel von Max**
Pithecanthropus Alalus; 1894; oil on canvas; 100 × 70 cm | © 2017. Photo: Scala, Florence/bpk—Bildagentur für Kunst, Kultur und Geschichte, Berlin
Gabriel von Max
Monkeys as Art Critics; 1889; oil on canvas; 60.5 × 43 cm | Private collection; © Photo: Ernst Jank

71 **Gabriel von Max**
Anthropological Teaching; circa 1900; oil on canvas; 59 × 46 cm | Lenbachhaus; © The Städtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus und Kunstbau München

72 **Gabriel von Max**
Pain Forgotten (Schmerzvergessen) (III); 1904; oil on canvas; 34.5 × 26.3 cm | Private collection

73 **Werner Büttner**
Welfare State Impression I; 1980; oil on canvas; 89 × 79 cm | Courtesy of the artist

74 **Claus Carstensen**
Affenqual in Tübingen; 2012; acrylic, posca marker, spray and collage on canvas; 180 × 150 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg
Max Klinger
Darwinian Theory (detail pp 68–69); 1875; ink on paper; 9.7 × 14.6 cm | Kupferstichkabinett; © bpk/Kupferstichkabinett, SMB; Photo: Dietmar Katz

75 **Claus Carstensen and Manuel Ocampo**
Chromophobia (The Unseen Power of the Monochrome); 2011; acrylic, spray, posca marker and collage on canvas; 130 × 90 cm | Collection of the artists; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

86 **James Ensor**
Strange Insects (detail pp 84–85); 1888; etching; 11.4 × 15.4 cm | Courtesy of James Ensor Archives; © James Ensor/VISDA; © Photo: Dirk Pauwels

87 **Steven Parrino**
Hell's Angels; 1985; enamel on canvas, two parts; 63.5 × 30.5 cm each | Private Collection; © Steven Parrino; Courtesy of the Parrino Family Estate and Gagosian Gallery

88 **Peter Louis-Jensen**
Fragment A; 1960; oil and sawdust on hardboard; 45 × 60 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist's family; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

89 **Alfred Kubin**
Swarm Spirits; 1903; ink and graphite on paper; 31.3 × 39.6 cm | Leopold Museum, Vienna; © Alfred Kubin/VISDA; Image courtesy: Leopold Museum, Vienna
Alfred Kubin
The Swamp (thumbnail p 124); 1903–1905; ink on paper; dimensions unknown | LENTOS Kunstmuseum Linz; © LENTOS Kunstmuseum Linz/Alfred Kubin/VISDA; © Photo: Reinhard Halder

92 **Andy Hope 1930**
Robot Empire (detail pp 90–91); 2005; oil on board; 50.7 × 41.8 cm | Friedrich Christian Flick Collection; Image courtesy: Friedrich Christian Flick Collection; Courtesy of the artist and Hauser & Wirth; © Andy Hope 1930

93 **Andy Hope 1930**
Amazing (thumbnail p 127); 2005; oil on board; 36.8 × 18.1 cm | Friedrich Christian Flick Collection; Image courtesy: Friedrich Christian Flick Collection; Courtesy of the artist and Hauser & Wirth; © Andy Hope 1930

94 **Andy Hope 1930**
X-Medley 19; 2012; acrylic and lacquer on board; 80 × 60 cm | © Andy Hope 1930; Courtesy of the artist and Hauser & Wirth; © Photo: Stefan Altenburger Photography; © Andy Hope 1930

98 **Jan Grarup**
Rwanda; 1994; photograph; 40 × 56.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg
Jan Grarup
Rwanda; 1994; photograph; 39 × 55.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

99 **Jan Grarup**
Rwanda (detail pp 96–97); 1994; photograph; 39.5 × 56.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

103 **Claus Carstensen**
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

108 **Félicien Rops**
Satan Sowing Tares (thumbnail p 36); 1882; lithograph; 30.4 × 21 cm | The Félicien Rops Museum, Namur; © Atelier de l'Imagier/musée Rops

109 **Max Klinger**
Peeing Death (thumbnail p 36); 1881; oil on canvas; 95 × 45 cm | The Museum of Fine Arts Leipzig; © bpk/Museum der bildenden Künste, Leipzig

110 **Jens Lund**
The Forest of the Fear of Death (detail pp 106–107, thumbnail p 36); 1900; indian ink on paper; 66 × 50.7 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Image courtesy: Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

111 **Steven Parrino**
The Self Mutilation Bootleg 2 (The Open Grave) (thumbnail p 37); 1988–2003; enamel on canvas; 292.1 × 162.6 × 50.8 cm | © Steven Parrino; Courtesy the Parrino Family Estate and Gagosian Gallery

112 **James Ensor**
Hop-Frog's Revenge (thumbnail p 37); 1898; etching; 49.5 × 31.8 cm | Museum of Fine Arts Ghent; © James Ensor/VISDA/www.lukasweb.be—Art in Flanders vzw; © Photo: Dominique Provost
Storm P
The Grief; 1907; ink, watercolour and gouache on paper; 31.4 × 27 cm | The Storm P Museum © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum

113 **Gardar Eide Einarsson**
Alone Among Friends (thumbnail p 37); 2006; acrylic on canvas; 158 × 122 cm | Private Collection; Courtesy of the artist and Nils Stærk

116 **Rudolf Stingel**
Untitled; 1993; oil and enamel on canvas; 101.6 × 101.6 cm | Christie's Images Limited; © 2017. Christie's Images, London/Scala, Florence
Asger Jorn
Untitled (detail pp 114–115); 1961; crayon and graphite on parchment paper; 70 × 48 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Asger Jorn/VISDA; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

117 **Steven Parrino**
Spin-Out Vortex 2; 2000; enamel on canvas; 182 × 182 cm | Private Collection; © Steven Parrino; Courtesy the Parrino Family Estate and Gagosian Gallery

118 **Christian Vind**
If Then the Light Within You Is Darkness, How Great Is That Darkness (thumbnail p 127); 2008; chalk on blackboard; 120 × 150 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

119 **Claus Carstensen**
False Light; 2007; inkjet, acrylic and spray on canvas; 179 × 127 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

120 **Tim Berresheim**
Ticky Times IV; 2005; photograph; 40 × 30 cm | Private Collection; Courtesy of the artist
Tim Berresheim
Ticky Times VI; 2005; photograph; 40 × 30 cm | Private Collection; Courtesy of the artist

121 **Tim Berresheim**
Ticky Times V; 2005; photograph; 40 × 30 cm | Private Collection; Courtesy of the artist
Tim Berresheim
Ticky Times II; 2005; photograph; 40 × 30 cm | Private Collection; Courtesy of the artist

132 **Claus Carstensen**
Agent; 2012; acrylic, posca marker, spray and collage on canvas; 180 × 150 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg
Niccolò Boldrini
Saint Francis Receiving the Stigmata (After Titian); undated, later impression; woodcut; 29.6 × 43.7 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Image courtesy: Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

133 **Jeffrey Silverthorne**
Young Woman, Morgue Work (detail pp 130–131); 1974; photograph; 40.5 × 50.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg
Jeffrey Silverthorne
Lovers, Accidental Carbon Monoxide Poisoning, Morgue Work; 1972–1974; photograph; 40.5 × 50.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

134 **Jeffrey Silverthorne**
Police Photographers with Husband and Wife Killed on Their Motorcycle by Drunk Driver, Morgue Work; 1972–1974; photograph; 40.5 × 50.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg
anonymous
The Green Overgrown Skull; undated; drypoint; 20.2 × 14.8 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

135 **Rudolf Stingel**
Untitled; 1990; oil and enamel on canvas; 240 × 204.5cm | © 2017. Christie's Images, London/Scala, Florence

138 **Henry Peder Riksted**
Indian Suicide; 1937; oil on paper mounted on cardboard; 28.5 × 19.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg*

139 **John Heartfield**
6 Million Nazi Voters: Fodder for a Big Mouth—And That's the Fish I Elected; 1930; offset; 64 × 48 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © John Heartfield/VISDA; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

140 **David Griggs**
The Sort of Black Claymore Paintings # 1; 2010; oil and collage on canvas; 25 × 20 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

141 **David Griggs**
The Sort of Black Claymore Paintings # 2; 2010; oil and collage on canvas; 36 × 26 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

142 **Manuel Ocampo**
Penetrator Inseminator; 2016; oil and digital print on canvas; 125 × 90 cm | © Courtesy of Manuel Ocampo and Marie Kirkegaard Gallery

143 **Hannes Hirche**
Nazi Mothers Are Having a Hard Time; 2006; graphite on paper; 20.7 × 14.6 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

144 **Sam Kiyoumarsi**
Untitled (detail pp 136–137); 2007; photograph; 30.5 × 46 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

145 **Claus Carstensen**
Painting with a Hammer to Nail the Crotch of Civilization—A Group Show of Wall Works and Tattoo Imagery Organised by Manuel Ocampo; 2010; c-print; 70 × 52.5 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg
anonymous
County of Los Angeles—Office of Chief-Coroner. Body. Full Length Anterior. Sharon Tate Polanski; 1969; offset; 72 × 52 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

152 **Asger Jorn**
The Golden Pig; 1950; oil on canvas;

50 × 100 cm | Museum Jorn; © Donation Jorn, Silkeborg/Asger Jorn/VISDA; © Photo: Lars Bay

153 Asger Jorn
The Eagle's Share II; 1951; oil on masonite; 74.5 × 60 cm | Museum Jorn; © Donation Jorn, Silkeborg/Asger Jorn/VISDA; © Photo: Lars Bay

158 Steven Parrino
Stockade (Existential Trap for Speed Freaks); 1988–1991; enamel on canvas; 193 × 264.2 cm | Private Collection; © Steven Parrino; Courtesy of the Parrino Family Estate and Gagosian Gallery

159 Max Klinger
Cupid, Death and the Beyond, plate XII, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 45 × 63 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

160 Max Klinger
Bear and Elf (thumbnail p 127), plate I, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 63 × 45 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Max Klinger
Battling Centaurs, plate V, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 63 × 45 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

161 Max Klinger
Landslide, plate VI, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 63 × 45 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Max Klinger
Moonlight, plate IV, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 63 × 45 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

162 Max Klinger
Simplicius Writing Lesson, plate VII, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 63 × 45 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Max Klinger
Simplicius in the Wilderness, plate X, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 45 × 63 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

163 Max Klinger
Simplicius Among the Soldiers, plate IX, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 45 × 63 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Max Klinger
Fallen Rider, plate XI, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 63 × 45 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

164 Max Klinger
Pursued Centaur, plate III, *Intermezzi, Opus IV* (detail pp 156–157); 1879–1881; etching; 45 × 63 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Max Klinger
By the Sea, plate II, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 45 × 63 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

165 Max Klinger
Simplicius at the Hermits Grave, plate VIII, *Intermezzi, Opus IV*; 1879–1881; etching; 63 × 45 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

168 PS Krøyer
Swan Banquet at B (detail pp 166–167); 1907; charcoal and gouache on paper; 34 × 38 cm | Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; Courtesy of the Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart and the Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: www.BoAmstrup.com

168–169 Egebjerg
Law and Order; circa 1940; ink on paper, front and back; 62 × 77 cm | Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; Courtesy of the Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: Geir Hauksson

170–171 Vilhelm Hansen
The Pixie Ship; circa 1930; oil on canvas; 77 × 187 cm | Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; Courtesy of the Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: www.BoAmstrup.com

171 Aroldo Bonzagni
The Hanging Tree;
1911; tempera on cardboard; 257 × 87 cm | Galleria Antologia Monza; Courtesy of Galleria Antologia

172 Claus Carstensen
It Conquered the World (for Tilli) (thumbnail p 127); 2012; acrylic, posca marker, spray and collage on canvas; 200 × 156 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

173 Gardar Eide Einarsson
Psychobuildings; 2012; acrylic on canvas; 213 × 183 cm | Courtesy of the artist and Nils Stærk

174 Rune Christian Clausen
Schizophrenia; 2005; acrylic on canvas; 40 × 30 cm | Courtesy of the artist's family

175 Hans Ulrik Larsen
Europe—The Book of Revelation World War I Donatello; 1978; acrylic on hardboard; 102 × 125 cm | Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; Courtesy of the artist and the Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: www.BoAmstrup.com

176 Antonin Artaud
Portrait of Jacques Marie Prével; 1947; graphite on paper; 57.4 × 45.6 cm | Centre Pompidou—Musée national d'art moderne—Centre de création industrielle, Paris; © ADAGP, Paris; © Antonin Artaud/VISDA; © Photo Centre Pompidou, MNAM-CCI, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais/Philippe Migeat

177 Jens Lund
The Flower of Horror; 1898; indian ink on paper; 34 × 24.2 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

Jens Lund
Composition; 1900; indian ink on paper; 52.5 × 36.5 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

178 Annette Kjær Jensen
Untitled; 1975; charcoal on paper; 47 × 60 cm | Courtesy of Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: www.BoAmstrup.com

Annette Kjær Jensen
Untitled; undated; charcoal on paper; 29.5 × 21 cm | Courtesy of Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: Geir Hauksson

Annette Kjær Jensen
Untitled; undated; charcoal on paper; 60 × 46 cm | Courtesy of Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: www.BoAmstrup.com

180 Antonin Artaud
The Theatre of Cruelty; 1946; graphite and wax crayon on paper; 62 × 46 cm | Centre Pompidou—Musée national d'art moderne—Centre de création industrielle, Paris; © ADAGP, Paris; © Antonin Artaud/VISDA; © Centre Pompidou, MNAM-CCI, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais/Philippe Migeat

Antonin Artaud
Self Portrait; 1948; graphite on paper; 65 × 50 cm | Centre Pompidou—Musée national d'art moderne—Centre de création industrielle, Paris; © ADAGP, Paris; © Antonin Artaud/VISDA; © Centre Pompidou, MNAM-CCI, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais/Philippe Migeat

181 Antonin Artaud
The Blue Head; 1946; graphite and wax crayon on paper; 63 × 48 cm | Centre Pompidou—Musée national d'art moderne—Centre de création industrielle, Paris; © ADAGP, Paris; © Antonin Artaud/VISDA; © Centre Pompidou, MNAM-CCI, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais/Philippe Migeat

182 Unica Zürn
Untitled; 1962; ink on paper; 31.4 × 23.5 cm | Courtesy of The Ulla and Heiner Pietzsch Collection, Berlin; © For the reprinting: Verlag Brinkmann & Bose, Berlin, Germany; © Photo: Jens Ziehe, Berlin

183 Hans Bellmer
Portrait of Unica Zürn; 1954; oil and collage on wood; 38 × 44.3 cm | Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Nationalgalerie, Sammlung Scharf-Gerstenberg; © bpk/Nationalgalerie, SMB, Sammlung Scharf-Gerstenberg/Jörg p Anders; © Hans Bellmer/VISDA

184 Unica Zürn
Untitled; 1960; ink on paper; 30 × 21 cm | Privatsammlung; © For the reprinting: Verlag Brinkmann & Bose, Berlin, Germany

185 Unica Zürn
Untitled; 1956; ink on paper; 31 × 23.5 cm | Privatsammlung; © For the reprinting: Verlag Brinkmann & Bose, Berlin, Germany

190 Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

196 Jens Lund
My Black Flower; 1898; graphite and indian ink on paper; 25.9 × 41.2 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Pernille Klemp

197 Gardar Eide Einarsson
Anti-Social (Female); 2004; acrylic on canvas; 150 × 120 cm | Private Collection; Courtesy of the artist and Nils Stærk

198 Jens Lund
Adam; 1912; graphite, indian ink and watercolour on paper; 47.5 × 29.4 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Pernille Klemp

Max Klinger
Adam; 1893; etching; 29.5 × 26.5 cm | Esbjerg Art Museum; Courtesy of Esbjerg Art Museum

199 Max Klinger
The Snake; 1893; etching; 29 × 15.5 cm | Esbjerg Art Museum; Courtesy of Esbjerg Art Museum

Jens Lund
Eve and the Snake; 1913; drypoint; 28.8 × 19.1 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Pernille Klemp

200 CF Hill
The Earth Was Filled with Violence; undated; black chalk on paper; 30 × 20 cm | Kulturen in Lund; Courtesy of Kulturen Lund Sweden; © Photo Kulturen Lund Sweden

201 CF Hill
Untitled (Eve Tempting with the Apple); undated; black chalk on paper; 37 × 46.9 cm | Malmö Art Museum; © Carl Fredrik Hill, reproduced by Johanna Rylander/Malmö Konstmuseum

202 Félicien Rops
Transformism I (detail pp 194–195); undated; heliogravure; 12.5 × 16.5 cm | The Félicien Rops Museum, Namur; © Atelier de l'Imagier/musée Rops

203 Paul Gauguin
Design for a Plate (Leda); 1889; zincograph; 22 × 20.5 cm | Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; Courtesy of Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

206 John Heartfield
War and Corpses—The Last Hope of the Rich (detail pp 204–205, thumbnail p 124); 1932; offset; 48 × 64 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © John Heartfield/VISDA; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

206–207 Claus Carstensen
Puppy; 2015; acrylic, posca marker and spray paint on canvas; 295 × 475 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

208 JF Willumsen
The Belgian Prisoner; 1918; 42.5 × 55.5 cm | aquatint; JF Willumsens Museum; © JF Willumsens Museum/JF Willumsen/VISDA; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

JF Willumsen
Untitled Sketch for The Belgian Prisoner; 1918; graphite on paper; 22.5 × 35 cm | JF Willumsens Museum; © JF Willumsens Museum/JF Willumsen/VISDA; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

209 JF Willumsen
Untitled Sketch for The Belgian Prisoner; 1918; graphite on paper; 35 × 45 cm |JF Willumsens Museum;© JF Willumsens Museum/JF Willumsen/VISDA; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

JF Willumsen
Two Dead Soldiers; 1917; aquatint; 32.5 × 21.2 cm | JF Willumsens Museum; © JF Willumsens Museum/JF Willumsen/VISDA; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

212 Martin Schongauer
Untitled; 1469–1484; drypoint; 18.3 × 23 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

213 Martin Schongauer
Untitled; 1469–1484; drypoint; 23 × 18.3 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

214 Martin Schongauer
Untitled; 1469–1484; drypoint; 23 × 18.3 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Martin Schongauer
Untitled; 1469–1484; drypoint; 23 × 18.3 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

215 Martin Schongauer
Untitled; 1469–1484; drypoint; 23 × 18.3 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

216 Claus Carstensen
Kaum Fleisch (detail pp 210–212); 2012; acrylic, posca marker, spray and collage on canvas; 180 × 150 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

216–217 Bjarne Melgaard
Untitled; 2005; oil on canvas; 200 × 300 cm | Collection Gunnar and Trine Kjems; Courtesy of Collection Gunnar and Trine Kjems;

220–221 Hans Bellmer
Untitled; 1946; graphite on paper; 16.3 × 24.6 cm | Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Nationalgalerie, Sammlung Scharf-Gerstenberg; © bpk/Nationalgalerie, SMB, Sammlung Scharf-Gerstenberg/Jörg p Anders; © Hans Bellmer/VISDA

221 William Mortensen
Human Relations (detail pp 218–219); 1932; silver gelatine print; 24.8 × 19.7 cm | Courtesy of the Dennis Reed Collection

222 William Mortensen
Untitled (Male-Female 2); circa 1926; photograph; 29.7 × 23 cm | Hereward Carrington Estate

223 William Mortensen
Untitled (Incubus Variation 3) (thumbnail p 33); circa 1926; photograph; 23 × 29.7 cm | Hereward Carrington Estate

224 JF Willumsen
Fertility; 1891; etching; 21.8 × 29.7 cm | JF Willumses Museum; © JF Willumsens Museum/JF Willumsen/VISDA.dk

Hans Ulrik Larsen
8 Weeks Abortion; 1978; acrylic on masonite; 65 × 48.5 cm | Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; Courtesy of the artist and the Psychiatric Museum, Middelfart; © Photo: Geir Hauksson

225 Werner Büttner
Alongside Faeces and Urine, You Were Pushed Into This World (thumbnail p 123); 2014; oil on canvas; 150 × 120 cm | Courtesy of the artist

226 Hans Bellmer
Small Moral Treaty, Crimes of Love; 1966–1968; colour etching; 37.8 × 28.3 cm | Museum Jorn; © Donation Jorn, Silkeborg; © Hans Bellmer/VISDA; © Photo: Lars Bay

226–227 Claus Carstensen
Dead Sheep Giving Birth—Somewhere between Dagebüll and Neukirchen, May 2009; 2009; c-print; 52.5 × 70 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

228 Anton Hansen
Child Coffin; circa 1920; woodcut; 25 × 19.2 cm | Courtesy of the Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts © Workers Museum & Arbejderbevægelsen's Library and Archive; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

George Grosz
Circe; undated; book print; 20 × 16 cm | Courtesy of the Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © George Grosz/VISDA; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

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Untitled; 1946; graphite on paper; 24.6 × 16.3 cm | Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Nationalgalerie, Sammlung Scharf-Gerstenberg; © bpk/Nationalgalerie, SMB, Sammlung Scharf-Gerstenberg/Jörg p Anders; © Hans Bellmer/VISDA

229 Johannes Holbek
Death; 1898; ink on paper; 52.6 × 37.1 cm | Museum Jorn; © Donation Jorn, Silkeborg; © Photo: Lars Bay

Johannes Holbek
Art Is Form of Life; 1898; ink on paper; 56.1 × 35.1 cm | Museum Jorn; © Donation Jorn, Silkeborg; © Photo: Lars Bay

232 Theodor Kittelsen
The Plague Is Coming; 1896; book print; 36 × 29 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg;

233 Gardar Eide Einarsson
The Plague (detail pp 230–231); 2008; acrylic and graphite on canvas; 200 × 129.5 cm | Private Collection; Courtesy of the artist and Nils Stærk

234 Gudmund Hentze
A Body Collector Hands Over a Baby to a Vulture, illustration for JP Jacobsen's *The Plague in Bergamo*; 1921; woodcut; 29.5 × 23 cm | Private Collection; © Gudmund Hentze/VISDA

234–235 JP Jacobsen
Untitled (JP Jacobsen's blotting pad); undated; ink on paper; 28 × 44.5 cm | © The Royal Library, Denmark, The Manuscript Collection, Troensegaard Autografsamling II

238 Victor Hugo
Consciousness Before a Bad Action; 1866; ink on paper; 13 × 23 cm | Maison Victor Hugo; © Maisons de Victor Hugo/Roger-Viollet;

Victor Hugo
The Spirit of the Storm in Front of Gilliatt; undated; ink on paper; 40 × 30 cm | Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF), Paris; © BnF, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais/image BnF

239 Victor Hugo
The White Opened His Eyes Wide and the Black Pouted; undated; ink on vellum; 13.9 × 13.1 cm | Maison Victor Hugo; © Maisons de Victor Hugo/Roger-Viollet

240 Storm P
Afraid of the Dark—Fear of the Night; circa 1907; indian ink, watercolour and gouache on paper; 37.2 × 26.8 cm | The Storm P Museum; © Courtesy of The Storm P Museum

Jens Lund
Oh Darkness That Devours Worlds; 1904; indian ink on paper; 64 × 50.6 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

241 Jens Lund
And I Saw the Sky Open... The Apocalypse; 1900; indian ink on paper; 78 × 55.2 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

242 Jens Lund
While Millions of Planets Cease to Exist, Our Planet Floats Like a Smiling Soap Bubble Through Space (detail pp 236–237); 1899; graphite and indian ink on paper; 37.4 × 55 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

243 Jens Lund
Fire Ball; 1899; indian ink on paper; 72.6 × 51.1 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

246 Gardar Eide Einarsson
Untitled (Stance) (thumbnail p 124); 2008; inkjet print on plywood; 200 × 120 cm | Private collection; Courtesy of the artist and Nils Stærk

247 Jens Lund
The Chimera from Nôtre Dame de Paris; 1909; oil on canvas; 65 × 81 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

248 Alfred Kubin
Power; 1900; ink on paper; 30.9 × 26.6 cm | Lenbachhaus Gallery, München; © The Städtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus und Kunstbau München; © Alfred Kubin/VISDA

Gardar Eide Einarsson
Only Because It's Against the Law; 2007; inkjet on plywood; 200 × 120 cm | Private collection; Courtesy of the artist

249 Zven Balslev
Untitled (detail pp 244–245); 2008; oil on canvas; 123 × 91 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

254 Cristina García Rodero
Cristina García Rodero photographs of Spanish festivals; circa 1975-1992; photograph | Cristina García Rodero Collection, Research Library, The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles, California (90.R.34)

Timothy Takemoto
Lacan's Borromean Knot; 2012 | www.flickr.com; CC

256 anonymous
Pyongyang, North Korea: Museum of the Revolution; undated

260 Romeo Lee
Goli; 2004; oil on canvas; 30 × 40.5 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg;

261 Ursula Reuter Christiansen
At Bakkehøjgård (detail pp 258–259); 1977; oil on canvas; 62.5 × 80 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; Courtesy of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

262 Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

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Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

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Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

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Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Claus Carstensen
Series of Eleven Defaced Linocuts by Georg Sluyterman von Langeweyde; 2013; posca marker on linocut; 21.8 × 15.7 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

268 Michael Ostendorfer
Mars Saturn; 1533, early 19th-century impression; woodcut; 12 × 10.3 cm | Courtesy of Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

Odilon Redon
There Was Perhaps a First Vision Attempted in the Flower; 1883; lithograph; 51.1 × 35.6 cm | The Stickney Collection, Art Institute of Chicago; © 2017. The Art Institute of Chicago/Art Resource, NY/Scala, Florence

269 Alfred Kubin
Saturn; 1937; indian ink on paper; 39 × 31 cm | Museum Jorn; © Donation Jorn, Silkeborg; © Photo: Lars Bay

Odilon Redon
The Misshapen Polyp Floated on the Shores, a Sort of Smiling and Hideous Cyclops; 1883; lithograph; 53 × 34.5 cm | Museum of Modern Art (MoMA); © 2017.

Digital image, the Museum of Modern Art, New York/Scala, Florence

270 **Odilon Redon**
When Life Was Awakening in the Depths of Obscure Matter, 1883; lithograph; 47.5 × 34.5 cm | The Stickney Collection, Art Institute of Chicago; © 2017. The Art Institute of Chicago/Art Resource, NY/ Scala, Florence

270–271 **Paul Gauguin**
Dramas of the Sea—Descent into the Maelstrom, 1889; zincograph; 18.2 × 27.7 cm | Courtesy of Schools of Visual Arts—The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts; © Photo: Anu Ramdas

271 **Jens Lund**
Forest of the Madness; 1900; indian ink on paper;
47.3 × 67.3 cm | Vejen Art Museum; Courtesy of Vejen Art Museum; © Photo: Pernille Klemp

272 **Werner Büttner**
On Evil I; 1983; oil on canvas; 150 × 190 cm | Courtesy of the artist

Werner Büttner
Art. 16, "Ones German Citizenship Can Not Be Deprived"; 1983; oil on canvas; 95 × 140 cm | Courtesy of the artist

273 **Werner Büttner**
Art. 19, "No Fundamental Right Can in Its Essence Be Violated"; 1983; oil on canvas; 79 × 120 cm | Courtesy of the artist

Werner Büttner
Art. 4, "The Freedom of Faith, Conscience and Religion Is Inviolable"; 1983; oil on canvas; 95 × 95 cm | Courtesy of the artist

274 **Max Klinger**
Second Future; 1893; etching and aquatint; 19.5 × 16.5 cm | Esbjerg Art Museum; Esbjerg Art Museum

275 **Max Klinger**
Third Future; 1893; 19.5 × 16.5 cm | etching; Esbjerg Art Museum; Esbjerg Art Museum

276 **Claus Carstensen**
Defaced Poster (detail pp 266–267); 2011; acrylic on photocopy; 91.4 × 119.5 cm | Collection of the artist; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

AP Hansen
Untitled; 2006; spray and offset mounted on hardboard (anonymously defaced election poster); 80 × 60 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

Pia Olsen Dyhr;
Investment in the Human Being; 2015; marker and offset mounted on hardboard (anonymously defaced election poster); 82 × 61 cm | Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg

277 **Matias Faldbakken**
The Name of a Person That I Want Dead Written in X's; 2006; photo retouching paint on photo paper; 21 × 29 cm | Courtesy of the artist and STANDARD (OSLO), Oslo; © Photo: Vegard Kleven

Matias Faldbakken
One Line for Every Enemy #10; 2008–2009; photo retouching paint on photo paper; 29.7 × 42 cm | Courtesy of the artist and STANDARD (OSLO); © Photo: Vegard Kleven

281 **Pier Paolo Pasolini**
Two stills from Pier Paolo Pasolini's; *Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom*; 1975; offset; 24 × 34 cm each; Collection Claus Carstensen; © Photo: Anders Sune Berg;

EXCERPTS

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14 **Goya, Francisco,** *Los Caprichos*, New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1969, p 40.
Goya, *Los Caprichos*, p 51.

15 **Editor's comment.**
Editor's comment.

16 **Goya,** *Los Caprichos*, p 37.
Goya, *Los Caprichos*, p 41.

17 **Goya,** *Los Caprichos*, p 39.
Goya, *Los Caprichos*, p 68.

18 **Goya,** *Los Caprichos*, p 77.

28 **Wimmer, Walter,** Portfolio of offset print: John Heartfield, *33 Fotomontagen*, John Peet trans, Dresden: VEB Verlag der Kunst, 1974.
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29 **Carstensen, Claus,** *F.T.*, Aarhus: Antipyrine, 2016, p 87.

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98 **Gourevitch, Philip**, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families – Stories from Rwanda*, Picador, London, 2000, p 15.
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99 **Gourevitch**, *We Wish to Inform You...*, p 128.
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132 **Lacan, Jacques**, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Pshycho-Analysis*, Jacques-Alain Miller (eds), Alan Sheridan trans, New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 1981, p 67.

142 **Ocampo, Manuel**, wall-text excerpt from *Sweating the Green-Bird Parrot Out*, Marie Kirkegaard Gallery, 2016.

158 **Artforum**. © Artforum, January 3, 2005, "Steven Parrino, Forty-Six, Dies after Motorcycle Accident."

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168 **Jacobsen, A Thune,** from the archive of Middelfart Psychiatric Museum

169 **Director's comment,** Middelfart Psychiatric Museum

170 **The Museum Committee,** from the archive of Middelfart Psychiatric Museum

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227 **Schopenhauer**, *The World as Will and Representation*, p 277.

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261 **Editor's comment**

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To all the artists included in this book and all the lenders to the exhibition.

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Jeffrey Silverthorne
Lovers, Accidental Carbon Monoxide Poisoning, Morgue Work (detail)
1972-1974

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